Karnataka High Court
V Balasubramanya @ Balender Venkata vs State Of Karnataka By The Secretary on 2 June, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 02ND DAY OF JUNE, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.22611 OF 2005 (GM - SLUM)
C/W
WRIT PETITION No.20955 OF 2005 (GM - SLUM)
WRIT PETITION No.21192 OF 2005 (GM - SLUM)
IN WRIT PETITION No.22611 OF 2005
BETWEEN:
SRI B.R.MURALIDHAR
S/O B.V.RATHAN KUMAR
AGED ABOUT 22 YEARS,
RESIDING AT NO.175/193,
4TH MAIN, 5TH CROSS,
CHAMARAJPET
BENGALURU - 560 018.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI M.SHIVAPRAKASH, ADVOCATE)
2
AND:
1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
M.S.BUILDING,
DR.B.R.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU - 01.
2 . THE UNDER SECRETARY
TO GOVERNMENT,
HOUSING DEPARTMENT,
M.S.BUILDING,
DR.B.R.AMBEDKAR VEEDHI
BENGALURU - 01.
3 . KARNATAKA SLUM CLEARANCE BOARD
BY ITS SECRETARY,
NO.55, RESILDAR ROAD,
SESHADRIPURAM,
BENGALURU - 20.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI RAHUL CARIAPPA K.S., HCGP FOR R-1 AND R-2;
SRI B.B.PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R-3)
3
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO QUASH THE
NOTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE R2 THE UNDER SECRETARY,
HOUSING DEPARTMENT BEARING NO.HD 34 SCB 2004,
DT.23.6.2005 AT ANN-F AND ETC.,
IN WRIT PETITION No.20955 OF 2005
BETWEEN:
V.BALASUBRAMANYA @ BALENDER VENKATA
S/O LATE VENKATASUBBA RAO
RESIDING AT NO.362, 12TH CROSS MAIN,
HIG, RMV II STAGE,
BENGALURU - 560 094.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI ABHINAV RAMANAND, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
M.S.BUILDING,
DR.B.R.AMBEDKAR ROAD
BENGALURU - 01.
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2 . THE UNDER SECRETARY-I
HOUSING DEPARTMENT,
M.S.BUILDING,
DR.B.R.AMBEDKAR ROAD
BENGALURU - 01.
3 . KARNATAKA SLUM CLEARANCE BOARD
BY ITS SECRETARY,
NO.55, RESILDAR ROAD,
SESHADRIPURAM,
BENGALURU - 20.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI RAHUL CARIAPPA K.S., HCGP FOR R-1 AND R-2;
SRI B.B.PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R-3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO DECLARE AND
QUASH BY ISSUE OF WRIT IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI OR
MANDAMUS THE NOTIFICATION NO.HD 34 SCB 2004 DATED
23.6.2005 (PRODUCED VIDE ANNEXURE - 'T') ISSUED BY THE
UNDER SECRETARY-1, HOUSING DEPARTMENT AND ETC.,
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IN WRIT PETITION No.21192 OF 2005
BETWEEN:
M/S. CHANDRA SPINNING AND
WEAVING MILLS PVT. LTD.,
HAVING ITS OFFICE AT: 9TH CROSS
5TH MAIN ROAD, CHAMARAJPET,
BENGALURU - 560 018
REPRESENTED BY ITS DIRECTOR
M.MANOHAR
S/O LATE MADHAVA KRISHNAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI L.M.CHIDANANDAYYA, ADVOCATE A/W
SRI AMITH L.M., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY THE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
M.S.BUILDING,
DR. B.R.AMBEDKAR ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 001.
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2 . THE UNDER SECRETARY - 1
HOUSING DEPARTMENT
M.S.BUILDING,
DR. AMBEDKAR ROAD
BENGALURU - 560 001.
3 . KARNATAKA SLUM CLEARANCE BOAD
NO.55, RESILDAR ROAD,
SHESHADRIPURAM
BENGALURU - 560 020,
BY ITS SECRETARY.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI RAHUL CARIAPPA K.S., HCGP FOR R-1 AND R-2;
SRI B.B.PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R-3)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT
IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI BY QUASHING THE IMPUGNED
NOTIFICATION NO.HD 34 SCB 2004 DATED 23.06.2005
(PRODUCED VIDE ANNEXURE-A) ISSUED BY THE UNDER
SECRETARY-1, HOUSING DEPARTMENT AND ETC.,
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THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
Batch of these petitions call in question a notification
declaring the subject properties in these petitions to be a slum
under the provisions of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement
and Clearance) Act 1973 ('the Act' for short).
2. Heard Sri M Shivaprakash, learned counsel appearing for
petitioner in W.P.No.22611 of 2005; Sri Abhinav Ramanand,
learned counsel appearing for petitioner in W.P.No.20955 of 2005;
Sri L.M. Chidanandayya, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner in W.P.No.21192 of 2005, Sri K.S. Rahul Cariappa,
learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for
respondents/State and Sri B.B.Patil, learned counsel appearing for
the Board.
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3. Before embarking upon consideration of the issue on its
merit, I deem it appropriate to notice the protagonists in the case
at hand. The petitioner in W.P.No.21192 of 2005 is M/s Chandra
Spinning & Weaving Mills Private Limited (hereinafter referred to as
'the Company' for short); Respondents 1 and 2 are the State in the
Department of Housing and Respondent No.3 is the Karnataka Slum
Clearance Board. In Writ Petition No.20955 of 2005 the petitioner is
an individual land owner and the respondents are the same. Writ
Petition No.22611 of 2005 is again by a land owner and the
respondents are the same.
4. Facts, in brief, which are germane are as follows:
For convenience, the facts obtaining in W.P.No.21192 of 2005
are considered. In the year 1942 the Managing Director of the
petitioner/ Company D.R. Madhava Krishnaiah purchases lands in
Site No.86 and 87 of Sy.No.65, Gavipura Village. The said lands
are then transferred to the company by the Managing Director
through a registered Sale Deed dated 30-08-1956. The Site Nos.86
and 87 are subsequently renumbered as Site Nos.76, 77 and 78 on
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being included within the Corporation limits of Bangalore City. On
30-08-1956 the petitioner also purchases land in Sy.No.16
measuring 22 guntas situated in Karithimmenahalli in terms of a
registered sale deed. Likewise, lands in Sy.No.65/2 measuring 1
acre and 10 guntas and another 14 guntas in Gavipura Village,
Bangalore was purchased in public auction in Execution proceedings
in Execution Case No.35 of 1964. Thus, the petitioner/Company
held the aforesaid lands.
5. On 11-12-1974 the Government of Karnataka issues a
notification declaring Sy.Nos. 63, 64, 65, 66 then known as
Venkataraman Huts, Gavipuram Village as a slum area under
Section 3(1) of the Act. The moment notification comes to be
issued, one of the land owner of the lands proposed to be acquired
on such declaration to be a slum, called in question the said
notification dated 11-12-1974 in Writ Petition No.2405 of 1975. This
Court, in terms of its order dated 27-08-1976 allowed the petition,
quashed the notification insofar as it related to the land belonging
to the petitioner therein, on the ground that the petitioner was not
heard while issuing the notification, which would mean that no
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preliminary notification was issued. The petitioner herein also sings
the same swan song.
6. After compliance with the order passed by this Court in
Writ Petition No.2405 of 1975, a notification again comes to be
issued on 16-06-1979 declaring 2 acres and 20 guntas of land in
Sy.Nos. 64 and 65 of Gavipura Village as a slum area. Another
notification comes to be issued on 06-10-1979 declaring other
survey numbers in Venkataraman Huts or Kudlimath Slum as a
slum area. On 22-02-1980 comes another notification declaring 6
acres and 30 guntas to be acquired under Section 17 of the Act and
called for objections from all the stake holders. This comes to be
challenged before this Court in Writ Petition No.2331 of 1981, which
comes to be allowed on the same ground of want of opportunity.
7. After the order passed by this Court, the respondent/Board
issues a tender notification calling for tender for construction of 720
tenements at Laggere Village, Nandini Layout, Bengaluru for
rehabilitation of slum dwellers of Venkataraman Huts/Kudlimath
slum. Thereafter, a preliminary notification again comes to be
11
issued calling for objections, in the light of the earlier notification
being quashed, for acquisition of 6 acres and 30 guntas for
rehabilitation of slum dwellers. The Housing Department is said to
have conducted a spot inspection in the presence of representatives
of the concerned parties and observes that the entire area is not
fully vacant, as there are some encroachment in the property which
was notification for acquisition in the year 1973. Objections were
then filed by all the stake holders when the preliminary notification
was issued.
8. The Government, on 13-03-2001, issues a final notification
rejecting the objections filed by the stake holders. Therefore,
objections are considered and final notification is issued after 19
years of issuance of preliminary notification. This comes to be
challenged before this Court in Writ Petition No.14251 of 2002
which comes to be rejected reserving liberty to challenge the final
notification, as objections had been considered. On 23-06-2005
another final notification comes to be issued, 4 years after rejection
of the objections; in all 23 years after issuance of the notification
under Section 11 of the Act. It is this that forms the challenge in
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Writ Petition No.21192 of 2005. It is the same notification that is
challenged in the other companion petitions of the year 2005.
9. A learned single Judge, on these petitions filed in the year
2005, to be specific on 08-09-2005, grants an order of status quo
and finally allows the petition in part, in terms of its order dated
20-09-2007 declaring that Section 20 of the Act was
unconstitutional, but did not quash the acquisition proceedings on
the ground that time limit was prescribed under the Act for issuance
of final notification. The Government of Karnataka tossed the said
order in Writ Appeal No.918 of 2008 before the Division Bench, as
the stake holders also filed writ appeal. The Division Bench, in
terms of its order dated 17-08-2012, dismisses the writ appeal filed
by the State and affirms the order of the learned single Judge, the
effect of which was Section 20 of the Act was declared
unconstitutional. Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the parties
approach the Apex Court in S.L.P.No.18942 of 2013. During the
pendency of the S.L.P., compensation was declared and awarded to
the land losers. The compensation was then transferred to the
Deputy Commissioner for its disbursement. The Apex Court grants
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leave and the matter is then converted into Civil Appeal No.1966 of
2013. This comes to be disposed of by an order dated 28-07-2022
remitting the matter back to the hands of this Court for
consideration afresh with regard to declaration of Section 20 to be
unconstitutional. It is, therefore, the matters are back to the doors
of this Court.
