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Jharkhand High Court
Vipul Munjal S/O Harish Munjal Aged … vs State Of Jharkhand Through Secretary on 8 April, 2025
Author: Deepak Roshan
Bench: Deepak Roshan
2025:JHHC:10886
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No. 6473 of 2024
1. Vipul Munjal S/o Harish Munjal aged about 45 years, R/o
Firayalal Compound, Kadru Division, P.O and P.S Chutia,
Dist-Ranchi.
2. Ritul Munjal S/o Harish Munjal aged about 43 years, R/o
Firayalal Compound, Kadru Division, P.O and P.S Chutia,
Dist-Ranchi. .....Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Jharkhand through Secretary, Department of
Revenue, Registration and Land Reforms, officiating from his
office at Project Bhawan, Ground Floor, Project Building, P.O
and P.S Dhurwa, Dist-Ranchi.
2. Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi officiating from his office at
O/o of Deputy Commissioner, Collectorate Building, beside
Civil Court, Ranchi, P.O. GPO, P.S Kotwali, Dist-Ranchi.
3. Special Regulation Officer, Ranchi, officiating from his
office at 98HG+2GH, Deputy Para, P.O and P.S Ahirtoli, Dist-
Ranchi.
4. Badal Oraon, S/o Late Domba Oraon, aged about not known
to the Petitioner, R/o Village-New Garden, Siramtoli,
Chutiya, P.O and P.S Chutiya, Dist-Ranchi.
....Respondents
---------
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
———
For the Petitioner : Mr. Prashant Pallav, Advocate
Mr. Parth Jalan, Advocate
For the Resp.-State : Mr. Mohan Kumar Dubey, A.C. to A.G
For the Res. No.4 : Mr. Radha Krishna Gupta, Advocate
———
CAV On:26/03/2025 Delivered on: 08/4/2025
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The instant writ petition has been filed praying, inter alia, for
quashing of the entire proceedings being SAR No. 52/2024-25,
initiated by the Court of Special Regulation Officer, initiated under
Section 71A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 vide notice
bearing number 340 dated 19.10.2024.
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3. Mr. Prashant Pallav, assisted by Mr. Parth Jalan, learned
counsels representing the petitioners submit that the land
appertaining to Khata No. 31, Plot No. 28 (corresponding to MS Plot
No. 1226) admeasuring an area of 1.41 acres in village-Siram
(hereinafter referred to as the scheduled land) was in the continuous
and peaceful possession of the Petitioners since 1946. The ancestor
of the Petitioners namely Jiwal Lal, took permission from then
Deputy Commissioner under the provisions of the Chotanagpur
Tenancy Act, 1908 and purchased the land from the recorded raiyat
(i.e. ancestors of Domba Oraon) by execution of a registered sale
deed on 20.7.1960.
It has been submitted that soon thereafter a suit being
Original Suit No. 109 of 1961 was filed by the legal heirs of Domba
Oraon against their co-sharers i.e. the legal heirs of Cherbo Oraon
along with the ancestor of the Petitioners. The Plaintiff of this suit
have sought for the relief for partition of the suit property and
further prayed that the compensation against acquisition of the land
appertaining to Plot No. 26 and 27 be released in their favour. The
suit was compromised and a decree was prepared in which the right,
title and interest of the Petitioners’ ancestor over the scheduled land
was recognized.
4. It has been further pleaded that the ancestor of Respondent
No. 4, namely one Domba Oraon had filed a case under Section 71A
of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 which was registered as SAR
Case No. 132 of 1992-93. The same was dismissed on the ground of
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limitation and the said decision was affirmed by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India in the order passed in Civil Appeal No. 1057
of 2004 dated 31.8.2010.
He further submits that the Respondent No. 4 is a luxurious
litigant and along with the impugned proceedings he is also
pursuing another suit being Original Suit No. 495 of 2021, in which
the same and similar reliefs have been sought.
5. In light of the above facts, it has been submitted that the
instant proceedingsis not only hopelessly barred by limitation but
also hit by the principles of res judicata. Further, it has been
contented that the Respondent No. 4 has not approached the
authorities with clean hands and have committed perjury by
furnishing a false statement on affidavit wherein it has been stated
that no other case has been filed by him with respect to the
scheduled land and as such the impugned proceeding is fit to be
quashed.
