Vst Industries Limited vs The Commissioner Of Central Excise, on 12 June, 2025

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Telangana High Court

Vst Industries Limited vs The Commissioner Of Central Excise, on 12 June, 2025

Author: P.Sam Koshy

Bench: P.Sam Koshy

      * THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
                      AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA

           +CENTRAL EXCISE APPEAL NO.41 OF 2008

%12-06-2025

# VST Industries Ltd,
  Azamabad, Hyderabad.

                                                             ...Appellant

Vs.

$ Commissioner of Customs & Central
  Excise, Hyderabad-II Commissionerate,
  7th Floor, Kendriya Shulk Bhavvan,
  Basheerbagh, Hyderabad - 500 004                      ...Respondent



!Counsel for the Appellant: Ms.L.Maithili

^Counsel for the Respondent : Sri A.Ramakrishna Reddy,
                              Learned Standing Counsel for
                              CDEC.

<Gist :

>Head Note:

? Cases referred:
1. 1997 (94) E.L.T. 495
2. 1999 (114) ELT 162 (Tri.)
3. 2023 (385) ELT 94 SC
4. 2023 (384) ELT 626 SC
5. 2010 (252) ELT 502 (Cri)
6. 1997 (89) ELT 247 SC
7. 2006 (203) ELT 532 (SC) para 12
8. 1991 (51) ELT 278
9. Manu/OR/0616/2008, dated 18.03.2008
10. Civil Appeal No.2416 of 2000 & batch, dated 06.08.2003
11. 2003 (156) ELT 161 (SC)
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    HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA, AT
                   HYDERABAD


 MAIN CASE NO: CENTRAL EXCISE APPEAL NO.41 OF 2008


   Between:

     VST Industries Ltd,
     Azamabad, Hyderabad.                      .. Appellant

                                 And

     Commissioner of Customs & Central
     Excise, Hyderabad-II.                     .. Respondent

   DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED: 12.06.2025

   SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA


   1. Whether Reporters of Local news papers             Yes/No
     may be allowed to see the Judgments?


   2. Whether the copies of judgment may be              Yes/No
      marked to Law Reporters/Journals


   3. Whether Their Ladyship/Lordship wish to           Yes/No
     see the fair copy of the Judgment?




                 __________________________________________
                  JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
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                                                          cea_41_2008



     THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
                      AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA

          CENTRAL EXCISE APPEAL NO.41 OF 2008

JUDGMENT:

(per Hon’ble Sri Justice Narsing Rao Nandikonda)

This appeal has been filed under Section 35G of the

Central Excise Act, 1944 (for short, ‘the Act, 1944’) against

the Final Order No.731 of 2007, dated 28.06.2007, in Appeal

No.E/408/2005 on the file of Customs, Excise and Service

Tax Appellate Tribunal, South Zonal Bench, Bangalore,

whereunder and whereby, the appeal filed by the appellant for

refund of claim for an amount of Rs.1,12,30,127/- for the

period from 01.03.1986 to 30.09.1994, was rejected in respect

of excess of duty paid by it on printed shells used as inputs in

manufacture of Cigarettes packed in packets

2. Heard Ms.L.Maithili, learned counsel for the

appellant and Sri. A.Ramakrishna Reddy, learned Standing

Counsel for CDEC, appearing for the respondents.

3. Brief facts of the case are that the appellant is a

limited company registered under the Hyderabad Companies

Act, IV of 1320 Fasli, having its Registered Office and Factory

at Azamabad, Hyderabad. It manufactures cigarettes falling
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under Chapter 24 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (for