COMMON SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL
FOR THE PETITIONERS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
10. Notification dated 23-06-2005 issued under Section 17 of
the Act is bad in law on the ground of delay, as Section 11
Notification - preliminary was issued in the year 1982 and the final
notification in the year 2001. Therefore, it was issued after a delay
of 19 years. Objections of the petitioners were rejected after 19
years of their filing. It is their contention that such delay can never
be termed to be reasonable and, therefore, the proceedings should
be quashed. The learned counsel would seek to place reliance upon
the following judgments on the point of delay:
(i) RAM CHAND v. UNION OF INDIA
- 1994 (1) SCC 44;
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(ii) C.JACOB v. SECRETARY & ANOTHER
- 2020 SCC OnLine KAR 308;
(iii) H.S.ABDUL RIYAZ BASHA v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
- W.P.No.26117 of 2022;
(iv) GODREJ AND BOYCE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
LIMITED v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
- (2014) 3 SCC 430;
(v) M/S.P.M. SWIMMING CENTRE, BENGALURU v. BBMP
- 2022(1) AKR 5.
There is total non-application of mind in issuing the notification
under Section 17 of the Act. The schedule properties and other
notified areas are not required, since the respondents have already
rehabilitated the slum dwellers at Laggere slums. Once the slum
dwellers have been rehabilitated, the provisions under Sections 11
and 17 cannot be invoked. The award was not passed at the time of
issuance of the final notification, which is on 23-06-2005. The
award was passed on 22-11-2013. Section 20 is unconstitutional
and arbitrary as it runs counter to Articles 14 and 300A of the
Constitution since it prescribes compensation payable on the
property tax paid by the land owner. Section 20 depicts that
compensation would be paid 300 times the property tax paid by the
land owner. Even then, it is a meagre sum. Section 20 is said to be
15
unconstitutional on the score that it is manifestly arbitrary as runs
counter to Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution. The date on
which the impugned notification was issued the lands were vacant
and property tax was collected by the Bangalore City Corporation
then as a vacant land.
11. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/Board Sri. B.B. Patil would vehemently contend that the
Act is a special Act enacted for the purpose of acquisition of lands
for rehabilitation of slum dwellers and so the determination of
compensation for the acquired land on the basis of market value
provided under the Land Acquisition Act, 2013 does not arise, since
the special law i.e., the Act would prevail over the general law - the
Land Acquisition Act. The Act is a State law which receives the
assent of the President under Article 254(2) of the Constitution and
so would prevail over the Land Acquisition Act of 2013. The object
of the Act is removal of unhygienic and unsanitary conditions
prevailing in the slums for better accommodation and improved
living conditions for slum dwellers and promotion of public health,
which is the mandate of directive principles of State policy. He
16
would also seek to place reliance upon several judgments of the
Apex Court to buttress his submissions.
12. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the
material on record. In furtherance whereof, the issues that fall for
my consideration are:
(i) Whether the final notification issued on 23-06-2005 for
acquisition of various lands under Section 17 of the Act
is tenable in the eye of law?
(ii) Is section 20 of the Act unconstitutional?
Issue No.1:
(i) Whether the final notification issued on 23-06-2005 for
acquisition of various lands under Section 17 of the Act
is tenable in the eye of law?
13. Certain provisions of the Act are germane to be noticed.
They read as follows:
"3. Declaration of slum areas.- (1) Where the
Government is satisfied, that,-
(a) any area is or is likely to be a source of danger to health,
safety or convenience of the public of that area or of its
17
neighborhood, by reason of the area being low-lying,
insanitary, squalid, over-crowded or otherwise; or
(b) the buildings in any area, used or intended to be used for
human habitation are,-
(i) in any respects, unfit for human habitation; or
(ii) by reason of dilapidation, over crowding, faulty
arrangement and design of such buildings,
narrowness or faulty arrangement of streets, lack
of ventilation, light or sanitation facilities, or any
combination of these factors, detrimental to safety,
health or morals, it may, by notification, declare
such area to be a slum area.
(2) In determining whether a building is unfit for human
habitation, for the purposes of this Act regard shall be had to its
condition in respect of the following matters, that is to say,-
(i) repair,
(ii) stability,
(iii) freedom from damp,
(iv) natural light and air,
(v) water-supply,
(vi drainage and sanitary conveniences,
(vii) facilities for storage, preparation and cooking of
food and for the disposal of waste water, and the
building shall be deemed to be unfit as aforesaid, if
it is so defective in one or more of the said matters
that it is not reasonably suitable for occupation.
... ... ...
11. Power to declare any slum area to be slum
clearance area.- (1) Where the Government, on a report from
the Board or the prescribed authority or the local authority
concerned or the State Housing Board or an officer authorised
by the Government for this purpose is satisfied as respects any
slum area that the most satisfactory method of dealing with the
conditions in the area is the clearance of such area and the
demolition of all the buildings in the area, it may, by
notification, declare the area to be a slum clearance area, that is
to say, an area to be cleared of all buildings in accordance with
the provisions of this Act:
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Provided that before issuing such notification the
Government shall call upon the owners of the lands and
buildings in such slum area to show cause why such declaration
should not be made and after considering the cause if any,
shown by such owners, it may pass such orders as it may deem
fit.
(2) Any part of the slum area or any building in the slum
area which is not unfit for human habitation or dangerous or
injurious to safety, health or morals may be excluded from the
notification under sub-section (1) if the Government considers it
necessary.
(3) The notification under sub-section (1) shall specify
each of the buildings to be demolished and the area to be
cleared.
... ... ...
17. Power to acquire land.- Where the Government is
satisfied that, for the purpose of executing any work of
improvement in relation to any slum area or any building in
such area or for the purpose of re-developing any slum
clearance area, or for the purpose of rehabilitating slum
dwellers, it is necessary to acquire any land within, adjoining or
surrounded, by any such area, it may acquire the land by
publishing in the official Gazette, a notice to the effect that it
has been decided to acquire the land in pursuance of this
section:
Provided that before publishing such notice, the
Government shall call upon the owner or any other person who,
in the opinion of the Government, may be interested in such
land, to show cause why it should not be acquired; and after
considering the cause, if any, shown by the owner or any other
person interested in the land, the Government may pass such
orders as it deems fit.
... ... ...
20. Amount payable.- (1) The amount payable in
respect of any land acquired under this Act, shall be 1three
hundred]1 times the property tax payable in respect of such
land on the date of publication of the notice referred to in
section 17, under the municipal law applicable to such area and
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where no such property tax is payable in respect of such land,
the property tax payable in respect of similar land adjacent
thereto.
(2) The prescribed authority shall, after holding an
enquiry in the prescribed manner, determine by order the
amount payable under sub-section (1) and publish the said
order in the official Gazette. A copy of the said order shall be
communicated to the owner of the land and every person
interested therein.
(3) Where the owner of the land and the owner of the
building on such land are different, the prescribed authority
shall apportion the amount between the owner of the land and
the owner of the building (in the same proportion as the value
of the land bears to the value of the building on the date of the
acquisition)."
Section 3 of the Act empowers the Government to declare a
particular area to be a slum. It permits the Government to declare
any area to be a source of danger to health, safety of the public
inter alia to declare the said area as a slum. Section 11 depicts
power to declare any slum area to be a slum clearance area by
issuance of a notification specifying each of the buildings to be
demolished and the area to be cleared for clearance of the slum and
its rehabilitation. Section 17 deals with power to acquire land.
Section 17 mandates that if the Government is satisfied that for the
purpose of executing any work of improvement in relation to any
slum area or rehabilitation lands can be acquired. Section 20 states
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that amounts payable is in the nature of compensation for the
acquired land under Section 17 and would be subject to payment
under Section 20. Section 20 mandates payment 300 times the
property tax prevailing then. The aforesaid are the ones that are
necessary to be considered in the case at hand.
14. The dates and the link in the chain of events are not in
dispute. The final notification comes to be issued on 23-06-2005
under Section 17 of the Act. The preliminary notification was issued
invoking Section 11 of the Act on 14-10-1982 of the subject lands.
In fact, there were two preliminary notifications, as the earlier
notifications issued both preliminary and final were quashed by this
Court and all of which have become final. Therefore, preliminary
notification issued on 22-08-1982 reads as follows:
"KARNATAKA SLUM CLEARANCE BOARD
Tender Notification No. Office of the Chairman
KSCB/EE/HD/Tender Karnataka Slum Clearance
Notification No.5/82-83 Board, No.112, 11th Cross,
5th Main, Malleshwaram,
Bangalore-560 003
Date: 28th August, 1982.
Sealed tenders in the prescribed form in duplicate on item
rate basis superscribed with the name of work on the cover are
invited from the Registered Contractors of Karnataka Public
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Works Department for the following works and will be received
by the Executive Engineer, Karnataka Slum Clearance Board,
Bangalore on behalf of the Chairman, Karnataka Slum Clearance
Board, Bangalore-3 up to 4.00 p.m. on 30-09-1982 and will be
opened on the same day if possible at 4.30 p.m. or any date
following the above date by the Executive Engineer, No.1
Division, Karnataka Slum Clearance Board, Bangalore in the
presence of the tenderers or their authorized representatives
who may desire to be present. Blank tender forms consisting of
detailed plan, complete specifications, the schedule of quantities
of various classes of work to be done and the set of conditions
of contract can be purchased from the office of the Chairman,
Karnataka Slum Clearance Board, Bangalore-3 on application
along with attested copy of registration certificate and on
payment of amount noted against each work (Non refundable)
during office working hours from 24-09-1982 to 28-09-1982.
Further the contractors are requested to submit the list of works
on hand with them under execution and proof of satisfactory
completion of works entrusted to them by any Government
Department along with the application for tender. Further
particulars, if any, required can be had from the office of the
Executive Engineer, Karnataka Slum Clearance Board,
Bangalore-3 on all working days. Competent Authority to
accept the tender reserved the right to reject any or all the
tenders without assigning any reason."
After issuance of the preliminary notification quoted supra, a
notification is issued on 14-10-1982 by the Housing and Urban
Development Department. It reads as follows:
"HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT SECRETARIAT
Notification-II No. HUD 192 MCS 82
Bangalore, dated 14th October, 1982.
Whereas the area specified in the Schedule to the
Notification No. HUD 63 MCS 77 dated 28th September, 1979/5th
October 1979 has been declared as a slum clearance area under
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Section 11 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and
Clearance) Act, 1973.