6. It has been submitted by Mr. Radha Krishna Gupta
appearing for the Respondent no.4that the land appertaining to Plot
No. 26 and 27 were possessed by him; however, the scheduled land
was vacant and was fraudulently occupied by the Petitioners. It has
been further submitted that he is unaware about the suit being OS
Case No. 495 of 2021 as the same has not been filed by him; but the
fact remains that the suit is being pursued by his father.
It has been pleaded that sale deed (the Court presumes that
Respondent No. 4 is talking about the sale deed of 1960) is
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fraudulent and the Respondent No. 4 has applied for the certified
copies of Title Suit No. 109 of 1961 to verify the facts.
7. In Para-10 of the counter-affidavit, Respondent No. 4 has laid
down his case wherein he has stated that he is not aware about any
OS case filed by his father. He has pleaded that the land was being
cultivated by his ancestors till late 90s and thereafter the land was
fraudulently acquired by the Petitioner. It has been further
submitted that after the demise of Domba Oraon, the case was
pursued by Akash Oraon (his brother) and as such he has no
knowledge of the same. It has been additionally pleaded that SAR
Case No. 132 of 1992-93 was with respect to Plot No. 26 and 27 and
not with respect to Plot No. 28. It has been lastly pleaded that the
name of his father i.e. Domba Oraon is still running in Register-II,
which shows that the possession of the Petitioner is illegal and has
been taken fraudulently.
8. Mr. Mohan Kumar Dubey, learned A.C. to A.G representing
the respondent-State has supported the case of Respondent No. 4
and has highlighted the object behind the enactment of the
Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908. He has submitted that the object
of the Act, 1908 was to protect the lands of the tribal population
from fraudulent transfers. It has been submitted that as there was
no permission for Plot No. 28, the case filed by Respondent No. 4 is
maintainable. It has been argued that the writ petition filed by the
Petitioner is premature and no proceeding can be assailed at the
time of the notice itself.
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9. In reply, Mr. Pallav has rebutted the argument of the
Respondents by contending that if the initiation of the any
proceeding itself is bad in the eye of law, then the Petitioner has all
the right to approach this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. It has been further submitted that the
assertions made in the counter-affidavit by Respondent No. 4 is
wholly vague and has been deliberately to mislead this Court into
believing that disputed questions of facts are involved in this case.
It is also been submitted by the learned Counsel that once
the dispute pertaining to Plot Numbers was already settled in the
Original Suit No. 109 of 1961, Respondent No. 4 cannot be allowed
to raise the same. Learned counsel has lastly submitted that the
Respondent No.4 cannot claim lack of knowledge with respect to the
scheduled property as he is bound by the decree and orders passed
against his ancestors from whom he is deriving title.
10. On basis of the submission of learned counsel for the parties,
the following issues are to be addressed by this Court.
(i) Whether the proceedings under Section 71A of the
Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 can be allowed to continue for
a sale deed which was executed in 1960?
(ii) Whether the impugned proceedingsis hit by the principles
of res judicata?
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(iii) Whether the impugned proceedings can be allowed to
continue when a civil suit is already pending for the same
relief?
11. The important facts which this Court has sieved from the
pleading and submissions of the parties are that the dispute
pertains to 3 (three) Plots within Khata No. 31 of Village Simar,
Thana Ranchi, District-Ranchi i.e. Plot No. 26, 27 and 28. The
aforesaid areas were amicably partitioned by and between Domba
Oraon and Cherbo Oraon (both sons of Mangra Oraon) and Domba
Oraon came into exclusive possession of RS Plot No. 28
(corresponding to MS Plot No. 1226) and Cherbo Oraon came to have
exclusive right over RS Plot No. 26 and 27 (corresponding to MS Plot
No. 1227, 1147 and 1148).
Thereafter, the records of right in the revisional survey was
prepared in which the owners of the Plot was interchanged. The
Petitioner’s ancestor executed a sale deed in 1960 and came in
peaceful possession of Plot No. 28 (corresponding to MS Plot No.
1226). After the execution of the sale deed a suit was initiated by the
wife of Domba Oraon (Son of Khaya Oraon) against the Petitioner’s
ancestor and the other co-sharer, which was registered as Title Suit
No. 109 of 1961. The relief sought in the suit is extracted as under:-
“(a) It be declared that the Plaintiff jointly are entitled to are entitled to
9,000 (INR Nine Thousand Only) and Defendant No. 2 to the balance of
compensation awarded for acquisition of RS Plot No. 26 and 27 in village
Siram P.S Ranchi No. 210, Dist-Ranchi, in land acquisition case No. 71 of
1961-62 before the Land Acquisition Officer at Ranchi, the Defendant No. 1
having no title to or possession over the said plots.
