Delhi High Court – Orders
Vinod Kumar Verma vs State Of Nct Of Delhi And Anr on 8 May, 2025
Author: Sanjeev Narula
Bench: Sanjeev Narula
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.M.C. 379/2025
VINOD KUMAR VERMA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Harshit Jain, Advocate
(DHCLSC) with Mr. Rahul Kumar,
Mr. Shubham Singh, Advocates
versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI AND ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Hemant Mehla, APP for State
with Insp. Sandeep Kumar, PS Madhu
Vihar
Mr. Gaurav Mehta, Ms. Sakshi Harit,
Mr. Ojas Singh Sachdeva, Advocates
for R-2
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
ORDER
% 08.05.2025
1. The present petition under Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha
Sanhita, 2023 seeks quashing of FIR No. 263/20231 dated 13th June, 2023,
registered at P.S. Madhu Vihar for offences under Sections 447/448/34 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860,2 as well as all consequential proceedings
emanating therefrom. Subsequently, the impugned FIR was amended and
Section 380 of IPC was also added.
1
“the impugned FIR”
2
“IPC”
CRL.M.C. 379/2025 Page 1 of 11
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2. The case of the prosecution is briefly outlined as follows:
2.1. The impugned FIR was registered on the basis of a complaint made
by Kamlesh Bhardwaj, a 72-year-old woman, against two individuals- Raj
Kumar Mishra and the Petitioner. The Complainant alleged that both the
accused are unlawfully asserting ownership over the Complainant’s
property, identified as Old No. D-2, now A-13, Madhu Vihar, Delhi.3 The
Complainant asserts that she has held valid title documents to the said
premises since 1988.
2.2. On 13th October, 2022, the Complainant received a call from a
neighbour informing her that Raj Kumar Mishra was attempting to install
electricity meter on her property. By the time Ms. Bhardwaj arrived, a PCR
van was already at the site. She informed the police that the property
belonged to her mother-in-law. Ms. Bhardwaj further reported that certain
household items, including a table, chair, cupboard, and a locked door, had
gone missing.
2.3. The Complainant produced the original title documents before the
police. Based on this, the FIR was registered and investigation commenced.
2.4. During the investigation, relevant documents were seized, and a local
inquiry was conducted, which corroborated the Complainant’s claim of
ownership of the property. Statements of key witnesses were recorded, and
records from the Department of Archives further validated the
Complainant’s ownership. Additionally, records from BSES confirmed that
a meter was installed in the Complainant’s name on 4th August, 2003, while3
“The property in question”
CRL.M.C. 379/2025 Page 2 of 11
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a temporary electricity meter had been installed in the name of Raj Kumar
Mishra in the year 2022. Records from the MCD, Assessment and
Collection Department, Shahdara South Zone, Delhi, also confirmed the
Complainant’s ownership of the property.
2.5. The police also took note of an FIR No. 144/2015, dated 7 th February,
2015, lodged by the Complainant’s son, Rajesh Bhardwaj, concerning theft
at the same address. This, according to the prosecution, also indicates
Complainant’s possession as far back as 2015.
2.6. During further investigation, Raj Kumar Mishra claimed that he had
purchased the property from one Mr. Madan for a sum of INR 6.5 lakhs and
had been in possession since 2005. He furnished self-attested copies of
certain property documents but stated that the originals had been filed in
Civil Suit No. 901/2022 titled Vinod Kumar Verma v. Raj Kumar Mishra,
which had been instituted by the present Petitioner. On 16 th January, 2025,
the said civil suit was referred to mediation on the joint request of the
parties.
2.7. As part of the investigation, notices under Section 41-A of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 19734 were sent to the Petitioner on three occasions:
6th June, 2024, 9th September, 2024, and 18th October, 2024. However, the
Petitioner failed to appear despite service. Two applications for anticipatory
bail filed by him were dismissed by the Court of Additional Sessions Judge-
03, Shahdara, on 29th October, 2024 and 19th November, 2024, respectively.
Non-bailable warrants were then issued. Despite concerted efforts by the4
“Cr.P.C”
CRL.M.C. 379/2025 Page 3 of 11
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investigating agency, the Petitioner could not be apprehended, prompting
initiation of proceedings under Section 82 of Cr.P.C.
2.8. On 22nd February, 2025, during execution of the process under
Section 82 of Cr.P.C, the Petitioner was arrested in accordance with the law.