Whereas the Government of Karnataka is satisfied that
for the purpose of rehabilitating slum dwellers, it is necessary to
acquire the lands specified in the Schedule below, and proposes
to do so under Section 17 of the Karnataka Slum Areas
(Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 (Karnataka Act No.33
of 1974).
Public notice is hereby given calling upon any person
interested in the said lands to show cause why they should not
be acquired.
Any representation against the said proposal may be sent
to the Secretary to Government, Housing and Urban
Development Department, Visveswaraiah Centre, Dr. Ambedkar
Veedhi, Bangalore-560 001, within 15 (fifteen) days from the
date of publication of this notification."
It is here that the public notice was given calling upon any person
interested in the lands to show cause as to why they should not be
acquired. The stake holders including the petitioners are said to
have filed their objections. This comes to be rejected on
13-03-2001. The order rejecting reads as follows:
"Proceedings of the Government of Karnataka
Department of Housing, Bangalore
Subject: Acquisition of open land adjoining to
Venkataramanagar Slum area, Chamarajpet,
Bangalore U/s 17 of KSA(SC) Act, 1973 -
regarding.
Read: 1. Notification No. HUD 192 MCS 82 dated14.10.1982
2. Representation received from the following:
23
1) Sri B.S.Narayana Rao, S/o B.V.Subba Rao
2) M/s Chandra Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd.
Represented by Sri M.Krishna Murthy (M.Krishna Murthy,
Advocate).
3) Office bearers of M/s Venkataramanagara Crop Housing
Society Limited.
4) Sri P.Javaraiah.
5) Sri S.M. Surendra Kumar S/o late C.Muniyappa.
i) Smt. Rathnamma
ii) Sri S.M. Chandrashekar
iii) Sri S.M. Murali First Representation 21.04.1986
iv) Smt. Manjula
v) Smt. Shobha
vi) Smt. Reddy Lakshmi
Represented by Advocate Sri A.V.Srinivas and Sri
C.Gangadhara for 5(i) to (vi)
6) Sri B.S.Narayana Rao,
7) Smt. Vishalakshmamma W/o N.S. Rajagopal
8) Sri R.Prabhakar
9) Sri R.Mohan Kumar
10) Sri R.Kashinath
11) Sri B.V. Promodh
12) Sri V.Rathnakar, GPA of V.Balasubramanya @ Balender
Venkata Vs. Karnataka Slum Clearance Board,
Bangalore.
Preamble:
In notification No. HUD 192 MCS 82 dated 14th October
1982, an extent of 6 acres 30 guntas was proposed for
acquisition as the adjoining slum area was insufficient to
rehabilitate the slum people of the Venkataramanagara slum
area which was declared as slum area U/s 3 of the Act to an
extent of 2 acres 10 guntas vide Government notification No.
HUD 65 MCS 76 dated 15-01-1977 and invited objections from
the interested persons.
The said area was previously proposed for acquisition
during the year 1980 vide Govt. notification No. HUD 301 MCS
79 dated 12/20th Feb., 1980 and dated 28/29th April 1980 but
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the said notification was quashed by the Hon'ble High Court of
Karnataka in Writ Petition No.16019 of 1980 (filed by M/s
Chandra Spinning and Weaving Mills) on the contention that the
land owners were not given opportunity before publication of
the notification (final). On the direction of the Hon'ble High
Court of Karnataka, earlier notification dated 12/20-02-1980
and dated 28/29-04-80 were cancelled in notification-II No.
HUD 192 MCS 82 dated 14-10-1982 was issued in inviting the
objections from the interested persons. Against the preliminary
notification dated 14-10-1982 the following have filed their
objections the details are as follows:
All the above objectors has raised several objections in
the matter at the time of personal hearings conducted in the
department. Some of the objectors have objected for the
acquisition of the land for the purpose but the objectors namely
office bearers of M/s Venkataramanagara Corp. Housing Society,
Sri B.V. Pramodh and Sri B.S. Venkataramana have not
objected for the acquisition of the land.
The representation of the files has appealed that the
lands proposed for acquisition be finally acquired after
overruling the objections raised by certain objectors.
In this case, the land of slum area is existing only in an
area of 2 acres 10 guntas and 90.90 sq.mtrs and the said area
was finally notified as slum clearance area U/s 11 of the Act vide
Government notification No. HUD 63 MCS 77 dated 28-09-
79/5.10.79. In the area there are 315 hutments' are existing as
per the SES and the final notification issued U/s 11 of the Act.
As the slum area is highly congested the Secretary, KSCB has
recommended to Government to acquire the adjoining and
surrounded vacant land of the area for the proper rehabilitation
of the slum dwellers. Hence, presently the case stands for final
decision i.e., to proceed further from the stage of preliminary
notification issued U/s 17 of the Act by the Government on
14-10-1982 as the formalities of the proceedings have been
made including the inspection of spot and as well as hearing the
objections also.
This case was hearing on 28-07-1994, 23-08-1994,
13-09-1994, 26-12-1994, 17-01-1995, 09-05-1995, 12-06-
1995, 25-07-1995, 4-09-1995 and 20-10-2000 wherein
25
objectors and Secretary, Karnataka Slum Clearance Board were
also present. On 20-10-2000 counsel for petitioner are present.
His arguments were heard by the Principal Secretary to
Government, Housing Department. He argued that even after
this long period acquisition of this land was not finalized. It
appears that there is no urgency or special reason to acquire the
land and the land need not be acquired. However the
representative of Karnataka Slum Clearance Board said that the
land is of about 6 acres 30 guntas and is vacant and required for
rehabilitating adjoining Venkataramana slum dwellers. Further
the counsel for petitioners said that the land is not fully vacant
as an educational institution has come up, it is better to drop
the acquisition. But finally, it was decided to conduct a spot
inspection of the land. A sketch of the land was obtained and
placed on record. A spot inspection was conducted on 11-12-
2000 by the Principal Secretary, Housing Department in the
presence of Sri Rathnakar one of objectors and Secretary, Slum
Clearance Board and Special D.C., Bangalore Urban District.
From the spot inspection it is found that though this land is said
to be property of Sri Krishnamurthy of Chandra Spinning Mills,
Sri Divakar represents the owner of the remaining land. He has
claimed that this area is fully vacant. This is not completely
true. There are some slum houses in the portion of land near
the area "house of Saraswathamma". A college building has also
come up in this portion. This is a RCC structure and a college is
being also run in the building. This portion is occupied by the
college building will have to be left out of acquisition.
Regarding necessity for acquisition, it is seen that a slum
exists in the portion shown as slum area in the sketch. There
are also some slum houses near college building. The slum is
very congested. It is necessary to rehabilitate slum dwellers by
providing them more space where they can build proper houses
or Karnataka Slum Clearance Board can construct the houses.
Further it is reported by the Secretary, K.S.C.B., that the slum
dwellers of nearby slums can also be rehabilitated in this area.
Hence, acquisition of said land is necessary.
The petitioner has cited the decision of the Supreme
Court in Mariyappa and others v. State of Karnataka (ILR 1998
KAR 1339) and has argued that the acquisition proceedings
have been rendered null and void because of the long delay. It
is seen that this decision of the Supreme Court pertains to the
26
Karnataka Acquisition of Land for House Sites Act, 1972,
whereas this is a case of acquiring the land under the Karnataka
Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973.
M/s Chandra Spinning Mills had earlier objected that their
vacant land was required for industrial activities. However, it is
seen that the area is predominantly residential and it will not be
in the interest of public health and environmental safety to
permit further industrial activity in the vacant land. Hence, the
following orders.
GOVERNMENT ORDER NO.DOH 25 MCS 93
BANGALORE DATED 13-03-2001
In view of the above circumstances the objections of the
petitioners are hereby dismissed and the acquisition of said land
shall be finalized by issue of necessary notification excluding the
area occupied by the college building."
The petitioners having filed their objections is a matter of record, as
the references in the order generate such clarity. The consideration
of objections also happened in the order quoted supra. Therefore,
the objections come to be rejected 19 years after their filing and
acquisition is directed to be finalized by issuance of necessary
notification. Notification is not issued immediately. The Government
took 4 more years after the rejection of objections to issue the final
notification. The final notification is issued on 23-06-2005. The
preamble of the notification reads as follows:
"ಕ
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ಸ ಾ ರದ ಆ9ೇಶ ಸಂ>ೆ : DOH 25 MCS 93, ಾಂಕ: 13-03-2001 gÀ°è DzÉò¸À¯ÁVzÉ.
28
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ೊಳ7ೆ ಪ19ೇಶ ( ಅBವೃ D ಮತು5 Eಮೂ ಲ ೆ ) ಾTR, 1973 ರ ಕಲಂ 17 ರನGಯ ಜdೕನನು;
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The schedule of the said notification contains all the properties of
the petitioners, either they are land owners or the subsequent
purchasers. This comes to be challenged before this Court in the
subject petition. An order of status quo was granted. The learned
single Judge allows the petition in terms his order dated
20-09- 2007.
15. The learned single Judge declared Section 20 of the Act as
unconstitutional, but refused to quash acquisition proceedings on
the ground that no time is prescribed under the Act for acquisition
of the property. Therefore, the learned single Judge declared
Section 20 as unconstitutional and at the same time did not grant
relief to the petitioners. The State being aggrieved by the said order
29
of the learned single Judge prefers Writ Appeal No.918 of 2008
before the Division Bench. So did the present petitioner in Writ
Appeal No.1492 of 2008. The Division Bench dismisses the writ
appeal filed by the petitioner in Writ Appeal No.1492 of 2008 solely
on the ground of delay in filing the appeal. By an order dated
28-08-2012 the Division Bench upholds the order of the learned
single Judge which had declared Section 20 of the Act to be
unconstitutional. The order of the Division Bench reads as follows:
"11. Having heard the counsel for the parties, we notice
the following undisputed facts in the present appeal:
The learned counsel appearing for both the parties submit
that in view of 44th Amendment, Right to hold the property is no
more a fundamental rights, it is a Constitutional right given to a
party. It is also not in dispute that the Act in question has been
enacted by the State to give effect to Directive Principles of the
State Policy, i.e. to provide better health to the general public.
