Vipan Kumar vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Anr on 26 March, 2025

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Himachal Pradesh High Court

Vipan Kumar vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Anr on 26 March, 2025

Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. MMO No. 610 of 2022
Reserved on: 17.03.2025
Date of Decision: 26th March 2025.

    Vipan Kumar                                                                  ...Petitioner
                                            Versus

    State of Himachal Pradesh and anr.                                           ...Respondents

    Coram

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No

For the Petitioner : Mr. Vivek Singh Attri, Advocate.

For the Respondent/State. : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy
Advocate General.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner has filed the present petition for

quashing FIR no. 47 of 2019, dated 03.04.2019, registered in Police

Station Gagret, Una, H.P and criminal proceedings arising out of

it.

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

petition are that the informant made a complaint to the police

asserting that the present petitioner was posted as Bank Manager

in Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Branch Office at Daulatpur
1
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

Chowk, District Una. He told the informant to take a loan to

purchase a truck for ₹17,90,000/-. The informant mortgaged his

land and paid the margin money to purchase the truck. The

petitioner, in connivance with Ravi Kumar Jaswal and Lalit Jaswal,

obtained the signatures of the informant on various documents.

The petitioner was not taken to any showroom. The amount of the

truck loan was transferred to the accounts of Lalit and Ravi.

₹4,08,000/- deposited in the informant’s account was also

withdrawn. The informant got no truck, and his land was also

mortgaged. The petitioner and co-accused threatened the

informant that he and his family members would be killed in case

the matter was reported to any person. The police registered the

FIR and conducted the investigation. It was found after the

investigation that Lalit Jaswal had prepared a forged quotation in

connivance with Ravi Kumar. The petitioner sanctioned the loan

on the forged quotation. A bank draft of ₹17,90,000/- was sent to

M/s Khalsa Enterprises Jalandhar Road Hoshiarpur, and there was

no agency in the name of M/s Khalsa Enterprises Jalandhar Road

Hoshiarpur. Admitted and specimen handwriting of Lalit Jaswal

and Ravi Jaswal were taken. As per the report of RFSL, the

signatures and handwriting of Lalit Jaswal matched the forged
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

quotation. The handwriting of Ravi Kumar matched with the

voucher. The loan was transferred to Sukhwinder Singh, who

withdrew the amount. His specimen signatures matched the

signatures on the vouchers. The petitioner did not verify whether

any such agency existed or not; hence, the charge sheet was filed

before the Court for the commission of offences punishable under

Sections 420, 406, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of IPC.

3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the FIR, the

petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the

informant reached the Bank along with Ravi Kumar and Lalit

Jaswal to avail the term loan facility. He opened a Saving Bank

Account and a loan account in the bank. He executed a mortgage

deed in favour of the Bank to avail the loan of ₹13,90,000/-. He

also produced a proforma invoice for getting the loan. The

petitioner found all the documents in order and sanctioned the

loan of ₹13,90,000/-. The informant paid margin money of

₹4,00,000/-. The amount of ₹17,90,000/- was transferred to M/s

Khalsa Enterprises, payable at Axis Bank, Shimla, for the purchase

of the vehicle. Khalsa Enterprises issued a sale certificate showing

the delivery of the vehicle to Kewal Krishan-informant. The

informant handed over a temporary registration certificate to the
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

Bank. He failed to produce the permanent registration number

and insurance certificate. He failed to pay the loan instalments.

The bank issued a letter asking him to deposit the amount. The

informant lodged the FIR as a counterblast to the demand raised

by the Bank. The complainant is an educated person. He had

signed all the documents after reading them. The allegations in

the FIR are false. He had voluntarily executed all the documents in

favour of the Bank. The petitioner cannot be held liable for the

forged invoice produced by the informant. The informant caused a

loss to the Bank and filed a false complaint to avoid his liability.

Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and

the FIR be quashed.

4. The petition is opposed by filing a reply by the

respondents making preliminary submissions regarding lack of

locus standi and the petitioner having concealed the material facts

from the Court. It was asserted that the investigating agency

conducted the investigation fairly, impartially and as per the law.

It was found after the investigation that Lalit Jaswal and the co-

accused had forged a quotation of the commercial vehicle, and

they induced the informant to execute a mortgage deed. The

petitioner sanctioned the loan in connivance with the other co-
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

accused without verifying the genuineness of the invoice

produced before him. The police filed the charge sheet before the

Court, and the competent court is seized the matter. The

petitioner has the efficacious remedy of submitting his version

before the learned Trial Court. Hence, it was prayed that the

present petition be dismissed.

5. I have heard Mr. Vivek Singh Attri, learned counsel for

the petitioner and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate

General, for the respondent/State.

6. Mr Vivek Singh Attri, learned counsel for the petitioner,

submitted that the FIR was lodged on the false facts. The

informant himself had produced the forged documents, and he

cheated the Bank and the petitioner. The petitioner was not

supposed to verify the correctness of the documents submitted by

the petitioner. The allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognisable offence. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition

be allowed and the FIR be quashed.

7. Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for

respondents No.1 and 2/State submitted that the petitioner in

connivance with the other co-accused had sanctioned the loan
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

based on the forged document. The vehicle was never purchased

and Sukhjinder Singh appropriated the money transferred to his

account, therefore, he prayed that the present petition be

dismissed.

8. I have given considerable thought to the submissions

made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

9. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC

OnLine SC 7 as under: –

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it
is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to
be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the
decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan
Lal
, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has
summarized some of the principles under which
FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the
following words:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series
of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive
list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should
be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety
do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out
a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying
the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence,
justifying an investigation by police officers under
Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of
a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2)
of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the
commission of any offence and make out a case
against the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-

cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently
improbable on the basis of which no prudent
person can ever reach a just conclusion that there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for
the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an
ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to private
and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would
be of relevance to us in this case.

