Madhya Pradesh High Court
Vishwanath Dubey vs State Of M.P. on 23 July, 2025
Author: Milind Ramesh Phadke
Bench: Milind Ramesh Phadke
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
AT GWALIOR
BEFORE
HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE MILIND RAMESH PHADKE
WRIT PETITION No. 6668 of 2010
VISHWANATH DUBEY
Versus
STATE OF M.P. AND OTHERS
Appearance:
Shri Jitendra Kumar Sharma - Senior Advocate alongwith Shri Nikhil
Bhatele - Advocate for the petitioner.
Shri K.S. Tomar - Government Advocate for the State.
RESERVED ON : 16/07/2025
DELIVERED ON : 23/7/2025
This petition having been heard and reserved for orders, coming on for
pronouncement this day, the Hon'ble Shri Justice Milind Ramesh Phadke
pronounced/passed the following:
ORDER
The matter pertains to imposition of penalty in a departmental inquiry
of deduction of 10% of the amount from pension of the petitioner for three
years by respondent No.1 vide order dated 03.06.2009. Assailing the
aforesaid order, the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India has been filed by the petitioner.
FACTS
2. The facts necessary for disposal of the present petition in short are
that the petitioner, who was posted as Assistant Commandant in 5th
Battalion, S.A.F., Morena stood retired from service on 31.07.2007. Prior to
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his retirement, a complaint was made by respondent No.3 about illegal
availing of the claims of Traveling Allowance (TA) and Dearness Allowance
(DA) bills claimed by the petitioner. On the basis of the said complaint, a
preliminary inquiry was conducted by the Assistant Commandant, 13th
Battalion, S.A.F., Gwalior and in furtherance thereof, a charge sheet was
served upon the petitioner, wherein three charges were levelled against him.
The petitioner denied the charges, but instead of dropping the inquiry, a
regular inquiry was decided to be conducted and after completion of the
inquiry, a report was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority, while
recording the findings of the petitioner being guilty of the charges. Vide
memo dated 04.10.2007, the Disciplinary Authority forwarded the inquiry
report to the petitioner seeking his representation. In response thereof, a
detailed representation was submitted to the Disciplinary Authority, but
without considering the said representation, the impugned order dated
03.06.2009 was passed whereby the penalty of deduction of 10% of the
amount from pension of the petitioner for three years was inflicted.
Aggrieved by the aforesaid, the present petition has been filed.
ARGUMENTS
3. Shri Jitendra Kumar Sharma – learned Senior Advocate
alongwith Shri Nikhil Bhatele – Counsel for the petitioner has argued before
this Court that by way of non-speaking order and without considering the
contents of the representation, the Disciplinary Authority had went on to
impose the penalty as aforesaid, which since is violation of principles of
natural justice deserves to be quashed.
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4. While referring to the Rule 14(18) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 , learned Senior
Counsel has argued that after the Government servant closes his case, the
Inquiring Authority is generally required to question him on the
circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of
enabling him to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against
him, but no such questionnaire was put to the petitioner and straightaway the
opinion was given, which is per se illegal.
5. It has further been argued that the petitioner was not permitted to
cross-examine the departmental witnesses, namely, Ramesh Chandra
Bhatele, Ramnarayan, Haricharan which had prejudiced his case, thus, when
proper procedure in conducting the inquiry was not followed and even the
principles of natural justice have not been followed, the entire inquiry stands
vitiated.
6. It has also been argued that the enquiry officer as well as
disciplinary authority had failed to consider the documentary evidence
produced by the petitioner and also had not considered the evidence of
witness, namely, Alok Ranjan, who had categorically admitted in his
statement that the petitioner was not fit for road journies as doctor had
advised him not to take road journey and he was only permitted to travel by
train, but ignoring the said statement and opinion of the doctor, it was held
that the petitioner had claimed travel allowance and dearness allowance bills
wrongly and had submitted wrong bills and accordingly, had imposed the
penalty, which is not sustainable. It was thus prayed that the present petition
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be allowed and the order/s impugned herein be set aside.
7. On the other hand, learned Govt. Advocate for the respondents/State
had submitted that so far as the argument of the petitioner that proper
procedure as provided under Sub-Rule 18 of Rule 14 of the Rules of 1966,
has not been followed is concerned, the aforesaid Sub-rule provides that the
Inquiring Authority only in case, if the Government servant has not been
examined after closing his case, is required to put in questions on the
circumstances appearing against him in the evidence, but herein case, the
petitioner had been examined, therefore, the procedure as contemplated
under Rule 14(18) of the Rules of 1966 cannot be said to have been violated,
thus, the said argument has no force.
