Madhya Pradesh High Court
Veerendra Singh Rajpoot vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 1 April, 2025
Author: Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia
Bench: G. S. Ahluwalia
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:7484
1 MCRC-14318-2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE G. S. AHLUWALIA
ON THE 1 st OF APRIL, 2025
MISC. CRIMINAL CASE No. 14318 of 2025
VEERENDRA SINGH RAJPOOT AND OTHERS
Versus
THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Rakesh Kumar Dubey - Advocate for applicants.
Shri Mohit Shivhare - Public Prosecutor for State.
ORDER
This application under Section 528 of BNSS has been filed seeking
quashment of FIR in Crime No.37/2025 registered at Police Station
Madhavganj, District Gwalior for offence under Sections 296, 351(2) of
BNS and Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act.
2 . Since application has been filed on the solitary ground that
applicants were not present on the spot, therefore, it is necessary to discuss
the details of allegations made in the FIR. Applicants are seeking quashment
of FIR on the ground of plea of alibi. It is further submitted that applicants
have also made complaint to police authorities pointing out that applicants
were not present on the spot and they were in their office. However, police
has not investigated the matter from the point of view of applicants.
3. Considered the submission made by counsel for applicants.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 4/2/2025
7:40:49 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:7484
2 MCRC-14318-2025
4 . So far as the question of plea of alibi is concerned, it is a highly
disputed question of fact which is to be proved by accused by leading cogent
evidence in the trial.
5. The Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Pal v. State (Govt. of NCT of
Delhi), reported in (2015) 4 SCC 749 has held as under:-
25. At this juncture, we think it apt to deal with the plea of alibi that
has been put forth by the appellant. As is demonstrable, the trial court
has discarded the plea of alibi. When a plea of alibi is taken by an
accused, burden is upon him to establish the same by positive
evidence after onus as regards presence on the spot is established by
the prosecution. In this context, we may profitably reproduce a few
paragraphs from Binay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar: (SCC p. 293,
paras 22-23) “22. We must bear in mind that an alibi is not an
exception (special or general) envisaged in the Penal Code, 1860 or
any other law. It is only a rule of evidence recognised in Section 11 of
the Evidence Act that facts which are inconsistent with the fact in
issue are relevant. Illustration (a) given under the provision is worth
reproducing in this context: ‘(a) The question is whether A committed
a crime at Calcutta on a certain day. The fact that, on that date, A was
at Lahore is relevant.’ 23. The Latin word alibi means ‘elsewhere’
and that word is used for convenience when an accused takes recourse
to a defence line that when the occurrence took place he was so far
away from the place of occurrence that it is extremely improbable that
he would have participated in the crime. It is a basic law that in a
criminal case, in which the accused is alleged to have inflicted
physical injury to another person, the burden is on the prosecution to
prove that the accused was present at the scene and has participated in
the crime. The burden would not be lessened by the mere fact that the
accused has adopted the defence of alibi. The plea of the accused in
such cases need be considered only when the burden has been
discharged by the prosecution satisfactorily. But once the prosecution
succeeds in discharging the burden it is incumbent on the accused,
who adopts the plea of alibi, to prove it with absolute certainty so as
to exclude the possibility of his presence at the place of occurrence.
When the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence has been
established satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable
evidence, normally the court would be slow to believe any counter-
evidence to the effect that he was elsewhere when the occurrence
happened. But if the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a
quality and of such a standard that the court may entertain some
reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene when the
occurrence took place, the accused would, no doubt, be entitled to the
benefit of that reasonable doubt. For that purpose, it would be a sound
proposition to be laid down that, in such circumstances, the burden on
the accused is rather heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict proof is
required for establishing the plea of alibi.”