short, the Act, 1985′). It also manufacture shells which are

consumed captively in packing of cigarettes, which are sold in

packets of 10s or 20s on the basis of MRP printed on such

packets. As per the Act, 1985, the appellant sought

classification of shells under Chapter 49 and filed a

classification list accordingly on 03.03.1986. Upon which,

the jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner vide its letter

C.No.V/48/17/12/86-Vo.II, dated 14.03.1986 classified that

under Chapter sub-heading 4818.13, for which the appellant

vide its letter, dated 14.03.1986 agreed to pay duty @15%

advance, applicable to Chapter sub-heading 4818.13 under

protest subject to the final outcome of the appeal pending on

the issue of classification, which according to the appellant

should be under Chapter 49. It is the further case of the

appellant that since the classification issue was not decided

finally till 1995 and as prices were based on costing method

under Rule 6(b)(ii) of the then Central Excise Valuation Rules,

1975, no final assessment was done. Therefore, the appellant

challenged the Department’s classification by filing appeal

before the Commissioner (Appeals), who upheld the stand of
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the Department. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant

filed appeal before the Customs Excise & Gold (Control)

Appellate Tribunal (CEGAT), New Delhi. On 31.08.1995,

CEGAT disposed of the appeal vide Final Order Nos.253 to

256/95C holding that the disputed items were classifiable

under sub-heading 4848.90 upto 29.02.1988 and under sub-

heading 4823.90 from 01.03.1988 onwards. The said

classification was accepted by the appellant and sought for

refund of excess duty paid by it by addressing letter, dated

26.12.1995 to the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise,

Division V, Hyderabad. In the said letter it is stated that

since the dispute between the company and the Department

has been finally resolved by CEGAT, the work sheets based on

reclassification of shells have been constructed for the periods

from 01.03.1986 to 30.09.1994 i.e., from the date of

introduction of Act, 1985 till the closure of shells

manufacturing activity in respondent factory premises, and a

differential duty of Rs.1,12,30,127.47 representing the

difference between the duties paid and the duty payable in

terms of CEGAT order. In response to the said letter, the

Superintendent (Tech), Central Excise, Hyderabad-V Division,
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gave reply vide, letter, dated 03.01.1996 asked the

respondent-company to furnish documents i.e., PLA Register

from March, 86 to March, 94, documentary evidence to prove

that the respondent-company has not passed on the burden

of the Central Excise Duty on its customers as required under

Section 12-B of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 and

also furnish the documentary evidence to prove that they

have followed the procedure while paying duty under protest

as required under Rule 233-B of the Rules, 1944. Thereafter,

on 16.04.1996, the Assistant Commissioner of Central Excise,

Division V, Hyderabad, issued show cause notice to the

appellant stating that on verification of refund claimed by it,

as no documentary evidence is available to prove that the

excise duty paid by it was not passed onto the final customers

and as the said goods were utilized by it for captive

consumption within the factory in manufacture of cigarette,

there is no sale of the goods and requested the appellant to

produce all the evidence upon which they intend to reply in

support of their defence at the time of hearing of the case

The appellant gave reply on 30.05.1996 to the show-cause

notice, dated 16.04.1996, which reads thus:
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“8) It is out of contention that the principles of

unjust enrichment do not apply in the instant case as the
issue here relates to classification of shells which are only
used as inputs in the manufacture of cigarettes packed in
packets and are not sold by us to the ultimate
consumers. They are only one of the many inputs that go
into the manufacture of cigarettes packed in packets
which we sell to the customers. It is a well settled
principle that where the goods are only used for captive
consumption or as inputs in the manufacture of other
finished goods, the question of unjust enrichment does
not arise.

10. Applying these principles to the present case
the duty paid shells are captively consumed by the
manufacturer of cigarettes. Since, they are not sold to
the consumer to whom the incidence of duty can be
passed on directly together with the right to receive the
refund, the principles of unjust enrichment cannot apply
in this case.

13. It is therefore, contended that as the principles
of unjust enrichment embodied in the Act do not apply to
shells, we are entitled to the refund of the differential
duty as claimed and our Refund claim should be
accordingly allowed.”