8. It was further submitted that in a departmental inquiry, the Courts
primarily focuses on the procedural fairness of the decision making process,
rather than the merits of the decision itself, which means the Courts would
only examine whether the inquiry was conducted according to the
established rules and principles of natural justice, ensuring that the employee
had a fair opportunity to present his/her case and the Courts don’t typically
substitute its judgment for that of the disciplinary authority on substance of
the decision, unless the decision is found to be perverse or based on no
evidence but herein case, no such argument has been raised, which could
show that there was some defect in the procedural aspect of the matter, thus,
when the inquiry was conducted according to the established Rules and
principles of natural justice, the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority
as well as the Appellate Authority doesn’t deserve to be interfered with.
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9. It was further submitted that the petitioner had not made any
allegation of personal bias against the enquiry officer and his contentions are
basically based on factual aspect, therefore, this Court is not required to
appreciate the evidence once again and sit as an Appellate Authority as
while exercising the powers of judicial review, the Court should not act as an
Appellate Authority. It was, thus, prayed that the present petition be
dismissed.
10. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the record.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
11. It is well established principle of law that the scope of judicial
review in departmental enquiry is very limited. The High Court can interfere
with the departmental proceedings only if the proceedings were conducted
contrary to the well established principles of law or the enquiry report is
based on no evidence or where the competence of Authority has been
challenged. None of the ingredients are present in the present case.
12. The Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka and another Vs.
N. Gangraj reported in (2020) 3 SCC 423 has held as under:
“8. We find that the interference in the order of
punishment by the Tribunal as affirmed by the High Court
suffers from patent error. The power of judicial review is
confined to the decision-making process. The power of
judicial review conferred on the constitutional court or on the
Tribunal is not that of an appellate authority.
9. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC
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1723, a three-Judge Bench of this Court has held that the
High Court is not a court of appeal over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public
servant. It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is
held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according
to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the
rules of natural justice are not violated. The Court held as
under : (AIR pp. 1726-27, para 7)
“7. … The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a court of
appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a
departmental enquiry against a public servant : it is
concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf, and according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of
natural justice are not violated. Where there is some
evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold
the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably
support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of
the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a
petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence
and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.”
10. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6
SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80], again a three-Judge Bench
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of this Court has held that power of judicial review is not an
appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which
the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to
ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to
ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is
necessarily correct in the eyes of the court. The court/tribunal
in its power of judicial review does not act as an appellate
authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own
independent findings on the evidence. It was held as under :
(SCC pp. 759-60, paras 12-13)
“12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision
but a review of the manner in which the decision is made.
Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the
individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the
conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct
in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on
charges of misconduct by a public servant, the
Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry
was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural
justice are complied with. Whether the findings or
conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority
entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction,
power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion.
But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the
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technical rules of the Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or
evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding.
When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion
receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is
entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the
charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review
does not act as appellate authority to reappreciate the
evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the
evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the
authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer
in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or
where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary
authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or
finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever
reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the
conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make
it appropriate to the facts of each case.
13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts.
Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has co-
extensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of
punishment. In a disciplinary inquiry, the strict proof of legal
evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant.
Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be
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permitted to be canvassed before the Court/Tribunal. In
Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964
SC 364, this Court held at p. 728 that if the conclusion, upon
consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary
authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face
of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of
certiorari could be issued.”
11. In High Court of Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil,
(2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 144, this Court held
that interference with the decision of departmental authorities
is permitted if such authority had held proceedings in
violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of
statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry
while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution. It was held as under : (SCC p. 423, para 16)
“16. The Division Bench [Shashikant S. Patil v. High
Court of Bombay, 1998 SCC OnLine Bom 97 : (2000) 1
LLN 160] of the High Court seems to have approached the
case as though it was an appeal against the order of the
administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court.
Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can
be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226
of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in
violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of
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statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or
if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations
extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the
conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is
wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person
could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very
similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the
departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary
Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if
the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal
position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the
findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of
that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High
Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution.”
12. In State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Nemi Chand
Nalwaya, (2011) 4 SCC 584:(2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 721, this
Court held that the courts will not act as an appellate court
and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor
interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the
material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and
properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the
question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of
the evidence will not be ground for interfering with the
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findings in departmental enquiries. The Court held as under:
(SCC pp. 587-88, paras 7 & 10)
“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as
an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the
domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another
view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has
been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on
evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the
reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for
interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries.
Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact
recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such
findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly
perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a
tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such
conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts
will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary
matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory
regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be
arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous
considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India,
(1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80, Union of India v.
G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1806
and Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC
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762 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1036, High Court of Bombay v.
Shashikant S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416 : 2000 SCC (L&S)
144].)