(emphasis supplied)
6. The Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Sattar v. State of Maharashtra,
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 4/2/2025
7:40:49 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:7484
3 MCRC-14318-2025
reported in (2010) 8 SCC 430 has held as under:-
“35. Undoubtedly, the burden of establishing the plea of alibi lay upon
the appellant. The appellant herein has miserably failed to bring on
record any facts or circumstances which would make the plea of his
absence even probable, let alone, being proved beyond reasonable
doubt. The plea of alibi had to be proved with absolute certainty so as
to completely exclude the possibility of the presence of the appellant
in the rented premises at the relevant time. When a plea of alibi is
raised by an accused it is for the accused to establish the said plea by
positive evidence which has not been led in the present case. We may
also notice here at this stage the proposition of law laid down in
Gurpreet Singh v. State of Haryana as follows: (SCC p. 27, para 20)
“20. … This plea of alibi stands disbelieved by both the courts
and since the plea of alibi is a question of fact and since both
the courts concurrently found that fact against the appellant, the
accused, this Court in our view, cannot on an appeal by special
leave go behind the abovenoted concurrent finding of fact.”
36. But it is also correct that, even though the plea of alibi of the
appellant is not established, it was for the prosecution to prove the
case against the appellant. To this extent, the submission of the
learned counsel for the appellant was correct. The failure of the plea of
alibi would not necessarily lead to the success of the prosecution case
which has to be independently proved by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt. Being aware of the aforesaid principle of law, the
trial court as also the High Court examined the circumstantial evidence
to exclude the possibility of the innocence of the appellant.”
7. Therefore, whether applicants were present on the spot or not is the
highly disputed question of fact which may be adjudicated by Trial Court
after marshalling the evidence which would come on record.
8 . So far as the application filed by applicants before different
authorities for conducting the investigation from their point of view is
concerned, it is suffice to mention here that accused persons have no right to
dictate his term to the Investigating Officer to conduct the investigation in a
particular manner.
9. The Supreme Court in the case of Romila Thapar and others vs. Union
of India and others reported in (2018) 10 SCC 753 has held as under:-
“23. After having given our anxious consideration to the rival
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 4/2/2025
7:40:49 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:74844 MCRC-14318-2025
submissions and upon perusing the pleadings and documents
produced by both the sides, coupled with the fact that now four
named accused have approached this Court and have asked for being
transposed as writ petitioners, the following broad points may arise
for our consideration:
23.1. (i) Should the investigating agency be changed at the behest of
the named five accused?
23.2. (ii) If the answer to Point (i) is in the negative, can a prayer of
the same nature be entertained at the behest of the next friend of the
accused or in the garb of PIL?
23.3. (iii) If the answer to Questions (i) and/or (ii) above, is in the
affirmative, have the petitioners made out a case for the relief of
appointing Special Investigating Team or directing the court-
monitored investigation by an independent investigating agency?
23.4. (iv) Can the accused person be released merely on the basis of
the perception of his next friend (writ petitioners) that he is an
innocent and law abiding person?
24. Turning to the first point, we are of the considered opinion that
the issue is no more res integra. In Narmada Bai v. State of Gujarat,
in para 64, this Court restated that it is trite law that the accused
persons do not have a say in the matter of appointment of
investigating agency. Further, the accused persons cannot choose as
to which investigating agency must investigate the offence
committed by them. Para 64 of this decision reads thus: (SCC p.
100)
“64. … It is trite law that the accused persons do not
have a say in the matter of appointment of an
investigating agency. The accused persons cannot
choose as to which investigating agency must
investigate the alleged offence committed by them.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. Again in Sanjiv Rajendra Bhatt v. Union of India, the Court
restated that the accused had no right with reference to the manner
of investigation or mode of prosecution. Para 68 of this judgment
reads thus: (SCC p. 40)
“68. The accused has no right with reference to the
manner of investigation or mode of prosecution.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 4/2/2025
7:40:49 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:7484
5 MCRC-14318-2025
Similar is the law laid down by this Court in Union of
India v. W.N. Chadha, Mayawati v. Union of India,
Dinubhai Boghabhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat, CBI
v. Rajesh Gandhi, CCI v. SAIL and Janata Dal v. H.S.
Chowdhary.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. Recently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in E. Sivakumar v.