It is also not in dispute that the Act has come into force on
29.10.1974 much prior to the 44th amendment, on which date,
the provisions of Articles 19(1)(f) and 31(3) were in force and
therefore what is to be considered in this appeal is:
"Whether the Judgment in K.T.PLANTATION PRIVATE
LIMITED can be applied and based on the same, whether
the order of the learned Single Judge is required to be
interfered with or not."
12. In paras-189, 190 and 191 of the aforesaid
Judgment, it is ruled that:
"189. Requirement of public purpose, for deprivation
of a person of his property under Article 300-A, is a
precondition, but no compensation or nil compensation or
30
its illusiveness has to justified by the State on judicially
justiciable standards. Measures designed to achieve greater
social justice, may call for lesser compensation and such a
limitation by itself will not make legislation invalid or
unconstitutional or confiscatory. In other words, the right to
claim compensation or the obligation to pay, though not
expressly included in Article 300-A, it can be inferred in that
article and it is for the State to justify its stand on justifiable
grounds which may depend upon the legislative policy,
object and purpose of the statute and host of other factors.
190. Article 300-A would be equally violated if the
provisions of law authorizing deprivation of property have
not been complied with. While enacting Article 300-A
Parliament has only borrowed Article 31(1) (the "Rule of
Law" doctrine) and not Article 31(2) (which had embodied
the doctrine of eminent domain). Article 300-A enables the
State to put restrictions on the right to property by law.
That law has to be reasonable. It must comply with other
provisions of the constitution. The limitation or restriction
should not be arbitrary or excessive or what is beyond what
is required in public interest. The limitation or restriction
must not be dis-proportionate to the situation or excessive.
191. The legislation providing for deprivation of
property under Article 300-A must be "just, fair and
reasonable" as understood in terms of Articles 14, 19(1)(g),
26(b), 301, etc. Thus in each case, courts will have to
examine the scheme of the impugned Act, its object,
purpose as also the question whether payment of nil
compensation or nominal compensation would make the
impugned law unjust, unfair or unreasonable in terms of
other provisions of the Constitution as indicated above.
13. In view of para-191 this court has to examine the
scheme of the impugned Act and its object and purpose so also
the question whether the payment of nil compensation or
nominal compensation would make the impugned law unjust,
unfair or unreasonable in terms of other provisions of the
Constitution as indicated above.
14. Again in para 192, 193 and 198, 201 and 209, Their
Lordships have stated as hereunder.
"192. At this stage, we may clarify that there is a
difference between "no" compensation and "nil"
31
compensation. A law seeking to acquire private property for
public purpose cannot say that "no compensation shall be
paid". However, there could be a law awarding "nil"
compensation in cases where the State undertakes to
discharge the liabilities charged on the property under
acquisition and onus is on the Government to establish
validity of such law. In the latter case, the Court in exercise
of judicial review will test such a law keeping in mind the
above parameters.
193. Right to property no more remains an
overarching guarantee in our Constitution, then is it the law,
that such a legislation enacted under the authority of law as
provided in Article 300-A is immune from challenge before a
constitutional court for violation of Articles 14, 21 or the
overarching principle of the rule of law, a basic feature of
our Constitution, especially when such a right is not
specifically incorporated in Article 300-A, unlike Article
30(1-A) and the second proviso to Article 31-A(1).
198. Article 300-A, unlike Articles 31-A(1) and 31-C
has not made the legislation depriving a person of his
property immune from challenge on the ground of violation
of Article 14 or Article 21 of the Constitution of India, but let
us first examine whether Article 21 as such is available to
challenge a statute providing for no or illusory
compensation and, hence, expropriatory.
201. This Court in Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar case
took the view that the principle of unfairness of procedure
attracting Article 21 does not apply to the acquisition or
deprivation of property under Article 300-A.
209. Statutes are many which though deprive a
person of his property, have the protection of Article 30(1-
A), Articles 31-A, 31-B, 31-C and hence are immune from
challenge under Article 19 or Article 14. On deletion of
Article 19(1)(f) the available grounds of challenge are
Article 14, the basic structure and the rule of law, apart
from the ground of legislative competence. In I.R.Coelho
case the basic structure was defined in terms of
fundamental rights as reflected under Articles 14, 15, 19,
20, 21 and 32. In that case the Court held that statutes
mentioned in Schedule IX are immune from challenge on
the ground of violation of fundamental rights, but if such
laws violate the basic structure, they no longer enjoy the
immunity offered by Schedule IX.
32
15. From the reading of the aforesaid paragraphs of the
Judgment, we are of the opinion that it is for the State to
demonstrate before the Court that amount fixed u/s 20 of the
Act is not illusory and it is just and reasonable compensation.
16. The present Act cannot get any immunity under
Article 31-C of the Constitution of India, since the present Act
has been enacted prior to the 44th Amendment. If the present
Act had been enacted after the 44th Amendment to the
Constitution, we are of the view that the Judgment in
K.T.PLANTATION PRIVATE LIMITED Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA
would squarely applicable. As stated supra, the present Act is
enacted prior to the 44th amendment. In such circumstances, it
is for the State that the amount fixed u/s 20 of the Act is the
market value and it is clear as no land looser can be deprived of
his property without paying the reasonable compensation. But
unfortunately, in this case, State has not made any efforts
before us to show that three hundred times of the assessment
fixed by the Municipality would be the reasonable compensation
or very near to the market value. In such circumstances, we are
of the view that if the learned Single Judge has held Sec.20 of
the Act as unconstitutional, we cannot lightly interfere with the
same.
17. Accordingly to the extent of holding Sec.20 of the Act,
as unconstitutional, we have to affirm the decision of the
learned Single Judge. So far as the direction issued by the
learned Single Judge, in directing the State Government to pay
compensation by following provisions of sections 23 and 24 of
the Land Acquisition Act, we are of the view, it is beyond the
purview of this court, the manner in which the compensation
has to be paid to a person when his land is acquired. In the
circumstances, we are of the opinion, it is always open for the
State to bring suitable amendment to section 20 of the Act.
18. With the above observations, these appeals are
disposed of."
Being aggrieved by the order of the Division Bench, the State
prefers Special Leave Petition in S.L.P.No.39936 of 2012. The
33
petitioner also preferred a Special Leave Petition before the Apex
Court aggrieved by the order dismissal of the appeal on the ground
of delay in S.L.P.No.18942 of 2013. The Apex Court by its order
dated 28-07-2022 reported in STATE OF KARNATAKA v. B.R.
MURALIDHAR1 has passed the following order:
".... .... ....
21. Be that as it may, the High Court had held that in
absence of an express provision regarding lapsing of acquisition
in the 1973 Act unlike the 1894 or 2013 Act, it is not open to
grant relief of setting aside impugned notification dated
23.6.2005 on account of efflux of time. In that, show cause
notice (preliminary notification) is ordinarily issued when the
competent authority is satisfied that for the purpose of
executing any work of improvement in relation to any "slum
area" or any building in such area or for the purpose of re-
developing any "slum clearance area", or for the purpose of
rehabilitating slum dwellers, it is necessary to acquire any land
and it has been so decided in pursuance of the said provision.
The need to develop the slum area and to rehabilitate the slum
dwellers is a continuing obligation of the State until it is fully
discharged. The fact that there is some time gap between the
preliminary notice to show cause why the land in question
should not be acquired and in issuance of the final notification
under Section 17, by itself, cannot be a ground to declare the
process initiated vide valid show cause notice as having lapsed
by efflux of time.
22. It is, however, urged by the writ petitioners that the
stated power to effectuate a purpose has to be exercised in a
reasonable time frame. The exercise of power in a reasonable
manner inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable
time. What would be the length of reasonable time must be then
determined by the facts of the case in the context of scheme of
the Act and the nature of the power which is to be exercised to
1
2022 SCC OnLine SC 925
34
prevent miscarriage of justice, misuse or abuse of power. Even
this plea will have to be examined by the High Court in the first
place.
23. After cogitating over the matter and in the fact
situation of the present case, we are of the considered opinion
that it would be appropriate to relegate the parties before the
High Court for reconsideration of the writ petitions afresh
including in relation to the question of constitutional validity of
Section 20 of the 1973 Act. In the remanded proceedings, it
would then be open to the writ petitioners to amend the writ
petition to raise a new plea regarding inapplicability of Section
17 to the land in question -- which had not been declared as
slum area or slum clearance area. That question, if answered in
favour of the writ petitioners, would go to the root of the matter
and it may then not be necessary to even examine the question
regarding the constitutional validity of Section 20 of the 1973
Act.
24. As a result, to do substantial justice to both the
parties, we deem it appropriate to relegate the parties before
the learned Single Judge of the High Court for reconsideration of
the writ petitions afresh on its own merits and in accordance
with law with liberty to both parties to amend the writ petition
or file further better affidavit to defend the provisions in
question and the action of acquisition, as the case may be. The
parties may do so within six weeks from today. The matter after
remand to proceed before the learned Single Judge of the High
Court in the first week of September 2022 for hearing.
25. We need to clarify that it will be open to the learned
Single Judge to await the decision of the larger Bench of this
Court in reference made in terms of Property Owners'
Association, in the event it becomes necessary to deal with the
argument of the expanse of expression "material resources of
the community" in Article 39(b) of the Constitution and its
applicability to the impugned provision of the 1973 Act.
Ordinarily, to observe judicial propriety we would have opted to
keep these appeals pending before this Court and to be heard
along with the connected cases before the larger Bench of this
Court. However, in that eventuality, the parties may have to
amend their pleadings, if they intend to urge further grounds of
challenge or by way of defence, as the case may be. That
35
exercise, therefore, can be undertaken in the first instance
before the High Court, where both sides will get full opportunity
to plead and argue their case.
26. In view of the above, we set aside the impugned
judgment(s) and order(s) dated 17.8.2012 and 28.8.2012 of the
Division Bench of the High Court as well as the common
judgment dated 20.9.2007 rendered by the learned Single
Judge and restore the Writ Petition No. 22611 of 2005, Writ
Petition No. 20955 of 2005 and Writ Petition No. 21192 of
2005 to the file of the High Court for being proceeded afresh in
accordance with law after giving liberty to the parties to amend
the pleadings or file better affidavit to defend the impugned
provisions and the action of the State, as the case may be. As
the High Court's impugned decisions have been set aside, it
must follow that the declaration issued by the High Court
regarding Section 20 of the 1973 Act being ultra vires stands
effaced and that provision be given full effect until further
orders of the High Court in the remanded petitions.