Alternatively, to relief A and only if it found that there is no partition
between Domba Oraon and Charwa Oraon the following relief:-
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B(1) It be declared that the Plaintiff are entitled to one half of the total
compensation for RS Plot No. 26 and 27;
B(2) R.S Plot No. 28 of the village Siram P.S Ranchi No. 210 District Ranchi
admeasuring 1.41 acres be partitioned between the Plaintiffs on one hand
and Defendant No. 1 on the other hand and the Plaintiff be allotted,
specific portion thereof in lieu of one half of the share.”
12. Title Suit No. 109 of 1961 was finally compromisedin which a
compromise decree was drawn. The Court finds it necessary to
reproduce the entire contents of the compromise which forms part of
the compromise decree prepared in Title Suit No. 109 of 1961.
“(a) All parties accept here to accept that entire RS Plot No. Khata No. 31
consisting of RS Plot No. 26 and 27 and 28 in suit were partitioned
between the original owners Domba Oraon and Charwa Oraon before the
revisional survey, Domba Oraon was allotted exclusively RS Plot No. 28.
(b) All the parties hereto also accept that Domba and Charwa remained in
exclusive possession of their respective allotments aforesaid. The
revisional record of rights is so far as the same indicates as interchange of
the allotments is also accepted by the all the parties to be a mistake.
(c) The plaintiffs and defendants no.2 accept and confirm that the
defendant no.1 is sole and exclusive owners of R.S. plot no.28 having been
acquired by him by transfer from the rightful exclusive owner the
defendant no. 2 on 5.8. 1946 followed by open adverse and continuous
possession since that day upto date with the full knowledge and consent
of the plaintiff and defendant no 2, none of whom have no manner of claim
to the said plot. The title to and possession over R.S. Plot no. 28 in village
Siram P.S. and district Ranchi of the defendant no. l are here by confirmed.
(d) In the premises aforesaid the defendant no.1 gives up all his claims to
a plot nos. 26 and 27 and to the compensation payable by the award in
land acquisition officer at Ranchi the plaintiffs and defendants no.2 have
med to the apportionment of the total amount awarded, so that the plaintiff
no. 1 and 2 jointly get Rs.9,000/- out of the same and defendant No. 2
shall get the balace. The plaintiffs and defendant no. 2 have filed the
necessary petition under section 29 of the Land Acquisition act
accordingly.
(e) in the premises aforesaid the defendant no.1 shall if necessary, join in
any further petition that may be deemed necessary to give effect to the
aforesaid agreement of apportionment between two plaintiffs and
defendant no. 2
(f) The defendant no.1 shall get his name mutated in the sherista of the
landlord in respect of plot no.28 and the plaintiffs and defendants nos. 2
shall joint in the said petition intimating that none of them have any
objection to the mutation.
(g) That, the parties shall respectively bear their own costs of this suit.”
13. Thereafter, another case under Section 71A of the Act, 1908
was filed by the father of the Petitioner namely Domba Oraon, which
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was registered as SAR 132/92-93. The said application was
dismissed vide order dated 24.08.1994. This order was confirmed till
the Hon’ble Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 1057 of 2004 vide order
dated 31.8.2010. Further another suit being Original Suit No. 495 of
2021 is pending before the Ld. Civil Court, Ranchi. Respondent No.
4 is Plaintiff No. 5 in the said suit. The relief sought in the suit is
reproduced as under:-
“(A) That on adjudication it be ordered and declared by a decree that the
right, title and interest of the plaintiffs over the land in suit.
(B) That on adjudication it be ordered and declared by a decree for
recovery of possession and the plaintiffs be put in khas possession of the
same defendant no.1 to 3. after evicting
(C) That a decree for the cost of the suit be passed.
(D) That a decree for such other relief or reliefs, if any to which the
plaintiffs may be found entitled to be passed.”