***
10. The fact that the criminal court subsequently
acquitted the respondent by giving him the benefit of doubt,
will not in any way render a completed disciplinary
proceeding invalid nor affect the validity of the finding of
guilt or consequential punishment. The standard of proof
required in criminal proceedings being different from the
standard of proof required in departmental enquiries, the
same charges and evidence may lead to different results in
the two proceedings, that is, finding of guilt in departmental
proceedings and an acquittal by giving benefit of doubt in the
criminal proceedings. This is more so when the departmental
proceedings are more proximate to the incident, in point of
time, when compared to the criminal proceedings. The
findings by the criminal court will have no effect on
previously concluded domestic enquiry. An employee who
allows the findings in the enquiry and the punishment by the
disciplinary authority to attain finality by non-challenge,
cannot after several years, challenge the decision on the
ground that subsequently, the criminal court has acquitted
him.”
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13. In another judgment reported as Union of India v.
P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610 : (2015) 1 SCC (L&S)
554, this Court held that while reappreciating evidence the
High Court cannot act as an appellate authority in the
disciplinary proceedings. The Court held the parameters as to
when the High Court shall not interfere in the disciplinary
proceedings : (SCC p. 617, para 13)
“13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court shall not:
(i) reappreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in
case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which
findings can be based;
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may
appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment
unless it shocks its conscience.”
14. On the other hand the learned counsel for the
respondent relies upon the judgment reported as Allahabad
Bank v. Krishna Narayan Tewari, (2017) 2 SCC 308 : (2017)
1 SCC (L&S) 335, wherein this Court held that if the
disciplinary authority records a finding that is not supported
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by any evidence whatsoever or a finding which is
unreasonably arrived at, the writ court could interfere with
the finding of the disciplinary proceedings. We do not find
that even on touchstone of that test, the Tribunal or the High
Court could interfere with the findings recorded by the
disciplinary authority. It is not the case of no evidence or that
the findings are perverse. The finding that the respondent is
guilty of misconduct has been interfered with only on the
ground that there are discrepancies in the evidence of the
Department. The discrepancies in the evidence will not make
it a case of no evidence. The inquiry officer has appreciated
the evidence and returned a finding that the respondent is
guilty of misconduct.
15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings
of the enquiry officer and had passed an order of punishment.
An appeal before the State Government was also dismissed.
Once the evidence has been accepted by the departmental
authority, in exercise of power of judicial review, the
Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere with the
findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if the
courts are the appellate authority. We may notice that the said
judgment has not noticed the larger Bench judgments in State
of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 and B.C.
Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC
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(L&S) 80 as mentioned above. Therefore, the orders passed
by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from patent
illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law.”
13. Further, the Apex Court in the case of State Bank of India and
others Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde reported in (2006) 7 SCC 212 has held a
under:
“6. Before we proceed further, we may observe at this
stage that it is unfortunate that the High Court has acted as an
Appellate Authority despite the consistent view taken by this
Court that the High Court and the Tribunal while exercising
the judicial review do not act as an Appellate Authority:
“Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to
correct errors of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in
manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of
natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on
merit by reappreciating the evidence as an Appellate
Authority.” (See Govt. of A.P. v. Mohd. Nasrullah Khan
[(2006) 2 SCC 373 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 316], SCC p. 379,
para 11.).
9. It is impermissible for the High Court to
reappreciate the evidence which had been considered by the
inquiry officer, a disciplinary authority and the Appellate
Authority. The finding of the High Court, on facts, runs to
the teeth of the evidence on record.
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12. From the facts collected and the report submitted
by the inquiry officer, which has been accepted by the
disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority, active
connivance of the respondent is eloquent enough to connect
the respondent with the issue of TDRs and overdrafts in
favour of Bidaye.
15. In Union of India v. Sardar Bahadur [(1972) 4 SCC
618 : (1972) 2 SCR 218] it is held as under: (SCC p. 623,
para 15)
A disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The
standard proof required is that of preponderance of
probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
inference that lender was a person likely to have official
dealings with the respondent was one which a reasonable
person would draw from the proved facts of the case, the
High Court cannot sit as a court of appeal over a decision
based on it. The Letters Patent Bench had the same power of
dealing with all questions, either of fact or of law arising in
the appeal, as the Single Judge of the High Court. If the
enquiry has been properly held the question of adequacy or
reliability of the evidence cannot be canvassed before the
High Court. A finding cannot be characterised as perverse or
unsupported by any relevant materials, if it was a reasonable
inference from proved facts. (SCR p. 219).
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16, In Union of India v. Parma Nanda [(1989) 2 SCC
177 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 303 : (1989) 10 ATC 30] it is held at
SCC p. 189, para 27 as under:
“27. We must unequivocally state that the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal to interfere with the disciplinary matters or
punishment cannot be equated with an appellate jurisdiction.