27. All contentions available to both sides are left open.
The matter may appear before the learned Single Judge of the
High Court of Karnataka in the first week of September 2022.
The High Court may endeavour to dispose of the petitions
expeditiously, in accordance with law.
28. The appeals are disposed of accordingly. No order as
to costs."
The Apex Court setting aside the orders passed by the Division
Bench directed the learned single Judge of this Court to take up the
matter while reserving liberty to the petitioners to amend the
pleadings or file a better affidavit. Exercising the said liberty, the
petitioners have now amended the petition raising additional
36
grounds. The issue now would be whether the final notification
impugned in the subject petition would be hit by delay.
16. The dates and the link in the chain of events are all
narrated hereinabove. The preliminary notification under Section 11
of the Act was issued on 14-10-1982. Objections were called for
and objections were immediately filed. Government took 19 years
to overrule the objections filed by the stake holders. The final
notification under Section 17 of the Act was issued on 23-06-2005
with a delay of 23 years. As contended by the learned counsel for
the petitioners delay of 23 years can by no stretch of imagination
be held to be a reasonable period of time for issuance of a final
notification of which a preliminary notification was issued 23 years
ago. Therefore, it becomes apposite to refer to the judgments of
the Apex Court, which considered the issue of delay qua acquisition
of property and the delay becoming fatal to the proceedings, even
in cases where there is no time limit prescribed under the statute.
37
THE JUDICIAL LANDSCAPE:
17. The Apex Court, in the case of RAM CHAND v. UNION
OF INDIA2, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
10. Craies on Statute Law, Seventh Edn., p. 282, has
also emphasised that the proceeding for compulsory
acquisition must be concluded without unreasonable
delay:
"Powers conferred by Act of Parliament must,
as a general rule, be exercised within a reasonable
time after notice has been given to the persons whose
property will be affected by their exercise, otherwise
the notice will be liable to be treated as being no
longer effective."
11. English Courts have been consistently
impressing that the land acquisition proceeding should be
completed within a reasonable time, failing which the
whole proceeding is vitiated. It was said in the case
of Tiverton and North Devon Rly. Co. v. Robert Francis
Loosemore [(1884) 9 AC 480, 489] :
"If nothing more was done, and the company
have slept upon their rights, and certainly if the delay
cannot be explained, they should be held to be
disabled from going on with any compulsory
purchase, ...."
Same view was reiterated in the case of Grice v. Dudley
Corpn [(1958) 1 Ch D 329: (1957) 2 All ER 673].
12. House of Lords in the case of Birmingham City
Corpn. v. West Midland Baptist (Trust) Assn.
(Inc.) [(1969) 3 All ER 172: (1969) 3 WLR 389], pointed
out that the land acquisition proceedings should be
2
(1994) 1 SCC 44
38
conducted in such a manner that the person affected by
the land acquisition, gets substantially the value of his
land, which he would have got on the date of his
dispossession. It was said:
"The principle and the rule cannot be
reconciled except on the basis that the total value to
the owner at the date of the notice to treat is always
substantially the same as the value at the date of the
expulsion."
13. The Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 has
now introduced a time-limit before which a declaration under
Section 6 has to be made. The relevant part of amended Section
6 says:
"Provided that no declaration in respect of any
particular land covered by a notification under Section 4,
sub-section (1),--
(i) published after the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment and Validation)
Ordinance, 1967 (1 of 1967), but before the
commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the
expiry of three years from the date of the
publication of the notification; or
(ii) published after the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made
after the expiry of one year from the date of the
publication of the notification:"
By the same Act, Section 11-A has been introduced, which fixes
a time-limit for the making of the award under Section 11 of the
Act, failing which the proceeding for the acquisition of the land
is to lapse. Section 11-A is as follows:
"11-A. Period within which an award shall be
made.-- The Collector shall make an award under Section
11 within a period of two years from the date of the
publication of the declaration and if no award is made within
that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the
land shall lapse:
39
Provided that in a case where the said declaration
has been published before the commencement of the Land
Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be
made within a period of two years from such
commencement.
Explanation.-- In computing the period of two years
referred to in this section, the period during which any
action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said
declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be
excluded."
14. The Parliament has recognised and taken note
of the inaction and non-exercise of the statutory power
on the part of the authorities, enjoined by the provisions
of the Act to complete the acquisition proceedings within
a reasonable time and because of that now a time-limit
has been fixed for making of the award, failing which the
entire proceeding for acquisition shall lapse. But, can it
be said that before the introduction of the aforesaid
amendment in the Act, the authorities were at liberty to
proceed with the acquisition proceedings, irrespective of
any schedule or time-frame and to complete the same as
and when they desired? It is settled that in a statute
where for exercise of power no time-limit is fixed, it has
to be exercised within a time which can be held to be
reasonable. This aspect of the matter can be examined in
the light of second proviso to Article 31-A of the
Constitution, which in clear and unambiguous terms
prohibits making of any law which does not contain a
provision for payment of compensation at a rate, which
shall not be less than the market value thereof. The Act is
consistent with the second proviso to Article 31-A,
because it provides for payment of compensation at the
market value of the land acquired. But, whether the
constitutional and statutory requirement of the payment
of the market value to the persons, whose lands have
been compulsorily acquired, is not being circumvented
and violated by keeping the land acquisition proceedings
pending for more than a decade and half, without making
the awards and paying the compensation, which has been
pegged to the dates of notifications under sub-section (1)
of Section 4 of the Act, which in the present cases had
40
been issued 14 to 21 years before the making of the
awards. If a person is paid compensation in the year
1980/1981 at the market rate, prevailing twenty years
before, will that be compliance of the constitutional and
statutory mandate? Ignoring the escalation of the market
value of the lands, especially near the urban
agglomeration or metropolitan cities, will amount to
ignoring an earthquake and courts can certainly take
judicial notice of the said fact. The interest and the
solatium, which have to be paid under the provisions of
the Act, are linked with the market value of the land with
reference to the date of the notification under sub-
section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. If a decision had been
taken as early as in the year 1966, by issuance of
declarations under Section 6, that the lands belonging to
the different cultivators, who held those lands within the
ceiling limit for cultivation, were needed for public
purpose, respondents should have taken steps for
completion of the acquisition proceedings and payment of
compensation at an early date. In the present cases,
unless a justification is furnished on behalf of the
respondents, can it be said that the statutory power of
making an award under Section 11 has been exercised
within a reasonable time from the date of the declaration
under Section 6? Due to escalation in prices of land, more
so in this area, during the preceding two decades, in
reality, the market rate, on the date of the notification
under Section 4(1) is a mere fraction, of the rate
prevailing at the time of its determination in the Award.
15. Mr Jaitley, appearing for Delhi Development
Authority, took a stand that even if it be assumed that there has
been an unreasonable delay in completion of the land
acquisition proceedings, that delay has been condoned and
validated by Section 11-A aforesaid, which was introduced by
the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. He pointed out
that in view of the proviso to Section 11-A of the Act, where a
declaration under Section 6 had been published before the
commencement of the Amendment Act of 1984, like in the
present cases, the awards can be made within a period of two
years from the commencement of such Act i.e. up to September
23, 1986. On a first impression, this argument is attractive. But,
from a reading of Section 11-A, it is apparent that the said
41
section neither purports to validate any pending acquisition, nor
it condones any delay which had already occurred. The main
part of Section 11-A introduces a statutory mandate to make an
award within a period of two years, from the date of the
publication of the declaration under Section 6 and provides that
if no award is made within that period, the entire proceeding for
acquisition of the land is to lapse. In the proviso, yet another
mandate has been introduced by the Parliament, saying that in
cases where declaration under Section 6 had been published
before the commencement of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a
period of two years from such commencement. The role of a
proviso hardly needs elucidation, in view of well-settled position
by series of judgments of this Court and the rules of
interpretation of statutes. The proviso only carves out an
exception, which could have been covered otherwise by the
substantive part of the section. According to us, it cannot be
held that the proviso to Section 11-A, in any manner,
validates or justifies the inaction on the part of the
authorities in delaying and keeping land acquisition
proceedings pending for a decade and a half, after
declarations had been made under Section 6 of the Act.
Apart from that, it is not in dispute that Section 11-A will
not be applicable to land acquisition proceedings, where
awards had been made, as in the present cases, prior to
September 24, 1984 when the Amending Act of 1984
came in force. As such, proviso to Section 11-A is not at
all applicable to the proceedings with which we are
concerned.
16. On behalf of the respondents, it was pointed out that
the petitioners have approached this Court only after making of
the awards, or when awards were to be made, having waited for
more than fourteen years, without invoking the jurisdiction of
the High Court under Article 226 or of this Court under Article
32. It is true that this Court has taken note of delay on the part
of the petitioners concerned in invoking the jurisdiction of the
High Court or of this Court for quashing the land acquisition
proceedings on the ground that the proceedings for acquisition
of the lands in question have remained pending for more than a
decade, in the cases of Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1975)
4 SCC 285] and Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India [1993
Supp (2) SCC 20 : AIR 1993 SC 852] . According to us, the
42
question of delay in invoking the writ jurisdiction of the
High Court under Article 226 or of this Court under Article
32, has to be considered along with the inaction on the
part of the authorities, who had to perform their
statutory duties. Can the statutory authority take a plea
that although it has not performed its duty within a
reasonable time, but it is of no consequence because the
person, who has been wronged or deprived of his right,
has also not invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court or
of this Court for a suitable writ or direction to grant the
relief considered appropriate in the circumstances? The
authorities are enjoined by the statute concerned to
perform their duties within a reasonable time, and as
such they are answerable to the Court why such duties
have not been performed by them, which has caused
injury to claimants. By not questioning, the validity of the
acquisition proceedings for a long time since the
declarations were made under Section 6, the relief of
quashing the acquisition proceedings has become
inappropriate, because in the meantime, the lands
notified have been developed and put to public use. The
lands are being utilised to provide shelter to thousands
and to implement the scheme of a planned city, which is a
must in the present set-up. The outweighing public
interest has to be given due weight. That is why this
Court has been resisting attempts on the part of the
landholders, seeking quashing of the acquisition
proceedings on ground of delay in completion of such
proceedings. But, can the respondents be not directed to
compensate the petitioners, who were small cultivators
holding lands within the ceiling limit in and around Delhi,
for the injury caused to them, not by the provisions of the
Act, but because of the non-exercise of the power by the
authorities under the Act within a reasonable time?