14. Thus, on basis of the aforesaid facts, it is clear that the
Petitioners (through their ancestor) continues to remain in peaceful
possession of the scheduled property since 1946. Thereafter, a sale
deed was executed by and between the Petitioner’s ancestor and the
ancestor of Respondent No. 4 in 1960.A partition suit was also filed
by certain members of the family of Respondent No. 4 in which the
parties to the suit came to a compromise. Any
dispute/confusion/mistake pertaining to the Plot numbers was
settled and the Petitioner’s right, title, interest and possession over
the scheduled property was recognized by the predecessor-in-
interest of Respondent No.4. This fact is recorded in the compromise
decree drawn and signed on 7.10.1961 in Title Suit No. 109 of 1961.
It is also apparent that an application under Section 71A of
the Act, 1908 being SAR Case No. 132 of 92-93 was filed by the
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father of Respondent No. 4. The said application was dismissed on
the ground that the said proceedings have been initiated after an
unreasonable period.
15. Respondent No. 4 has disputed the fact pertaining to such
transfer by stating that such transfer was fraudulent in nature. It is
settled law that fraud vitiates everything.
However, fraud is something which is to be pleaded and
proved. An empty statement about a transaction being fraudulent,
especially when the existence of such fact is recorded on a judicial
document (decree dated 7.10.1961), will not come to the aid of
Respondent No. 4. Reference in this regard is made to the case of
Mary v. Leelamma and Ors (MANU/KE/1665/2020), wherein it has
been held that fraud, coercion, undue influence etc.must be proved
by the person alleging it and there should be full disclosure with
respect to the same in the pleadings itself. A general or vague
allegation is not sufficient to build up a case of fraud. The relevant
portion of the judgement is extracted as under:-
“24. There is no dispute with the proposition that the burden of proof in
respect of the plea of fraud, undue influence or coercion is upon the person
who alleges the same. The initial burden can be discharged only by
putting forth the necessary plea in the pleadings and thereafter by
adducing evidence in accordance with law. Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908 specifies that the party relying upon fraud, undue
influence and other category of cases mentioned therein, must specify
particulars in the pleading. The allegations must be fully stated, so that,
the issues of fraud and undue influence can be decided on the particulars
pleaded and evidence adduced by such party. There cannot be any
departure from what has been ordained under Order 6 Rule 4 C.P.C. and
full particulars must be laid down in the pleadings itself. The cognate vices
mentioned in Order 6 Rule 4 C.P.C. must be separately pleaded with
specificity, particularity and precision. A general or vague allegation is not
sufficient to build up a case of fraud or undue influence. The intention
underlying Order 6 Rule 4 C.P.C. is that the opposite party is to be put on
sufficient notice as to the case which he is called upon to meet. The
aforesaid propositions were laid down by the Supreme Court in9
2025:JHHC:10886BishundeoNarain and Another v. Seogeni Rai and Others
(MANU/SC/0059/1951 : AIR 1951 SC 280), Afsar Sheikh and Another v.
Soleman Bibi and Others MANU/SC/0001/1975 : (1976) 2 SCC 142) and
General Manager, Electrical Rengali Hydro Electric Project, Orissa and
Others. v. Sri. Giridhari Sahu and Others MANU/SC/1238/2019 : (2019)
10 SCC 695).”
16. In the case at hand, Respondent No. 4 has merely stated that
the transfer was fraudulent but has not uttered anything to provide
a foundation for the same. On the contrary, the contention of
Respondent No. 4 is in the teeth of the decree passed in Title Suit
No. 109 of 1961. Further, the decree in the said suit acknowledges
the right of the Petitioners which was created after having
permission and execution of the sale deed. It cannot be said to be a
case of collusion. Further, assailing a decree based on fraud or
collusion, it is same court which passed the judgment and decree to
consider such claim.
17. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sita Sahu v. The
State of Jharkhand and Ors(MANU/SC/0774/2004), has
interpreted Section 71A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and
has held that even though the provision starts with the words ‘at
any time’ the powers cannot be exercised after an unreasonably long
period. In the said case the proceedings were initiated after a lapse
of 40 (forty) years. The relevant portion of the judgment is
reproduced as under:-
” 11. We are, therefore, of the view that the use of the words “at any time”
in section 71A is evidence of the legislative intent to give sufficient
flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio-economic
policy of the Act viz. to prevent inroads upon the rights of the ignorant,
illiterate and backward citizens. Thus, where the Deputy Commissioner
chooses to exercise his power under Section 71A it would be futile to
contend that the period of limitation under Limitation Act has expired. The
period of limitation under the Limitation Act is intended to bar suits
brought in civil courts where the party himself chooses to exercise his right
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of seeking restoration of immovable property. But, where, for socio-
economic reasons, the party may not even be aware of his own rights, the
legislature has stepped in by making an officer of the State responsible for
doing social justice by clothing him with sufficient power. However, even
such power cannot be exercised after an unreasonably long time during
which third party interests might have come into effect. Thus, the test is
not whether the period of limitation prescribed in the Act of 1963 had
expired, but whether the power under Section 71A was sought to be
exercised after unreasonable delay.”