Union of India, while dealing with the appeal preferred by the
“accused” challenging the order of the High Court directing
investigation by CBI, in para 10 observed: (SCC pp. 370-71)
“10. As regards the second ground urged by the
petitioner, we find that even this aspect has been duly
considered in the impugned judgment. In para 129 of
the impugned judgment, reliance has been placed on
Dinubhai Boghabhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat,
wherein it has been held that in a writ petition seeking
impartial investigation, the accused was not entitled to
opportunity of hearing as a matter of course. Reliance
has also been placed on Narender G. Goel v. State of
Maharashtra, in particular, para 11 of the reported
decision wherein the Court observed that it is well
settled that the accused has no right to be heard at the
stage of investigation. By entrusting the investigation
to CBI which, as aforesaid, was imperative in the
peculiar facts of the present case, the fact that the
petitioner was not impleaded as a party in the writ
petition or for that matter, was not heard, in our
opinion, will be of no avail. That per se cannot be the
basis to label the impugned judgment as a nullity.”
27. This Court in Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kerala, has
enunciated that the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction
cannot change the investigating officer in the midstream and appoint
an investigating officer of its own choice to investigate into a crime
on whatsoever basis. The Court made it amply clear that neither the
accused nor the complainant or informant are entitled to choose their
own investigating agency, to investigate the crime, in which they are
interested. The Court then went on to clarify that the High Court in
exercise of its power under Article 226 of the Constitution can
always issue appropriate directions at the instance of the aggrieved
person if the High Court is convinced that the power of investigation
has been exercised by the investigating officer mala fide.
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 4/2/2025
7:40:49 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:7484
6 MCRC-14318-2025
28. Be that as it may, it will be useful to advert to the exposition in
State of West Bengal and Ors. Vs. Committee for Protection of
Democratic Rights, West Bengal and Ors.13 In paragraph 70 of the
said decision, the Constitution Bench observed thus:
“70. Before parting with the case, we deem it necessary
to emphasise that despite wide powers conferred by
Articles 32 13 (2010) 3 SCC 571 38 and 226 of the
Constitution, while passing any order, the Courts must
bear in mind certain self-imposed limitations on the
exercise of these Constitutional powers. The very
plenitude of the power under the said articles requires
great caution in its exercise. Insofar as the question of
issuing a direction to the CBI to conduct investigation
in a case is concerned, although no inflexible
guidelines can be laid down to decide whether or not
such power should be exercised but time and again it
has been reiterated that such an order is not to be
passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party
has levelled some allegations against the local police.
This extraordinary power must be exercised sparingly,
cautiously and in exceptional situations where it
becomes necessary to provide credibility and instil
confidence in investigations or where the incident may
have national and international ramifications or where
such an order may be necessary for doing complete
justice and enforcing the fundamental rights.
Otherwise the CBI would be flooded with a large
number of cases and with limited resources, may find it
difficult to properly investigate even serious cases and
in the process lose its credibility and purpose with
unsatisfactory investigations.”
29. In the present case, except pointing out some circumstances to
question the manner of arrest of the five named accused sans any
legal evidence to link them with the crime under investigation, no
specific material facts and particulars are found in the petition about
mala fide exercise of power by the investigating officer. A vague
and unsubstantiated assertion in that regard is not enough. 39
Rather, averment in the petition as filed was to buttress the reliefs
initially prayed (mentioned in para 7 above) – regarding the manner
in which arrest was made. Further, the plea of the petitioners of lack
of evidence against the named accused (A16 to A20) has been
seriously disputed by the Investigating Agency and have
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 4/2/2025
7:40:49 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:7484
7 MCRC-14318-2025
commended us to the material already gathered during the ongoing
investigation which according to them indicates complicity of the
said accused in the commission of crime. Upon perusal of the said
material, we are of the considered opinion that it is not a case of
arrest because of mere dissenting views expressed or difference in
the political ideology of the named accused, but concerning their
link with the members of the banned organization and its activities.