In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the
allegations made in the first information report or the
complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR
or the complaint can be quashed.

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not
constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police
officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such
a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an
express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of
the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal
proceedings are instituted, such proceeding can be
quashed.”

10. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185 wherein it was observed:

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its
extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may
issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to
secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are
neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory
provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly.
The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded
within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High
Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where
intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the
course of several decades, has laid down the principles and
guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing
criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting
the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial
Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the
following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been
filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the
legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv)
the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains
vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are
willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal
, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)

11. The present petition is to be decided as per the

parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

12. The status report clearly mentions that the forged

invoice was used to sanction the loan. The petitioner asserted that

the invoice was forged by the informant in connivance with Lalit

and Ravi, whereas the prosecution has asserted that this was

forged by Lalit and Ravi in connivance with the petitioner. These

facts are to be verified by conducting a trial, and it is

impermissible for this Court to determine the truthfulness or

falsity of the allegations made by either party. It was laid down by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under

Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot conduct an inquiry to determine the

reliability, genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in

the FIR. It was observed:

“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to
the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations
made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of
the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the
allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face
value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make
out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in
the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint
even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the
commission of an offence or make out a case against the
accused. We are of the considered view that the present case
would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated
by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court
in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
Department of Home
(2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:

“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission
of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that
once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for
quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit
in this submission, keeping in mind the position of
this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A.
v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7
SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23].
In Joseph Salvaraj
A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat
, (2011) 7 SCC
59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the
question of whether the High Court could entertain
the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the
charge-sheet was filed by the police during the
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC
p. 63, para 16)
“16. Thus, the general conspectus of the
various sections under which the appellant is
being charged and is to be prosecuted would
show that the same is not made out even
prima facie from the complainant’s FIR. Even
if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned
Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have
still examined whether the offences alleged
to have been committed by the appellant were
prima facie made out from the complainant’s
FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”

13. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:

2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court while exercising

jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC cannot conduct a mini-

trial. It was observed on page 397:

“17. This Court in a series of judgments has held that while
exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not
supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be
made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan
Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The
relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted
hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
“6. … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of
discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings,
while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the
Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …

7. … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the
powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether
any sufficient material is available to proceed further
against the accused for which the accused is required to
be tried or not’.”

14. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the

truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR.

15. The petitioner was posted as a Bank Manager. He

issued the Bank draft in favour of the Khalsa Enterprises. The

status report shows that no such agency existed. Therefore, the

issuance of the Bank draft in the name of a non-existing agency

prima facie shows the involvement of the petitioner in the

commission of the crime.

16. A heavy reliance was placed upon the photocopies of

the letters stated to have been written by the petitioner to the

informant asking him to deposit the insurance certificate and the

permanent registration certificate. The authenticity of these

documents is yet to be verified and it is premature for this Court to

say anything about these documents. It will be open for the

petitioner to produce these documents before the learned Trial

Court, which would be within the jurisdiction to comment on their

authenticity and reliability.

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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

17. Reliance was also placed upon the statements of the

accounts, wherein some amount is stated to have been deposited

by the informant. Again, these are photocopies, and their

authenticity cannot be commented upon. It was laid down by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC

1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed if on the

face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same no

offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract

anything. It was observed:

“10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings
against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only
if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying
the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test
is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are,
without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is
made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing
the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482
of the present Code.”

18. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram,

1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the

fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceedings

under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:

“Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed
to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari
filed a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in
Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is
neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent, by filing this
document, is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is
not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C.”

19. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in

Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K.

Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:

“9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the
documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of
the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness
of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents,
which are not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC
debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of
the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of
Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another
, 2002 (1) Supreme

192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as
follows:

“The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears
that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of
the statement made on oath of the complainant that
the ingredients of the offence or offences are
disclosed and there is no material to show that the
complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that
event there would be no justification for interference
by the High Court. When information is lodged at the
Police Station and an offence is registered, then the
mala fides of the informant would be of secondary
importance. It is the material collected during the
investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides
the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala
fides against the informant are of no consequence and
cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the
proceedings”.

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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

20. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of

Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was

observed at page 142:

“16. … the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the
complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from
the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the
offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the
veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed
in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based
on the evidence collected during the course of the trial.”

21. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of

Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was

held:

13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely
on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial
but the same are not material at the stage of deciding
whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High
Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to
place any reliance on these three documents.

22. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus

Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC

86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was

observed:

“63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction
by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where
the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have
not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a
prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of
inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not
there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple
proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High
Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine
the High Courts’ powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such
powers are always available to be exercised ex debito
justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the
administration of which alone the High Courts exist.
However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or
criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the
High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section
482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid
down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read
with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due
satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of
the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the
complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary
evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that
proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an
abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible
if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so
demand.” (Emphasis supplied)

23. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into these

documents.

24. No other point was urged.

25. Therefore, the allegations in the FIR constitute a

commission of a cognisable offence, and the same cannot be

quashed in the exercise of the inherent powers of this Court;

consequently, the present petition fails, and the same is dismissed.
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Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:7805 )

26. The observations made hereinbefore shall remain

confined to the disposal of the present petition and will have no

effect on the merits of the case.

(Rakesh Kainthla)
26 March,2025
th
Judge
(Saurav Pathania)

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