18. This view was adopted by this Court and followed in the case
of Sharda Devi v. The Commissioner and Ors
(MANU/JH/1102/2011), the relevant portion of the judgment is
reproduced as under:-
“20. It is true that no specific period of limitation is provided under the Act
for restoration of the land since Section 71A of the CNT Act provides that
the proceeding can be initiated at any time when it comes to the notice of
the Deputy Commissioner. But though no period of limitation is provided
neither there is any clear and perfect time limit but still various decisions
of the High Court and the Supreme Court while dealing with the question
of restoration of land in favour of a Tribal under Section 71A and Section
46 of the CNT Act as well as Schedule Area Regulation, 1969, it was held
that the Act cannot be made applicable retrospectively and that too after
an inordinate delay. In the case of Patras Oraon v. State of Bihar and Ors.
reported in (1991) 2 BLJR 1048 it was held that the reasoning of the
authorities that the Schedule Area Regulation, 1969 was applicable, was
quashed and application of the provision with retrospective effect, was
held to be unsustainable in law.
Similarly, the Apex Court, in the case of Situ Sahu and Ors. (Supra)
interpreted the use of words “at any time” in Section 71-A. The
interpretation by the Apex Court is that this denotes the legislative intent to
give sufficient flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio
economic policy of the Act i.e. to prevent inroads upon the rights of the
ignorant, illiterate and backward citizens. But the Apex Court was
conscious that since no period of time has been fixed, therefore, certain
guidelines are necessary. It was held that the power for restoration cannot
be exercised after an unreasonable long period of time during which third
party interest might have come into effect. It is not a case that the
Appellant acquired the land fraudulently. So far the prohibition of Section
46 of the CNT Act whereby transfer by a Member of Scheduled Tribe
without the sanction of the Deputy Commissioner, was not in existence in
the year 1926 and thus, I am of the opinion that there is no contravention
of any other provision of the Act applying the law laid down in the case of
Situ Sahu (Supra). Reliance has been placed by the Respondents as well
on this citation also but I am of the view that since the Apex Court was
clearly of the opinion that such a power of restoration cannot be exercised
after an unreasonable long period during which third party interest might
have been created. Therefore, in the instant case the Petitioner is
admittedly a third party and he has evidently perfected his right. The
reasoning of automatic redemption as held by the authorities in the
impugned orders is out of question. The appellate authority as well as the11
2025:JHHC:10886revisional authority did not take the subsequent event i.e. transfer in
favour of the Petitioner and the perfection of title much before the
restoration application was filed; therefore the impugned order are vitiated
in law. Similar view was adopted by the Apex Court in the case of Jai
Mangal Oraon v. Mira Nayak (Smt) and Ors. along with Jai Mangal Oraon
v. Rita Sinha and Ors. reported in MANU/SC/0371/2000 : (2000) 5 SCC
141 it was clearly held that the provisions commencing with words “if at
any time….” cannot be taken to mean that powers under the provisions
under Section 71A can be exercised without any reference to time limit and
without any consideration of the rights acquired in the mean time under
the ordinary law.”
19. The facts which have been admitted by the predecessor-in-
interest of the contesting parties show that the Petitioner (through
their ancestor) were in peaceful possession of the scheduled property
since 1946, but a transfer was effectuated by way of a sale deed in
1960. The impugned proceedings have been initiated in the year
2024 i.e. after 64 (sixty-four) years from date of transfer. In the case
of Sharda Devi (supra), this Court had held proceedings initiated
after 40 (forty) years to be unreasonable and accordingly proceedings
after 64 (sixty-four) cannot by any stretch of imagination be held to
be within a reasonable period. It is not out of place to mention that
the Respondent No.4 has already taken this view in SAR Case No.
132 of 92-93. The first issue, thus stands answered.