4. After receipt of the said reply, the Assistant

Commissioner of Central Excise, Hyderabad, passed an order,

dated 30.05.1997, vide C.No.V/48/18/3/96-R, rejecting

refund claim of the appellant. Against which, an appeal being

A.No.427/97 (H) CE, dated 17.05.1999 was preferred against

the order in Appeal No.57/99 (H-III) CE and the learned

Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise (Appeals) Lal
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Bahadur Stadium Road, Basheerbagh, Hyderabad, dismissed

the said appeal holding that on verification of refund claim in

the instant case, it was noticed that no documentary evidence

is available to prove that excise duty paid on shells was not

passed onto the final customers. The shells were used in

relation to the packing of Cigarettes for the purpose of selling

the same. To arrive value of the cigarettes, normally among

other ingredients, the basic cost of the shells plus central

excise duty would be paid at the relevant time and the same

be taken into account. The appellant has not disputed same.

It appears that the duty paid on shells was included in the

price of the Cigarettes and finally the incidence of duty was

not borne by the appellant. But the burden of payment of

excise duty was shifted onto the final customers. It is further

stated that as per the provisions of Section 12B of Central

Excise & Salt Act, 1944 (for short, ‘the Act, 1944’), every

person who paid the duty of excise on any goods under the

Act shall unless contrary is proved, it is deemed to have

passed on the full incidence of such duty to the buyers of

such goods. Further, it was held that the appellant has

passed on the duty incidence to the final customer and such
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amount so accrued shall be credited to the Consumer Welfare

Fund in terms of Section 11D of the Act, 1944, which reads

as follows:

“7. The appellant is a manufacturer of cigarettes
falling under Chapter 24 of the Central Excise Tariff.
Cigarettes are sold in packets of 10s or 20s on the basis
of MRP printed on such packets with Central Excise
Tariff Act, 1985
, which came into effect from 28.02.1986.
The appellant sought classification of shells under
Chapter-49, rate of duty-NIL and filed a classification list
accordingly on 03.03.1986. The jurisdictional Assistant
Commissioner vide letter C.No.V/408/17/12/86-Vol.II,
dated 41.03.1986 classified the same under Chapter sub-
heading 4818.13. The appellant vide its letter, dated
14.03.1986 agreed to pay duty @ 15% advance applicable
to Chapter sub-heading 4818.13 under protest subject to
the final outcome of the appeal pending on the issue of
classification, which according to the appellant should be
under Chapter 49.”

5. As there was no classification decided till 1995,

the appellant is paying duty under protest and there is no

final assessment also done. Further, the appellant challenged

the department’s classification by filing an appeal before the

Commissioner (Appeals), New Delhi, wherein the CEGAT, New

Delhi, vide order No.253 to 256/95-C, dated 31.08.1995

properly classified under chapter sub-heading 4818.90 from

01.03.1986 to 29.02.1988 and under chapter sub-heading
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4823.90 from 01.03.1988 attracting duty @12% which was

later reduced to 10%. As such, re-classification of the appeal

has become final. Subsequent to re-classification, the

appellant filed refund claim for excess amount of

Rs.1,12,30,127/- paid under protest for the period from

01.03.1986 to 30.09.1994. After issuing show-cause notice,

the learned Assistant Commissioner passed an order in-

original bearing C.No.V/48/3/96-R, dated 30.05.1997

rejecting the refund claim under the provisions of Section 11B

and ordered to be deposited in the Consumer Welfare Fund in

terms of Section 11B of the Act, 1944. Against which, the

appellant filed an appeal before the Commissioner of Central

Excise Appeals, who upheld the order in Appeal No.57/99 (H-

III) CE, dated 17.05.1999 rejecting the claim over the

appellant on the purported ground of ‘unjust enrichment.’

The appellant carried the matter in appeal before CESTAT,

who set aside the order and remanded the matter back with a

direction to ascertain whether the duty paid by the appellant

was under protest or not and directed to pass orders afresh.