The Tribunal cannot interfere with the findings of the inquiry
officer or competent authority where they are not arbitrary or
utterly perverse. It is appropriate to remember that the power
to impose penalty on a delinquent officer is conferred on the
competent authority either by an Act of legislature or rules
made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. If
there has been an enquiry consistent with the rules and in
accordance with principles of natural justice what
punishment would meet the ends of justice is a matter
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority.
If the penalty can lawfully be imposed and is imposed on the
proved misconduct, the Tribunal has no power to substitute
its own discretion for that of the authority. The adequacy of
penalty unless it is mala fide is certainly not a matter for the
Tribunal to concern itself with. The Tribunal also cannot
interfere with the penalty if the conclusion of the inquiry
officer or the competent authority is based on evidence even
if some of it is found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the
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matter.”
17. In Union Bank of India v. Vishwa Mohan [(1998)
4 SCC 310 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1129] this Court held at SCC
p. 315, para 12 as under:
“12. After hearing the rival contentions, we are of the
firm view that all the four charge-sheets which were enquired
into relate to serious misconduct. The respondent was unable
to demonstrate before us how prejudice was caused to him
due to non-supply of the enquiry authority’s report/findings
in the present case. It needs to be emphasised that in the
banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and
honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and
in particular the bank officer. If this is not observed, the
confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. It is
for this reason, we are of the opinion that the High Court had
committed an error while setting aside the order of dismissal
of the respondent on the ground of prejudice on account of
non-furnishing of the enquiry report/findings to him.”
18. In Chairman and MD, United Commercial Bank v.
P.C. Kakkar [(2003) 4 SCC 364 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 468] this
Court held at SCC pp. 376-77, para 14 as under:
“14. A bank officer is required to exercise higher
standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with the money
of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee
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of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the
interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost
integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing
which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and
discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every
officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court
in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja
Bihari Patnaik [(1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194] it
is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit
resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without
authority. The very discipline of an organisation more
particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and
officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere.
Acting beyond one’s authority is by itself a breach of
discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the
employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These
aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High
Court.”
19. In Regional Manager, U.P. SRTC v. Hoti Lal
[(2003) 3 SCC 605 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 363] it was pointed
out as under: (SCC p. 614, para 10)
“If the charged employee holds a position of trust
where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of
functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter
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leniently. Misconduct in such cases has to be dealt with iron
hands. Where the person deals with public money or is
engaged in financial transactions or acts in a fiduciary
capacity, the highest degree of integrity and trustworthiness
is a must and unexceptionable.”
20. In Cholan Roadways Ltd. v. G.
Thirugnanasambandam [(2005) 3 SCC 241 : 2005 SCC
(L&S) 395] this Court at SCC p. 247, para 15 held:
“15. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the
principles of the Evidence Act have no application in a
domestic enquiry.””
14. Herein case, the counsel for the petitioner could not point out any
infirmity in the procedure adopted in Departmental Enquiry. The argument
that the inquiry officer has not allowed the petitioner to cross-examine
certain witnesses, therefore, in wake of violation of principles of natural
justice, the inquiry stands vitiated is concerned, the said argument appears to
be in total derogation of the record, as from the record of the departmental
inquiry, it would be evident that the petitioner on the date of examination of
the witnesses though had examined certain witnesses, but on the date, when
the three persons as stated that he was not given chance to cross-examine
them, the petitioner was absent, thus when the petitioner himself was not
diligent to cross-examine those witnesses and no application for permitting
him to cross-examine those witnesses was moved, therefore, it can be said
that the petitioner has waived his rights, thus, the said argument has no
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force.
15. With regard to the violation of the provisions of Sub-rule 18 of
Rule 14 of the Rules of 1966 is concerned, this Court finds that the
provisions of aforesaid Sub-rule are applicable in cases where after closure
of the case of the employee, the said employee had not got himself examined
and only in such case, questionnaire shall be put to him by inquiry officer on
the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence, but as the petitioner
had appeared and had also deposed his statement, there is no applicability of
the aforesaid Rules.
16. In light of the aforesaid scenario, this Court finds that the petition
has no sum and substance and it is accordingly dismissed.
(MILIND RAMESH PHADKE)
JUDGE
Digitally signed by PAWAN KUMAR
pwn*
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH
GWALIOR, ou=HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH BENCH
GWALIOR,
2.5.4.20=b864d1ab4ace2215bfcf3ab301c34d631287f1b1cdd90b4
a49f265f02d9d593f, postalCode=474001, st=Madhya Pradesh,
serialNumber=61B9D129971D2EA4FD4455ED49EA436EA65E261
64BEEED89153191C56E98CE21, cn=PAWAN KUMAR
Date: 2025.07.23 14:05:30 +05’30’
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