2.9. A charge sheet was filed against Raj Kumar Mishra on 15th January,
2025. As far as the Petitioner is concerned, investigation remains pending.
3. Counsel for the Petitioner argues that the impugned FIR is liable to be
quashed as the allegations made are false and fabricated, and do not disclose
the alleged offences against the Petitioner. He urges the following in support
of his petition:
3.1. The Petitioner is the legitimate owner of the property in question.
Reliance is placed upon extensive documentation, including a General
Power of Attorney, an Agreement to Sell, an Affidavit, Payment Receipts,
and Registered Wills all executed on 1st January, 2001, proving Petitioner’s
legitimate ownership. Consequently, the allegation of criminal trespass
collapses entirely.
3.2. The Petitioner has filed a civil suit (CS No. 901/2022) against Raj
Kumar Mishra, Jyoti Bhardwaj, and Kamlesh Bhardwaj regarding the
subject property. A Local Commissioner appointed by the Civil Court
submitted a report dated 14th November, 2022, expressly stating that no
party was in actual physical possession. This undermines any allegations of
dispossession or criminal trespass levelled against the Petitioner.
3.3. The impugned FIR was registered 8 months after the incident.
Moreover, the complaint dated 14th October, 2022, initially submitted by
Kamlesh Bhardwaj, materially differs from the version presented in the FIR,
CRL.M.C. 379/2025 Page 4 of 11
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particularly regarding the allegedly stolen household items such as a chair,
table, cupboard, and a lock with a chain. These accusations, are
demonstrably contrived and appear to be nothing more than afterthoughts.
3.4. The Complainant is attempting to turn a civil dispute into a criminal
matter in order to harass the Petitioner and exert pressure to comply with the
Complainant’s illegal demands.
4. Per contra, counsel for the Complainant opposes the present petition
presenting a sharply contrasting narrative grounded on the following
contentions:
4.1. The Complainant has maintained uninterrupted possession of the
property since 1988. The Petitioner and his co-accused forcibly attempted to
dispossess the Complainant and unlawfully appropriated household articles
from the premises. The documents submitted by the Complainant to the
investigating officer date back to January, 1988, and substantiate
Complainant’s possession. This corroborated by the statements of the
neighbours recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C, confirm the
Complainant’s long-term possession of the property in question.
4.2. In the ongoing civil litigation, the Petitioner has described himself as
indigent, expressly disclaiming ownership of any movable or immovable
property. Such admissions, directly contradict his current assertion of lawful
ownership.
4.3. The Petitioner has allegedly purchased the property in question from
Ved Prakash and Mahesh Chand Sharma. However, he has concealed the
fact that the said individuals executed a registered cancellation deed
revoking their prior transactions. Moreover, both Ved Prakash and MaheshCRL.M.C. 379/2025 Page 5 of 11
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Chand Sharma have separately initiated proceedings against the Petitioner in
this Court and before the Additional District Judge (East), Karkardooma
Courts, which demonstrates that Petitioners claims are dubious.
5. Mr. Hemant Mehla, APP for the State, informs that a chargesheet has
already been filed against the co-accused, Raj Kumar Mishra, and the
Petitioner himself has been arrested pursuant to due process. He further
assures the Court that a supplementary charge sheet against the Petitioner is
imminent and shall shortly be filed before the Trial Court.
6. The Court has carefully considered the submissions of the Petitioners.
At the outset, it is pertinent to emphasise that the extraordinary power vested
in this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C, to quash criminal proceedings
must be exercised sparingly, judiciously, and only when compelling
circumstances so warrant. The Supreme Court, in Indian Oil Corporation v.
NEPC India Limited and Others,5 succinctly summarized the legal
principles governing the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,
which may be briefly recounted as follows:
“12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal
proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several
decisions. To mention a few– Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v.
Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri)
234] , State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992
SCC (Cri) 426] , Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6
SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059] , Central Bureau of Investigation v.
Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045]
, State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164 : 1996 SCC
(Cri) 628] , Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999
SCC (Cri) 401] , Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E.
Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615] , Hridaya Ranjan Prasad5
(2006) 6 SCC 736.
CRL.M.C. 379/2025 Page 6 of 11
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Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] , M.
Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and
Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1
SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283] . The principles, relevant to our purpose
are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case
alleged against the accused.
For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but
without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed
inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of
the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is
warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint.
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the
process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have
been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause
harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a
legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with
abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal
ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is
laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not
been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of
the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even
the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence.
(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b)
purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence.
A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing
a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a
criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are
different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint
relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a
civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to
quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in
the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not”
[Emphasis Supplied]
7. Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v.