Thereafter, the Commissioner (Appeals) Hyderabad vide

Appeal No.12/2005 (H-II) CE dated 31.01.2005 rejected the
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entire refund claim on the ground that the payment under

protest was on the question of classification advanced by the

appellant.

6. The main contention of learned counsel for the

appellant is that the assessment made was only provisional

as on 14.03.1986 and the same stood effectively finalized on

17.04.1996 i.e., the date of the Show Cause Notice as to why

refund should not be rejected on the ground of ‘unjust

enrichment’ or at any rate by 30.05.1997. She also

contended that once the assessment is provisional, it remains

provisional in its entirety and cannot be partly provisional

and partly final. In support of her contentions she relied upon

the judgment of the High Court of Madras in Collector of

Central Excise, Madras v. India Tyre Rubber Company

Limited 1, wherein at paragraph No.4 it was held as under:

“We find that the issue that has been referred
to for our consideration is no longer res integra
and the matter is covered by more than one
decision of the Apex Court and the larger Bench
of the Tribunal constituted under the Act. In
the light of the judgment of the Apex Court
reported in Samrat International (P) Ltd. V.
Collector of Central Excise


1
    1997 (94) E.L.T.495
                                               12
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                 MANU/SC/0544/1992 : 1991ECR19 (SC) and
                 the                  subsequent                  decision
                 MANU/CE/0112/1191                 which   came      to   be

rendered by the Larger Bench of the Tribunal
under the Act after considering not only the
decision of the Apex Court noticed supra, but
also several other judgments. We have to
answer the question referred to us in the
negative and hold that the provisional
assessment made should for all purposes to be
treated as provisional and not necessarily
provisional in respect of the particular ground
considered. No costs.”

7. She further contended that there is no legal basis

to provisionally assess valuation while treating the

classification separately. Rule 9B of the Rules, 1944,

mandates a single order for finalization as held by CESTAT in

CCE Madras v. Enfield India Ltd 2 . Further, it is settled

position of law that provisional assessment must be finalized

comprehensively covering both classification and valuation

and it cannot be partially finalized as held in appellant’s own

case in CCE, Hyderabad v. VST Industries Limited (Final

order No.A/30848/2018 in Appeal No.E/1219/2010) and

contended that the order dated 30.05.1997, effectively

2
1999 (114) ELT 162 (Tri.)
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concluded the proceedings under Rule 9B(5) of Rules, 1944

on adjusting the provisionally paid duties with the finally

assessed duties, thereby finalizing the provisional

assessment. However, the refund was rejected on the ground

of ‘unjust enrichment.’ She further contended that in the

present case, the principle of ‘unjust enrichment’ is

inapplicable prior to 25.06.1999 as proceedings under Rule

9B of the Rules, 1944 and the issue in this case is no longer

res integra. She also relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs v. Mangalore

Refinery and Petrochemicals Limited 3 reiterating that as

claim for refund is arising out of finalization of provisional

assessment prior to 25.06.1999, the principle of ‘unjust

enrichment’ does not arise. She also relied upon the

judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CCE v. Hindustan

Zinc Ltd 4 . Though the Department alleged that the

appellant failed to prove that the duty was not passed on to

the customers, however, in the case of CCE. C & ST

Bhubaneswar-I v. Paradeep Phosphates Limited 5, the High

Court agreed with the contention stating that “the assessee

3
2023 (385) ELT 94 SC
4
2023 (384)ELT 626 SC
5
2010 (252) ELT 502 (Ori)
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cannot be said to be guilty of ‘unjust enrichment’ and need

not furnish documents to prove that they have not passed on

the excise burden to customers.” She also further argued

that the said ruling is relevant in the present case for the

reason that the assessment was provisional and the appellant

was not required to provide proof during the provisional

assessment stage. She further argued that the refund

application has been made on 16.12.1995 and it was finalized

before 1997, and as such neither Section 11B of the Central

Excise Act nor the subsequent amendment to Rule 9B of the

Rules, 1944 would be attracted for invocation of the principle

of ‘unjust enrichment.’