This is not the stage where the efficacy of the material or sufficiency
thereof can be evaluated nor it is possible to enquire into whether
the same is genuine or fabricated. We do not wish to dilate on this
matter any further lest it would cause prejudice to the named
accused and including the co-accused who are not before the Court.
Admittedly, the named accused have already resorted to legal 40
remedies before the jurisdictional Court and the same are pending. If
so, they can avail of such remedies as may be permissible in law
before the jurisdictional courts at different stages during the
investigation as well as the trial of the offence under investigation.
During the investigation, when they would be produced before the
Court for obtaining remand by the Police or by way of application
for grant of bail, and if they are so advised, they can also opt for
remedy of discharge at the appropriate stage or quashing of criminal
case if there is no legal evidence, whatsoever, to indicate their
complicity in the subject crime.
30. In view of the above, it is clear that the consistent view of this
Court is that the accused cannot ask for changing the Investigating
Agency or to do investigation in a particular manner including for
Court monitored investigation…………………”
10. The Supreme Court in the case of Dinubhai Boghabhai Solanki v. State
of Gujarat, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 626 has held as under:-
“50. In W.N. Chadha [Union of India v. W.N. Chadha, 1993 Supp
(4) SCC 260 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 1171] , the High Court had quashed
and set aside the order passed by the Special Judge in charge of CBI
matters issuing the order rogatory, on the application of a named
accused in the FIR, Mr W.N. Chadha. The High Court held that the
order issuing letter rogatory was passed in breach of principles of
natural justice. In appeal, this Court held as follows: (SCC pp. 290-
91 & 293, paras 89, 92 & 98)
“89. Applying the above principle, it may be held that
when the investigating officer is not deciding any
matter except collecting the materials for ascertaining
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 4/2/2025
7:40:49 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:7484
8 MCRC-14318-2025
whether a prima facie case is made out or not and a full
enquiry in case of filing a report under Section 173(2)
follows in a trial before the Court or Tribunal pursuant
to the filing of the report, it cannot be said that at that
stage rule of audi alteram partem superimposes an
obligation to issue a prior notice and hear the accused
which the statute does not expressly recognise. The
question is not whether audi alteram partem is implicit,
but whether the occasion for its attraction exists at all.
***
92. More so, the accused has no right to have any say
as regards the manner and method of investigation.
Save under certain exceptions under the entire scheme
of the Code, the accused has no participation as a
matter of right during the course of the investigation of
a case instituted on a police report till the investigation
culminates in filing of a final report under Section
173(2) of the Code or in a proceeding instituted
otherwise than on a police report till the process is
issued under Section 204 of the Code, as the case may
be. Even in cases where cognizance of an offence is
taken on a complaint notwithstanding that the said
offence is triable by a Magistrate or triable exclusively
by the Court of Sessions, the accused has no right to
have participation till the process is issued. In case the
issue of process is postponed as contemplated under
Section 202 of the Code, the accused may attend the
subsequent inquiry but cannot participate. There are
various judicial pronouncements to this effect but we
feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate those
decisions. At the same time, we would like to point out
that there are certain provisions under the Code
empowering the Magistrate to give an opportunity of
being heard under certain specified circumstances.
***
98. If prior notice and an opportunity of hearing are to
be given to an accused in every criminal case before
taking any action against him, such a procedure would
frustrate the proceedings, obstruct the taking of prompt
action as law demands, defeat the ends of justice and
make the provisions of law relating to the investigation
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 4/2/2025
7:40:49 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:7484
9 MCRC-14318-2025
lifeless, absurd and selfdefeating. Further, the scheme
of the relevant statutory provisions relating to the
procedure of investigation does not attract such a
course in the absence of any statutory obligation to the
contrary.”
These observations make it abundantly clear that it would not be
necessary to give an opportunity of hearing to the proposed accused
as a matter of course. The Court cautioned that if prior notice and an
opportunity of hearing have to be given in every criminal case
before taking any action against the accused person, it would
frustrate the entire objective of an effective investigation. In the
present case, the appellant was not even an accused at the time when
the impugned order was passed by the High Court. Finger of
suspicion had been pointed at the appellant by independent
witnesses as well as by the grieved father of the victim.