17. Mr Goswami, on behalf of the respondents, referred
to the judgment of this Court in the case of Special Land
Acquisition Officer, Bombay v. Godrej and Boyce [(1988) 1 SCC
50 : (1988) 1 SCR 590] . There an order under Section 48 of
the Act, withdrawing the acquisition of the land in question, was
being challenged on the ground that such order had been issued
a long time after the declaration under Section 6. In that
context, it was said by this Court that the petitioners, who were
43
the holders of the lands and were in possession thereof, had not
been prejudiced by the delay. On the basis of that judgment, it
was urged that even in the present cases the petitioners have
remained in possession of their lands and as such, there is no
question of their suffering any injury due to delay in the
completion of land acquisition proceedings. That decision is
inapplicable in the present situation because Section 48 is not
applicable after making of the awards. In a case where after
declaration under Section 6, but prior to making of the award,
acquisition is withdrawn under Section 48, the land having
enhanced market value remains with the holder thereof.
18. It may be pointed out that different States in India
including Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and West
Bengal have in the years 1950 and 1955, by State Amendments
introduced Section 48-A, in the relevant Land Acquisition Act, in
order to safeguard the interest of the persons in respect of
whose lands declarations have been issued under Section 6, but
no awards have been made within a reasonable time. In view of
Section 48-A aforesaid, the declaration under Section 6 may not
become invalid because of the delay in the completion of the
proceeding for acquisition, but after a period of two years from
the date of the publication of such declaration, unless the owner
of the land had been responsible for the delay, the owner shall
be entitled to receive compensation for the damage suffered by
him in consequence of such delay. Such damage is to be
determined under Part III of the Act, as compensation payable
under Section 48-A. In view of this section, while computing the
quantum of compensation, what damage the owner of the land
has suffered due to delay in completion of the acquisition
proceeding, has also to be calculated. Unfortunately, no such
amendment was introduced in the principal Act and even when
several amendments were introduced by the Land Acquisition
(Amendment) Act, 1984, this aspect of the matter appears to
have been overlooked.
19. The learned counsel, appearing for the respondents,
while resisting the charge of unreasonable delay in completing
the acquisition proceeding, stated that between the years 1959-
65 more than 68 thousand acres of land had been notified under
sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. Thereafter, several
thousand objections had been filed; even writ applications had
been filed in Delhi High Court, questioning the validity of
44
notifications under Section 4 and declarations under Section 6 of
the Act. In such petitions, the High Court had also passed
interim orders.
20. On behalf of the petitioners, it was pointed out that in
most of the writ applications, which had been filed questioning
the notifications under Section 4 and declarations under Section
6 of the Act, the interim orders were only in respect of
dispossession of the petitioners of such writ applications. As
such the respondents were at liberty to proceed with the land
acquisition proceedings and should have prepared the awards
within a reasonable time. In any case, all such writ applications
were dismissed by the judgment of this Court on August 23,
1974, in the case of Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi [(1969) 3
All ER 172: (1969) 3 WLR 389]. From the counter-affidavits filed
before this Court on behalf of the respondents, there does not
appear to be any reasonable explanation, why after dismissal of
the aforesaid writ applications on August 23, 1974, no effective
steps were taken till 1980-1981 and in some cases till 1983 for
preparation of the awards.
21. It was urged on behalf of the respondents that in
view of sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
(Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967, if the declarations
under Section 6 have been after expiry of three years from the
date of publication of notifications under sub-section (1) of
Section 4, then the persons concerned are entitled to be paid
simple interest, calculated at the rate of six per cent per annum
on the market value of such land, as determined under Section
23 of the Act, up to the date of the tender or payment of the
compensation awarded by the Collector for the acquisition of
such land. The aforesaid sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the
Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967, may
be applicable to cases where the declaration under Section 6
has been made either before or after the commencement of the
said Act, but made after the expiry of three years of the
notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act. But in
cases where declaration has been made within three years from
the date of issuance of notification under sub-section (1) of
Section 4, obviously the aforesaid Amending Act shall not be
applicable. This provision can hardly be said to compensate the
persons who have been deprived of the legitimate compensation
for years.
45
22. Reference was also made to Section 34 of the Act.
That provision will apply where the compensation has neither
been paid nor deposited before taking possession of the land
and interest at the rate of six per cent, which has been later
substituted to nine per cent by Act 68 of 1984, has to be paid
from the time of taking possession until the compensation has
been paid or deposited. This section has no relevance in the
context of the question involved in the present cases.
23. Section 28 of the Act is also applicable only in respect
of the excess amount, which is determined by the Court after a
reference under Section 18 of the Act. This Court had held in the
case of Union of India v. Zora Singh [(1992) 1 SCC 673] , that
sub-section (1-A), which was introduced by Act 68 of 1984 in
Section 23, regarding payment of interest at the rate of 12 per
cent per annum, over the market value of the land for the
period commencing on and from the date of the publication of
the notification under Section 4, sub-section (1), up to the date
of the award of the Collector or up to the date of the taking of
possession of the land whichever is earlier, was applicable to
cases which were pending after the reference under Section 18
of the Act. But in the meantime the correctness of that
judgment has been doubted in the case of K.S. Pariapooranan v.
State of Kerala [(1992) 1 SCC 684] , and the matter has been
referred to the Constitution Bench.
24. The petitioners because of the delay and
inaction on the part of the respondents are in a great
predicament. Any amount determined as market value of
their lands acquired, with reference to the dates of
issuance of notifications under sub-section (1) of Section
4 of the Act i.e. at the rate prevalent 15-21 years prior to
the dates of the making of the award, cannot be held to
be compliance of the mandate regarding payment of
market value of the land so acquired under the
Constitution and the Act. This Court faced with such a
situation, where proceedings have remained pending for
years after issuance of declarations under Section 6, in
order to protect the petitioners concerned from
irreparable injury i.e. getting compensation for their
lands acquired with reference to the date of notification
under sub-section (1) of Section 4, which may be more
than a decade before the date of the making of the
46
award, has advanced the date of notification under sub-
section (1) of Section 4 of the Act, so that market value
of the land so acquired is paid at a just and reasonable
rate. Reference in this connection may be made to the
cases of Ujjain Vikas Pradhikaran v. Raj Kumar Johri
[(1992) 1 SCC 328] ; Akhara Brahm Buta, Amritsar v.
State of Punjab [(1992) 4 SCC 243 : JT (1992) 5 SC 136]
and Bihar State Housing Board v. Ram Bihari Mahato [AIR
1988 SC 2134] . This Court has advanced the date of
notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the Act,
in the cases referred to above, without assigning any
reason, as to how the date fixed by Sections 11 and 23 of
the Act, can be altered for ascertainment of the market
value of land. The power of this Court under Article 142 is
very wide and can be exercised in the ends of justice. The
scope of the said Article was recently examined in the
case of Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India [(1991) 4
SCC 584 : AIR 1992 SC 248] .
25. There appears to be some force in the
contention of the petitioners that the object of
respondents was to peg the price of the lands acquired
from the different cultivators to a distant past and not to
proceed further because if the awards had been made
soon after the declarations under Section 6, respondents
had to pay or tender the compensation to the claimants,
which for some compulsion, respondents were not in a
position to pay or tender them. But, nonetheless, the
exercise of power in the facts and circumstances of the
cases by the respondents has to be held to be against the
spirit of the provisions of the Act, tending towards
arbitrariness. In such a situation this Court in exercise of
power under Article 32 and the High Court under Article
226, could have quashed the proceedings. But, taking
into consideration that in most of the cases, the Delhi
Administration and Delhi Development Authority have
taken possession of the lands and even developments
have been made, it shall not be proper exercise of
discretion on the part of this Court to quash the
proceedings because, in that event, it shall affect the
public interest. Moreover, third party interests created in
the meantime are also likely to be affected and such third
parties are not impleaded. The relief of quashing the
47
acquisition proceeding having become inappropriate due
to the subsequent events, the grant of a modified relief,
considered appropriate in the circumstances, would be
the proper course to adopt. The High Court or this Court,
can grant a modified relief taking into consideration the
injury caused to the claimants by the inaction on the part
of respondents and direct payment of any additional
amount, in exercise of power under Article 226 or Article
32 of the Constitution.
26. We are of the view, that there was no
justification on the part of the respondents for the delay
in completion of the proceedings after the judgment of
this Court in Aflatoon case [(1969) 3 All ER 172 : (1969)
3 WLR 389] on August 23, 1974. There is no explanation,
except that there were several cases and, as such, in
normal course, there was bound to be delay in making of
the awards. This may have been acceptable if the delay
was only in respect of some of the awards. It is an
admitted position that till 1980 no award had been made
in respect of any of the acquisitions. As such, the
respondents have failed to satisfy that they have
performed their statutory duty within a time which can be
held to be reasonable."
(Emphasis supplied)
A little later, the Apex Court in the case of KERALA STATE
HOUSING BOARD v. RAMAPRIYA HOTELS (P) LIMITED3 has
held as follows:
".... .... ....
5. The crucial question whether a period of 4 years
envisaged in proviso to Section 16(1) should be reckoned from
the date when the agreement was executed or from the date
the publication of the notification, under Section 3(1) after the
3
(1994) 5 SCC 672
48
agreement was executed and what would be the meaning of the
words "from such date"? Before considering these questions, it
is necessary to note few material facts and the pre-existing law.
Unamended Section 16(1) gave power to the Collector and all
persons interested in the compensation, to agree for fixation of
the amount of compensation by an award by consent. It is
otherwise known as statutory agreement. There was no
limitation prescribed for making the award by the Collector.
Sub-section (2) makes the award conclusive evidence between
the Government and the persons agreed of the value of the land
and the amount of compensation allowed for the same. In other
words, by an agreement, the value of the amount gets pegged
down under the agreement, to the date of issuance of the
notification under Section 3(1) of the Act, which is the same as
Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act (1 of 1894), a condition
precedent for a declaration to follow under Section 6 of the Act.
The claimant foregoes the right of reference under Section 18 of
the Act. It is notorious that after publication of the notification
under Section 4(1) of the Central Act and declaration under
Section 6, years would roll by before making the award under
Section 11 of the Central Act. In State of Gujarat v. Patil
Raghav Natha [(1969) 2 SCC 187: (1970) 1 SCR 335] the
period of limitation under Bombay Land Revenue Act for
exercise of the power under Section 65 came up for
consideration. This Court held that: (SCC p. 193, para 11)
"[T]hat there is no period of limitation
prescribed under Section 211, but it seems to us plain
that this power must be exercised in reasonable time
and the length of the reasonable time must be
determined by the facts of the case and the nature of
the order which is being revised."
In Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak [(1984) 1 SCC 125] this
Court held that the power must be exercised "in a
reasonable manner and the reasonable exercise of the
power and it is exercised within a reasonable time". In
the context of land acquisition, this Court in State of
M.P. v. Vishnu Prasad Sharma [(1966) 3 SCR 557 : AIR
1966 SC 1593] had held that after the publication of the
notification under Section 4(1) requiring particular land
in a locality, it must expeditiously issue "declaration
under Section 6 to that effect". That after pegging the price
49
by the issuance of the notification under Section 4(1) the
Government have no power to issue successive declarations
under Section 6 in respect of parcels of land covered by
notification under Section 4(1) at different times. Parliament
amended Section 6 by the Land Acquisition (Amendment and
Validation) Act, 1967 and gave power to the Government to
make different declarations from time to time in respect of
different parts of lands covered by the same notification under
Section 4(1). However, it introduced a proviso prescribing
limitation of 3 years from the date of the publication of the
notification. In the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 it
was further reduced to one year. Equally Section 11-A was
made by 1984 Amendment Act prescribing 2 years' limitation
from the date of publication of the declaration to make the
award in respect of the proceedings taken under the Act and the
proviso thereto gives further three years to make the award in
the pending proceedings from the date of the commencement of
1984 Amendment Act. On expiry thereof, "proceedings for the
acquisition of the land shall lapse". It is thus clear from the
legislative mandate that the completion of passing of the award
after the initiation of the acquisition proceedings are being
unduly delayed and now it is enjoined to be done within 2 years
from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6.
The Kerala Legislature recognising the same situation prevailing
under the Act the Kerala Land Acquisition Amendment Act,
1980, suitably amended Sections 3 and 6 of that Act, Section
16(1) was also amended. Preceding thereto a Division Bench of
that court in KalyankuttiAmmal v. State of Kerala [ILR (1981) 2
Ker 53] interpreted the agreement and Section 16(1) and held
that the agreement under Section 16(1) becomes void after the
notification under Section 3(1) lapsed. To give effect to such a
lapsed agreement Section 16(1) was suitably amended and
proviso to Section 16(1) was made. The statement and objects
in this behalf undoubtedly support the contention of the counsel
for the Board that the word, "from such date" would be
referable to the date of the publication of notification under
Section 3(1), but in interpreting the effect of the proviso the
court has to look into the purpose and the effect of the main
Section 16(1) on the agreement entered into by the Collector
and the person interested in the compensation. It is seen that
the agreement ties the owner of the land with the market
value mentioned thereunder, but undue delay in making
the award leads to manifest injustice. Having had the
50
power to make an award under the agreement and
without any limitation the Collector would be left with his
discretion to make the award leisurely at his whim or he
may delay the issuance of the notification under Section
3(1) or may issue successive declarations under Section
6. This arbitrary exercise of power would result in
hardship and manifest injustice to the owner of the land
which would be violative of not only Article 14 of the
Constitution, but also becomes an unfair procedure
offending Article 21. Therefore, the legislature introduced
the proviso. "Such date" referred to in the proviso, by
necessary implication, must be referable to the date of
the agreement, though by strict construction it may lead
to the conclusion that "such date" may be referred to the
date of the publication of the notification under Section
3(1). When two views are possible, to avoid manifest
injustice, unjustness and arbitrariness or
unconstitutionality of the statute, construction in favour
of sustaining the constitutionality should be leaned."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court, in both the afore-quoted judgments, would hold
that powers conferred by the Act of Parliament must as a general
rule be exercised within a reasonable time. Non-exercise of such
statutory power within a reasonable time, notwithstanding the fact
that no time limit has been fixed by making the award or taking the
acquisition to its logical conclusion, the acquisition would
undoubtedly lapse. The Apex Court in Kerala State Housing Board
supra reiterates that if the concerned legislation does not stipulate
the time frame within which the process or its components are to
51
be completed, it amounts to violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the
Constitution of India. The Apex Court in the case of JAGADISH v.
STATE 0F KARNATAKA4 has held as follows:
".... .... ....
6. In a recent judgment of this Court in the context of the
same Act, this aspect has been referred to
in Satyan v. Commr. [Satyan v. Commr., (2020) 14 SCC 210]
7. One of the aspects debated
in Satyan [Satyan v. Commr., (2020) 14 SCC 210] , is whether
in the context of the aforesaid legal position, settled
transactions should be permitted to be disturbed after a long
period of time. The various judgments were referred to in this
behalf albeit the suomotu power be exercised by the
Commissioner's office in para 12 of Satyan
case [Satyan v. Commr., (2020) 14 SCC 210]. The said
paragraph is extracted as under: (SCC pp. 218-19)
"12. The second limb of the submission of Mr
Dave, learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, was
that settled transactions cannot be disturbed after a
long period of time. The transactions were of the year
1997. They were sought to be unsettled after almost
eight (8) years, by preferring an application in the
year 2005. To support this plea, he referred to the
following judicial pronouncements:
12.1. Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie
Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy [Ibrahimpatnam Taluk
Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v. K. Suresh Reddy, (2003) 7
SCC 667] , SCC para 11 -- the question posed to be decided
in the appeal is referred to in para 1 and the question has
been answered in para 19. Both paras 1 and 19 are read as
under: (SCC pp. 671 & 680)
'1. In all these appeals, the following question of
law arises for consideration:
4
(2021) 12 SCC 812
52
"Whether the Collector can exercise suomotu
power under sub-section (4) of Section 50-B of the
Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 1950at any time or such power is
to be exercised within a reasonable time."
* * *
19. It is also necessary to note that the suomotu
power was sought to be exercised by the Joint Collector
after 13-15 years. Section 50-B was amended in the
year 1979 by adding sub-section (4), but no action was
taken to invalidate the certificates in exercise of the
suomotu power till 1989. There is no convincing
explanation as to why the authorities waited for such a
long time. It appears that sub-section (4) was added so
as to take action where alienations or transfers were
made to defeat the provisions of the Land Ceiling Act.
The Land Ceiling Act having come into force on 1-1-
1975, the authorities should have made inquiries and
efforts so as to exercise the suomotu power within
reasonable time. The action of the Joint Collector in
exercising suomotu power after several years and not
within reasonable period and passing orders cancelling
validation certificates given by the Tahsildar, as rightly
held [Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie
Sangam v. K. Suresh Reddy, 1996 SCC OnLine AP 1108]
by the High Court, could not be sustained.'
The ratio, thus, is that such suomotu powers have to
be exercised within a reasonable period of time.
12.2. Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand [Situ
Sahu v. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 8 SCC 340] -- the
exercise of power in respect of transactions, which
required prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner
was again observed to be one which had to be
exercised within a reasonable period of time.
12.3. Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore
Yadav [Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav, (2018) 12
SCC 527 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 427] -- the view expressed is
the same as in the aforesaid two judgments in para 13, as
under: (SCC p. 530)
'13. In our view, where no period of
limitation is prescribed, the action must be
taken, whether suomotu or on the
53
application of the parties, within a
reasonable time. Undoubtedly, what is
reasonable time would depend on the
circumstances of each case and the purpose
of the statute. In the case before us, we are
clear that the action is grossly delayed and
taken beyond reasonable time, particularly,
in view of the fact that the land was
transferred several times during this period,
obviously, in the faith that it is not
encumbered by any rights.'
12.4. Vivek M. Hinduja v. M. Ashwatha [Vivek M.
Hinduja v. M. Ashwatha, (2020) 14 SCC 228] -- the
provisions of the said Act were in issue, where suomotu
action was sought to be taken in 1998, in respect of
transactions of the vintage 1967, and this was held to be a
long delay, which did not warrant the exercise of such
power."
(emphasis in original)
8. We have discussed the aforesaid aspect in some detail
as it has a direct bearing to the factual controversy in the
present case.
9. Now, once again, let us turn back to the factual matrix.
It appears that there was an endeavour to disturb the
possession of the private respondents which compelled them to
file a civil suit being OS No. 5875 of 1994 on 25-6-1994 before
the City Civil Court, Bangalore. A decree was passed for
permanent injunction in favour of the private respondents and
against the persons claiming similar rights as the appellant
before us (who is in the line of succession of the original two
ladies, namely, SmtGundamma and SmtSiddamma) opining that
the private respondents before us have proved their lawful
possession of the property and were entitled to a permanent
injunction. Aggrieved by the said decree, the defendants in that
suit, who are grandchildren of G. Ramaiah and Gundamma laid
a challenge in the first appeal before the High Court which was
also dismissed on 19-3-2004 [Ramakka v. G.N. Gnanadey, 2004
SCC OnLine Kar 661] albeit on the ground of delay.
10. The appellant before us, as a legal heir of the original
beneficiaries being Smt Gundamma and Smt Siddamma, sought
54
directions from the Deputy Commissioner to enquire about the
violation of the provisions of the SC and ST Act. This application
was filed by the appellant on 13-10-2009. Thus, this is the first
time that the appellant has sought to claim exercise of rights
under the SC and ST Act.
11. On enquiry, the Assistant Commissioner, vide order
dated 9-9-2010 opined in his favour. The challenge laid by the
private Respondents 4 to 9 also did not succeed. It was deemed
appropriate to take recourse to a remedy of appeal. The appeal
was thereafter dismissed by the Deputy Commissioner on 8-10-
2010 and once again a writ petition was filed by them before the
High Court but vide order dated 16-8-2011 [G.N.
Ramachandra v. State of Karnataka, 2011 SCC OnLine Kar
4513] , the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. It
is, thereafter, that the private respondents' fate took a turn for
the better when they succeeded in the writ appeal in terms of
order dated 5-7-2013 [Jagadish v. State of Karnataka, 2013
SCC OnLine Kar 5290 : ILR 2013 Kar 4091] . The appellant has,
thus, filed the present appeal.