20. Coming to the next issue, the Petitioner has brought on
record the order passed in SAR Case No. 132 of 92-93. The father of
Respondent No.4 had filed an application being SAR Case No. 132 of
92-93, which was dismissed vide order dated 24.08.1994 on the
ground that the proceeding has been initiated after an unreasonable
period of time. This order was challenged in appeal, which was
registered as Case No. 34 R 215/1994-95. This appeal was also
dismissed vide order dated 3.7.1996. The revision petition being SAR
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2025:JHHC:10886
Rev Case No. 374 of 1996 was also dismissed vide order dated
24.9.1996. The Respondent’s father assailed the orders passed by
the revenue authorities by filing a writ petition being CWJC No.
3755/96(R) which was dismissed vide order dated 27.3.97. The intra
court appeal, being LPA No. 249 of 1997 (R) was also dismissed vide
order dated 14.9.1999. The matter thereafter travelled to the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of India and the same was dismissed vide order
dated 31.8.2010 passed in Civil Appeal No. 1057 of 2004.
Respondent No. 4 has averred that the said proceedings are
not applicable owing to 2 (two) reasons. Firstly, the proceedings were
brought forth by the father of the Respondent and not by the
Respondent himself and secondly because the subject matter of SAR
Case No. 132 of 92-93 was Plot No. 26 and 27 and not Plot No. 28.
However, this Court cannot agree with the contentions of
Respondent No. 4. The issue pertaining to the confusion of Plots has
already been recorded in the decree drawn and sealed on 7.10.1961.
A bare perusal of the order will show that the same was taken into
consideration while dismissing the SAR case being SAR Case No.
132 of 92-93.
21. The next argument of Respondent No. 4 is against public
policy. In case every legal heir will contest that he is not bound by
the orders passed against his predecessor-in-interest, then there will
be no end to litigation. This aspect was considered by the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of Prabhakara Adiga v. Gowri and
Ors,1wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that when the right
(2017 4 SCC 97)
1
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litigated in heritable, then the legal heir is bound by decision passed
against his predecessor-in-interest. The relevant portion of the
judgments is reproduced as under: –
“25. In our considered opinion the right which had been adjudicated in
the suit in the present matter and the findings which have been recorded
as basis for grant of injunction as to the disputed property which is
heritable and partible would enure not only to the benefit of the legal heir
of decree-holders but also would bind the legal representatives of the
judgment-debtor. It is apparent from Section 50 CPC that when a
judgment-debtor dies before the decree has been satisfied, it can be
executed against legal representatives. Section 50 is not confined to a
particular kind of decree. Decree for injunction can also be executed
against legal representatives of the deceased judgment-debtor. The maxim
“actiopersonalismoritur cum persona” is limited to certain class of cases as
indicated by this Court in Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain
Choudhary [Girijanandini Devi v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967
SC 1124] and when the right litigated upon is heritable, the decree would
not normally abate and can be enforced by legal representatives of decree-
holder and against the judgment-debtor or his legal representatives. It
would be against the public policy to ask the decree-holder to litigate once
over again against the legal representatives of the judgment-debtor when
the cause and injunction survives. No doubt, it is true that a decree for
injunction normally does not run with the land. In the absence of statutory
provisions it cannot be enforced. However, in view of the specific
provisions contained in Section 50 CPC, such a decree can be executed
against legal representatives”
It is not in dispute that Respondent No. 4 is claiming right,
title and interest through his father by way of inheritance and as
such the Respondent No. 4 cannot simply disown the order passed
in the proceedings initiated by his predecessor-in-interest.
22. This Court has already held that the principles of res judicata
will apply to proceedings under Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908.
Reference in this regard is made to the case of Sarmitha Sinha v.
State of Jharkhand and Ors (2010 2 JLJR 392), relevant portion
of which is quoted as under:-
“23. It appears that the assertion of the petitioner Meera Prasad that
earlier also an application under Section 71-A of the Chhotanagpur
Tenancy Act was filed against her by respondent No. 5 Bandhan
Oraonbeing SAR Case No. 26/89-90 and the same was dismissed by the
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Special Officer as well as by the Appellate Authority. This point has
already been settled by a number of judgments of this Court wherein it
has been held that if on earlier occasions the application for restoration
has been rejected and it has become final then subsequent application for
restoration for the same and would be hit by principles of resjudicata.