51. In Rajesh Gandhi case [ CBI v. Rajesh Gandhi , (1996) 11 SCC
253 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 88] , this Court again reiterated the law as
follows: (SCC pp. 256- 57, para 8)
“8. There is no merit in the pleas raised by the first
respondent either. The decision to investigate or the
decision on the agency which should investigate, does
not attract principles of natural justice. The accused
cannot have a say in who should investigate the
offences he is charged with. We also fail to see any
provision of law for recording reasons for such a
decision. … There is no provision in law under which,
while granting consent or extending the powers and
jurisdiction of the Delhi Special Police Establishment
to the specified State and to any specified case any
reasons are required to be recorded on the face of the
notification. The learned Single Judge of the Patna
High Court was clearly in error in holding so. If
investigation by the local police is not satisfactory, a
further investigation is not precluded. In the present
case the material on record shows that the investigation
by the local police was not satisfactory. In fact the
local police had filed a final report before the Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad. The report, however,
was pending and had not been accepted when the
Central Government with the consent of the State
Government issued the impugned notification. As a
result, CBI has been directed to further investigate the
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 4/2/2025
7:40:49 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:7484
10 MCRC-14318-2025
offences registered under the said FIR with the consent
of the State Government and in accordance with law.
Under Section 173(8) CrPC, 1973 also, there is an
analogous provision for further investigation in respect
of an offence after a report under sub-section (2) has
been forwarded to the Magistrate.”
The aforesaid observations would clearly support the course adopted
by the High Court in this matter. We have earlier noticed that the
High Court had initially directed that the investigation be carried
under the supervision of the Special Commissioner of Police, Crime
Branch, of the rank of the Additional Director General of Police. It
was only when the High Court was of the opinion that even further
investigation was not impartial, it was transferred to CBI.
52. Again in Sri Bhagwan Samardha [Sri Bhagwan Samardha
Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwanandha Maharaj v. State of A.P.,
(1999) 5 SCC 740 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 1047] , this Court observed as
follows: (SCC pp. 742-43, paras 10-11)
“10. Power of the police to conduct further
investigation, after laying final report, is recognised
under Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Even after the court took cognizance of any
offence on the strength of the police report first
submitted, it is open to the police to conduct further
investigation. This has been so stated by this Court in
Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1979) 2
SCC 322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] . The only rider
provided by the aforesaid decision is that it would be
desirable that the police should inform the court and
seek formal permission to make further investigation.
11. In such a situation the power of the court to direct
the police to conduct further investigation cannot have
any inhibition. There is nothing in Section 173(8) to
suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused
before any such direction is made. Casting of any such
obligation on the court would only result in
encumbering the court with the burden of searching for
all the potential accused to be afforded with the
opportunity of being heard. As the law does not require
it, we would not burden the Magistrate with such an
obligation.”
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 4/2/2025
7:40:49 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:7484
11 MCRC-14318-2025
These observations also make it clear that there was no
obligation for the High Court to either hear or to make
the appellant a party to the proceedings before
directing that the investigation be conducted by CBI.
53. We had earlier noticed that the High Court had come to the
prima facie conclusion that the investigation conducted by the police
was with the motive to give a clean chit to the appellant, in spite of
the statements made by the independent witnesses as well as the
allegations made by the father of the deceased. The legal position
has been reiterated by this Court in Narender G. Goel [Narender G.