CRL.M.C. 379/2025 Page 7 of 11
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State (NCT of Delhi),6 referencing several judgments, has delineated the
criteria for the exercise of inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal
proceedings at a preliminary stage:
“14. The parameters for invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to
quash the criminal proceedings under S.482 CrPC, have been spelled out
by Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian for the two judges’ bench in State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604], and
the suggested precautionary principles serve as good law even today, for
invocation of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
‘103. We also give a note of caution to the effect
that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should
be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and
that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not
be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint and that the
extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an
arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its
whim or caprice.’
15. In the impugned judgment, the learned Judge had rightly relied upon
the opinion of Justice J.S. Khehar for a Division Bench in Rajiv Thapar
(supra), which succinctly express the following relevant parameters to be
considered by the quashing Court, at the stage of issuing process,
committal, or framing of charges,’28. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This
is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of
the allegations levelled by the prosecution/Complainant
against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for
determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the
accused are. Even if the accused is successful in showing
some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the
prosecution/Complainant, it would be impermissible to
discharge the accused before trial. This is so because it
would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by
the prosecution/Complainant, without allowing the
prosecution or the Complainant to adduce evidence to6
2022 SCC OnLine SC 513.
CRL.M.C. 379/2025 Page 8 of 11
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substantiate the same.’
16. The proposition of law as set out above makes it abundantly clear that
the Court should be slow to grant the relief of quashing a complaint at a
pre-trial stage, when the factual controversy is in the realm of possibility
particularly because of the legal presumption, as in this matter. What is
also of note is that the factual defence without having to adduce any
evidence need to be of an unimpeachable quality, so as to altogether
disprove the allegations made in the complaint.
17. The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pretrial stage
can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary
stages will result in finality without the parties having had an
opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the
proper forum i.e., the trial Court is ousted from weighing the material
evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an un-merited
advantage in the criminal process.”
[Emphasis Supplied]
8. Applying these settled principles to the facts at hand, it becomes
evident that the submissions raised by the Petitioner are predominantly their
defences, largely premised upon the assertion of ownership documents and
pending civil litigation. Such contentions, as persuasive as they might be in
civil adjudication, cannot automatically discredit or negate the allegations
detailed in the FIR. Indeed, the Petitioner’s claims, notably his reliance on
ownership documents and assertions of civil possession disputes, inherently
involve disputed questions of fact that would require determination on the
basis of evidence to be adduced by parties, precisely the function of a trial
court. Any interference by this Court would be premature and prejudice the
rights of the complainant.
9. Moreover, the timeline between the incident and the FIR, is not by
itself indicative of mala fide intent or fabrication, especially considering that
the Complainant promptly reported the initial dispute to the authorities.
CRL.M.C. 379/2025 Page 9 of 11
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Further, discrepancies highlighted between the complaint dated 14 th
October, 2022, and the FIR lodged subsequently do not conclusively
demonstrate fabrication or malicious intent. The effect of alleged variations
between different accounts of the Complainant is an issue to be considered
by the Trial Court; and not sufficient ground for quashing under Section 482
of Cr.P.C. at this priliminary stage.
10. Significantly, the allegations levelled, encompassing both trespass and
theft, clearly outline offences cognizable under IPC. The Complainant’s
assertions are supported by documentary evidence spanning several decades
and corroborated preliminarily by independent witness statements. Thus, on
the prima facie evaluation of these allegations, this Court cannot deem the
FIR improbable or absurd to the extent that would warrant the exercise of its
extraordinary jurisdiction to quash. Additionally, mere existence or
pendency of civil proceedings concerning the same subject matter does not
ipso facto provide a ground for quashing criminal proceedings under Section
482 of Cr.P.C.7 Criminal law and civil remedies operate distinctly and
independently, and the mere availability of a civil remedy does not
inherently preclude criminal accountability, particularly where the factual
allegations suggest acts beyond mere civil wrongs.
11. Consequently, this Court refrains from exercising its inherent
jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C to quash the FIR at this preliminary
juncture. It is clarified, however, that the observations herein should not be
construed as indicative of the merits of the allegations or the Petitioner’s
7
See also: Punit Beriwala v. State NCT of Delhi, 2025 INSC 582
CRL.M.C. 379/2025 Page 10 of 11
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defences thereto. The Petitioner shall remain fully entitled to raise all factual
and legal defences available to him before the Trial Court at the appropriate
stage.
12. Dismissed.
SANJEEV NARULA, J
MAY 8, 2025/ab
CRL.M.C. 379/2025 Page 11 of 11
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