Reference in this regard may be made to the decisions in the case of
“Gadia Oraon v. State of Jharkhand. reported in 2004 (1) JCR 237 (Jhr.)”
and “Bibi Makho v. State of Bihar, reported 2004 (1) JLJR 515 : 2004 (2)
JCR 107 (Jhr)” and “Ram Chandra Sahu v. State of Bihar, reported in
1990 (1) PLJR 604″ and “SmtSatyawati Devi v. State of Bihar, reported in
1996 (2) PLJR 719″.
Considering the above position of law and fact of this case,
this Court has no hesitation in holding that the impugned
proceedings are hit by the principles of res judicata. The second
issue stands answered accordingly.
23. Coming to the last issue i.e. simultaneous proceedings under
Section 71A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and before the
Ld. Civil Court, Ranchi. The copy of the plaint registered as
Original Suit No. 495 of 2021 has been annexed along with the
writ petition. The relief sought in the suit (which has been quoted
in the preceding paragraphs) show that even in the suit, recovery
of the scheduled property has been prayed for. The contention of
Respondent No. 4, that he is not aware about the proceedings
pending in the Ld. Civil Court is unfounded as his name reflects as
a Plaintiff. The action of the predecessor-in-interest being binding
upon the legal heirs has already been discussed by this Court in
the preceding paragraphs.
24. The Hon’ble Apex Court in a plethora of judgments has
defined forum shopping or forum hunting to be a practice of
choosing multiple forums for the same cause of action with the
intention obtain a favorable decision. Such practices have been
15
2025:JHHC:10886
deprecated. The most apt observation of the Hon’ble Supreme
Court, considering the present facts is contained in Para-14 in the
case of K. Jayaram v. BDA,2 which is reproduced as under:-
“14. It is necessary for us to state here that in order to check multiplicity
of proceedings pertaining to the same subject-matter and more importantly
to stop the menace of soliciting inconsistent orders through different
judicial forums by suppressing material facts either by remaining silent or
by making misleading statements in the pleadings in order to escape the
liability of making a false statement, we are of the view that the parties
have to disclose the details of all legal proceedings and litigations either
past or present concerning any part of the subject-matter of dispute which
is within their knowledge. In case, according to the parties to the dispute,
no legal proceedings or court litigations were or are pending, they have to
mandatorily state so in their pleadings in order to resolve the dispute
between the parties in accordance with law.”
25. In the given facts of the case, the affidavit filed by Respondent
No. 4 before the concerned authority, which is attached along with
the instant writ petition shows that a false disclosure has been made
by Respondent No. 4, stating that there is no pending proceeding
with respect to the scheduled land, wherein same and similar relief
has been prayed. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jagmohan
Bahl v. State (NCT of Delhi)3, has held that any attempt of forum
shopping has to be done with a heavy hand. The relevant portion of
the judgments is reproduced as under:-
“13. On a perusal of the aforesaid authorities, it is clear to us that the
learned Judge, who has declined to entertain the prayer for grant of bail, if
available, should hear the second bail application or the successive bail
applications. It is in consonance with the principle of judicial decorum,
discipline and propriety. Needless to say, unless such principle is adhered
to, there is enormous possibility of forum-shopping which has no sanction
in law and definitely, has no sanctity. If the same is allowed to prevail, it
is likely to usher in anarchy, whim and caprice and in the ultimate
eventuate shake the faith in the adjudicating system. This cannot be
allowed to be encouraged. In this regard we may refer to the
pronouncement in Chetak Construction Ltd. v. Om Prakash [Chetak
Construction Ltd. v. Om Prakash, (1998) 4 SCC 577] , wherein this Court(2022) 12 SCC 815
2(2014) 16 SCC 501
316
2025:JHHC:10886has observed that a litigant cannot be permitted “choice” of the “forum”
and every attempt at “forum-shopping” must be crushed with a heavy
hand. In Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Assn.
(2) v. S.C. Sekar [Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Assn.
(2) v. S.C. Sekar, (2009) 2 SCC 784] , it has been observed that the
superior courts of this country must discourage forum-shopping.”
Considering the above position of law and the governing facts,
the impugned proceedings for recovery of possession amounts to
forum hunting by Respondent No. 4. The last issue is answered
accordingly.
26. In light of the above discussion, the instant writ petition is
allowed and entire proceedings being SAR Case No. 52/2024-25
along with the notice bearing number 340, dated 19.10.2024, is
hereby, quashed and set aside. Pending I.As., if any, also stands
closed.
(Deepak Roshan, J.)
Amardeep/
AFR
17
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