Goel v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6 SCC 65 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri)
933] : (SCC pp. 68-69, paras 11-13)
“11. It is well settled that the accused has no right to be
heard at the stage of investigation. The prosecution will
however have to prove its case at the trial when the
accused will have full opportunity to rebut/question the
validity and authenticity of the prosecution case. In Sri
Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata
Vishwanandha Maharaj v. State of A.P. [Sri Bhagwan
Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwanandha
Maharaj v. State of A.P., (1999) 5 SCC 740 : 1999
SCC (Cri) 1047] this Court observed: (SCC p. 743,
para 11) „
11. … There is nothing in Section 173(8) to suggest
that the court is obliged to hear the accused before any
such direction is made. Casting of any such obligation
on the court would only result in encumbering the
court with the burden of searching for all the potential
accused to be afforded with the opportunity of being
heard.‟
12. The accused can certainly avail himself of an opportunity to
cross-examine and/or otherwise controvert the authenticity,
admissibility or legal significance of material evidence
gathered in the course of further investigations. Further in light
of the views expressed by the investigating officer in his
affidavit before the High Court, it is apparent that the
investigating authorities would inevitably have conducted
further investigation with the aid of CFS under Section 173(8)
of the Code.
13. We are of the view that what is the evidentiary value can be
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 4/2/2025
7:40:49 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:7484
12 MCRC-14318-2025
tested during the trial. At this juncture it would not be proper
to interfere in the matter.”
11. Furthermore, this Court while exercising the powers under Section
528 of BNSS can also not issue any direction to the police authorities to
conduct the investigation in a particular manner because such a direction
would certainly come under the purview of supervising the investigation.
12. Supreme Court in the Case of Manohar Lal Sharma Vs. Principal
Secretary and others, reported in (2014) 2 SCC 532 has held as under:-
“38. The monitoring of investigations/inquiries by the Court is
intended to ensure that proper progress takes place without directing
or channelling the mode or manner of investigation. The whole idea
is to retain public confidence in the impartial inquiry/investigation
into the alleged crime; that inquiry/investigation into every
accusation is made on a reasonable basis irrespective of the position
and status of that person and the inquiry/investigation is taken to the
logical conclusion in accordance with law. The monitoring by the
Court aims to lend credence to the inquiry/investigation being
conducted by CBI as premier investigating agency and to eliminate
any impression of bias, lack of fairness and objectivity therein.
39. However, the investigation/inquiry monitored by the court does
not mean that the court supervises such investigation/inquiry. To
supervise would mean to observe and direct the execution of a task
whereas to monitor would only mean to maintain surveillance. The
concern and interest of the court in such “Court-directed” or “Court-
monitored” cases is that there is no undue delay in the investigation,
and the investigation is conducted in a free and fair manner with no
external interference. In such a process, the people acquainted with
facts and circumstances of the case would also have a sense of
security and they would cooperate with the investigation given that
the superior courts are seized of the matter. We find that in some
cases, the expression “Courtmonitored” has been interchangeably
used with “Court-supervised investigation” Once the court
supervises an investigation, there is hardly anything left in the trial.
Under the Code, the investigating officer is only to form an opinion
and it is for the court to ultimately try the case based on the opinion
formed by the investigating officer and see whether any offence has
been made out. If a superior court supervises the investigation andSignature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 4/2/2025
7:40:49 PM
NEUTRAL CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-GWL:7484
13 MCRC-14318-2025
thus facilitates the formulation of such opinion in the form of a
report under Section 173(2) of the Code, it will be difficult if not
impossible for the trial court to not be influenced or bound by such
opinion. Then trial becomes a farce. Therefore, supervision of
investigation by any court is a contradiction in terms. The Code
does not envisage such a procedure, and it cannot either. In the rare
and compelling circumstances referred to above, the superior courts
may monitor an investigation to ensure that the investigating agency
conducts the investigation in a free, fair and time-bound manner
without any external interference.”
13. Thus, it is clear that this Court cannot supervise the investigation
and at the most it can monitor the investigation. There is a basic difference
between supervision and monitoring the case. Monitoring the case would
merely mean that investigation is concluded as per mandate of Section
173(1) of Cr.P.C./Section 193(1) of BNSS.
14. Viewed from every angle, this Court is of considered opinion that
no case is made out warranting interference. Petition fails and is hereby
dismissed.
(G. S. AHLUWALIA)
JUDGE
Rashid
Signature Not Verified
Signed by: RASHID KHAN
Signing time: 4/2/2025
7:40:49 PM
[ad_1]
Source link