12. There are a number of issues raised before us
calling for the inter se play of the Inams Abolition Act and
the SC and ST Act. We, however, do not see the need to
examine them as, according to us, the appellant is
disentitled to any relief on the short ground of having
knocked the doors of the authorities concerned three
decades after the SC and ST Act came into force. It is this
very aspect which forms subject-matter of debate in a
number of judgments and finally in Satyan
case [Satyan v. Commr., (2020) 14 SCC 210], (they have
been discussed in para 12 extracted hereinabove). It was
recognised that there was no limitation of time
prescribed but it should be exercised within a reasonable
period of time. It is in that context that period of 20 years
has been said to be too long a period for calling for
interference by the authorities concerned. Leave the said
period, in the present case, we are confronted with the
factual situation of 30 years' period between the rights
accruing and the exercise of rights. In the meantime, the
lands have been developed by the private respondents
who, according to us, is bona fide purchaser of the land
and created infrastructure on the same. It does seem
55
now an endeavour of the appellant to only extract some
amount knowing fully well the kind of establishment
which has come up on the land in question. We cannot be
a part to such endeavour. We are, thus, of the view that
in the conspectus of the legal position discussed
aforesaid and the facts referred to by us, the appellant is
disentitled to any relief on this short ground of an
inordinate delay in seeking to avail of their remedy in
limine. Insofar as the other aspects raised in the present
appeals are concerned, we are leaving the questions of
law open since we are not required to comment on the
same for adjudication of the present controversy."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court was considering acquisition of land by issuance of
final notification after 30 years of preliminary notification. The Apex
Court holds that though there was no limitation of time prescribed,
it should be exercised within a reasonable period and 20 or 30
years can by no stretch of imagination be considered to be a
reasonable period. The Apex Court, in a later judgment, in the case
of KOLKATA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION v. BIMAL KUMAR
SHAH5 holds as follows:
".... .... ....
33. Following are the seven principles:
33.1.The Right to notice
5
2024 SCC OnLine SC 968
56
33.1.1. A prior notice informing the bearer of the right
that the State intends to deprive them of the right to property is
a right in itself; a linear extension of the right to know
embedded in Article 19(1)(a). The Constitution does not
contemplate acquisition by ambush. The notice to acquire must
be clear, cogent and meaningful. Some of the statutes reflect
this right.
33.1.2. Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
Section 3(1) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act, 1952, Section 11 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and Section 3-A of
the National Highways Act, 1956 are examples of such statutory
incorporation of the right to notice before initiation of the land
acquisition proceedings.
33.1.3. In a large number of decisions, our constitutional
courts have independently recognised the right to notice before
any process of acquisition is commenced.
33.2.The Right to be heard
33.2.1. Following the right to a meaningful and effective
prior notice of acquisition, is the right of the property-bearer to
communicate his objections and concerns to the authority
acquiring the property. This right to be heard against the
proposed acquisition must be meaningful and not a sham.
33.2.2. Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
Section 3(1) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act, 1952, Section 15 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and Section 3-C of
the National Highways Act, 1956, are some statutory
embodiments of this right.
33.2.3. Judicial opinions recognising the importance of
this right are far too many to reproduce. Suffice it to say that
that the enquiry in which a landholder would raise his objection
is not a mere formality.
33.3.The Right to a reasoned decision
57
33.3.1. That the authorities have heard and considered
the objections is evidenced only through a reasoned order. It is
incumbent upon the authority to take an informed decision and
communicate the same to the objector.
33.3.2. Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
Section 3(2) of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable
Property Act, 1952, Section 19 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and Section 3-D of
the National Highways Act, 1956, are the statutory
incorporations of this principle.
33.3.3. Highlighting the importance of the declaration of
the decision to acquire, the Courts have held that the
declaration is mandatory, failing which, the acquisition
proceedings will cease to have effect.
33.4.The Duty to acquire only for public purpose
33.4.1. That the acquisition must be for a public purpose
is inherent and an important fetter on the discretion of the
authorities to acquire. This requirement, which conditions the
purpose of acquisition must stand to reason with the larger
constitutional goals of a welfare State and distributive justice.
33.4.2. Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, Sections 3(1) and 7(1) of the Requisitioning and
Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 1952, Sections 2(1),
11(1), 15(1)(b) and 19(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation
and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 and Section 3-A(1) of the National
Highways Act, 1956 depict the statutory incorporation of the
public purpose requirement of compulsory acquisition.
33.4.3. The decision of compulsory acquisition of land is
subject to judicial review and the Court will examine and
determine whether the acquisition is related to public purpose.
If the Court arrives at a conclusion that that there is no public
purpose involved in the acquisition, the entire process can be
set aside. This Court has time and again reiterated the
58
importance of the underlying objective of acquisition of land by
the State to be for a public purpose.
33.5.The Right of restitution or fair compensation
33.5.1. A person's right to hold and enjoy property is an
integral part to the constitutional right under Article 300-A.
Deprivation or extinguishment of that right is permissible only
upon restitution, be it in the form of monetary compensation,
rehabilitation or other similar means. Compensation has always
been considered to be an integral part of the process of
acquisition.
33.5.2. Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
Sections 8 and 9 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of
Immovable Property Act, 1952, Section 23 of the Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and Sections 3-G
and 3-H of the National Highways Act, 1956 are the statutory
incorporations of the right to restitute a person whose land has
been compulsorily acquired.
33.5.3. Our courts have not only considered that
compensation is necessary, but have also held that a fair and
reasonable compensation is the sine qua non for any acquisition
process.
33.6.The Right to an efficient and expeditious
process
33.6.1. The acquisition process is traumatic for
more than one reason. The administrative delays in
identifying the land, conducting the enquiry and
evaluating the objections, leading to a final declaration,
consume time and energy. Further, passing of the award,
payment of compensation and taking over the possession
are equally time-consuming. It is necessary for the
administration to be efficient in concluding the process
and within a reasonable time. This obligation must
necessarily form part of Article 300-A.
33.6.2. Sections 5-A(1), 6, 11-A and 34 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894, Sections 6(1-A) and 9 of the
59
Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property
Act, 1952, Sections 4(2), 7(4), 7(5), 11(5), 14, 15(1),
16(1), 19(2), 25, 38(1), 60(4), 64 and 80 of the Right to
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and Sections
3-C(1), 3-D(3) and 3-E(1) of the National Highways Act,
1956, prescribe for statutory frameworks for the
completion of individual steps in the process of
acquisition of land within stipulated timelines.
33.6.3. On multiple occasions, upon failure to
adhere to the timelines specified in law, the courts have
set aside the acquisition proceedings.
33.7.The Right of conclusion
33.7.1. Upon conclusion of process of acquisition
and payment of compensation, the State
takes possession of the property in normal
circumstances. The culmination of an acquisition process
is not in the payment of compensation, but also in taking
over the actual physical possession of the land. If
possession is not taken, acquisition is not complete. With
the taking over of actual possession after the normal
procedures of acquisition, the private holding is divested
and the right, title and interest in the property, along
with possession is vested in the State. Without final
vesting, the State's, or its beneficiary's right, title and
interest in the property is inconclusive and causes lot of
difficulties. The obligation to conclude and complete the
process of acquisition is also part of Article 300-A.
33.7.2. Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
Sections 4 and 5 of the Requisitioning and Acquisition of
Immovable Property Act, 1952, Sections 37 and 38 of the Right
to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,
Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, and Sections 3-D
and 3-E of the National Highways Act, 1956, statutorily
recognise this right of the acquirer.
33.7.3. This step of taking over of possession has been a
matter of great judicial scrutiny and this Court has endeavoured
to construe the relevant provisions in a way which ensures non-
60
arbitrariness in this action of the acquirer. For that matter, after
taking over possession, the process of land acquisition
concludes with the vesting of the land with the authority
concerned. The culmination of an acquisition process by vesting
has been a matter of great importance. On this aspect, the
courts have given a large number of decisions as to the time,
method and manner by which vesting takes place."
(Emphasis supplied)
At paragraph 33.6.1 the Apex Court observes the acquisition
process is a traumatic one. The administrative delays in identifying
the land and conducting the enquiry leading to the final notification
consumes time and energy. Therefore, it is necessary for the
administration to be efficient in concluding the process within a
reasonable time. This obligation, the Apex Court holds that it must
necessarily form part of Article 300A of the Constitution. The Apex
Court also considers what is reasonable time in the case of
CHAIRMAN, STATE BANK OF INDIA v. M.J. JAMES6 and holds
as follows:
".... .... ....
36. What is a reasonable time is not to be put in a
straitjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of
days, etc. as it depends upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. A right not exercised for a long time is non-
existent. Doctrine of delay and laches as well as
acquiescence are applied to non-suit the litigants who
6
(2022) 2 SCC 301
61
approach the court/appellate authorities belatedly
without any justifiable explanation for bringing action
after unreasonable delay. In the present case, challenge
to the order of dismissal from service by way of appeal
was after four years and five months, which is certainly
highly belated and beyond justifiable time. Without
satisfactory explanation justifying the delay, it is difficult
to hold that the appeal was preferred within a reasonable
time. Pertinently, the challenge was primarily on the
ground that the respondent was not allowed to be
represented by a representative of his choice. The
respondent knew that even if he were to succeed on this
ground, as has happened in the writ proceedings, fresh
inquiry would not be prohibited as finality is not attached
unless there is a legal or statutory bar, an aspect which
has been also noticed in the impugned judgment. This is
highlighted to show the prejudice caused to the
appellants by the delayed challenge. We would,
subsequently, examine the question of acquiescence and
its judicial effect in the context of the present case."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court holds that what is reasonable time cannot be put in
a straightjacket formula or judicially codified in the form of days
inter alia, as it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
case, but holds a right not exercised for a long time becomes
non-existent right.
18. If the facts obtaining in the case at hand are considered
on the bedrock of the elucidation of law by the Apex Court, the
inference would be that the State has lost its right for declaring the
62
area as a slum under Section 17 of the Act by sheer delay. It is an
admitted fact today that slum dwellers who were residents of the
said slum in the year 1982 have all been rehabilitated at Laggere
slum. In the light of rehabilitation of slum dwellers, the purpose for
which the notification is sought to be issued gets completely
diluted. Therefore, the purpose for which the acquisition began has
lost its stream mid-way. Above all, the entire acquisition proceeding
is vitiated on account of delay. The other issue whether Section 20
is to be declared unconstitutional or otherwise need not bear
consideration, in the light of the acquisition being held vitiated on
account of delay.
19. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Writ Petitions are allowed.
63
(ii) Notification dated 23-06-2005 issued by the 1st
respondent/State Government and all further
proceedings thereto, if any, stand quashed.
Sd/-
(M. NAGAPRASANNA)
JUDGE
bkp
CT:MJ
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