8. Further, she also relied on a judgment of the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mafatlal Industries Limited v.

Union of India 6 , wherein it expressly held that refunds

arising from provisional assessment adjustments are not

covered under Section 11B Central Excise Act. She also

further argued that the impugned order is erroneous and it

travels beyond the scope of the show cause notice and it is

liable to be set aside. The only allegation raised in the show

6
1997 (89) ELT 247 SC
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cause notice, dated 16.04.1996 is as to why the refund

already determined should not be rejected on the ground of

‘unjust enrichment’ and the show cause notice did not

dispute the provisional assessment or its finalization or the

quantum assessed. The only issue raised was whether the

refund was barred by ‘unjust enrichment.’

9. She also further argued that the CESTAT had no

jurisdiction to introduce such an issue for the first time when

it was neither subject dispute, nor was it part of hearing

before it. The observation was that “these points were not

made before the lower authorities” was also mechanically

mentioned without verifying the records, and by losing sight

of the fact that no authority had ever disputed finalization of

assessment at any stage. She further contended that the

department actively processed the refund claim itself

presupposes that the provisional assessment was finalized.

Therefore, the observation made by the CEGAT in the order

with regard to refund for finalizing classification is erroneous,

as Departmental actions constitute finalization of provisional

assessment, making refund due under Rule 9B (5) of the

Rule, 1944. She further argued that finalization of
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provisional assessment is sine qua non observed by the

Hon’ble Supreme Court in CCE & Customs, Mumbai v. ITC

Limited 7 and she finally argued that the Department cannot

by any stretch of the imagination claim that the assessment

remains provisional after 30 years without concrete evidence.

The refund quantification sheet and RT-12 returns

unequivocally demonstrate that the duties were initially paid

provisionally at 15%, as also endorsed therein and was

always paid under protest. She argued that the CBEC has

issued instructions that provisional assessment should be

closed within 3-6 months vide Clause 2.7 of Circular

No.288/4/97-CX, dated 14.01.1997. For the reasons

mentioned above, the revenue department has not placed on

record at any point of time any evidence as part of the

payments constituted post-clearance under protest. In such

circumstances, the burden of proving ‘unjust enrichment’ lies

on the department. The department having failed to

discharge its burden, cannot improve the doctrine of ‘unjust

enrichment’ and placed reliance on the judgment of the

7
)2006(203) ELT 532 (SC) para 12
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Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kirloskar oil Engines limited v.

Union of India. 8

10. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel for

the respondent contended that consequent upon finalization

of classification by the Tribunal, the claim of the appellant for

refund was rejected by the Assistant Commissioner under the

provisions of Section 11 B of the Central Excise Act and

ordered the amount to be deposited to Consumer Welfare

Fund. ‘Shells’ are used captively in manufacture and packing

of cigarettes. He further contended that as no evidence was

produced by the appellant as to the value of shell used in the

cigarette packets, the rate of duty included was limited to

10% or 12% only and not 15% which was paid under protest.

He further contended that the appellant was bound to pay

revised duty upon reclassification by CEGAT, he was entitled

to lower rate of duty and the amount of duty so paid excess is

of not refundable unless it can prove the amount of duty so

paid excess. He further submits that the CESTAT was right

in giving finding that the refund claim of the appellant has

not arisen on account of finalization of provisional assessment

8
1991 (51) ELT 278
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and the same arose only on finalization of classification by the

Tribunal. The finding given by CESTAT that the clause

‘unjust enrichment’ would be applicable to the appellant as

refund has arisen out of CEGAT order and not on finalization

of provisional assessment. He further submitted that there is

no substantial question of law in the present appeal and

therefore, the appellant is not entitled for any relief

11. On proper analysis of entire material placed on

record, admittedly, the petitioner’s company is a limited

company registered under Hyderabad Companies Act, IV of

1320 Fasli, having its Registered Office and Factory at

Azamabad, Hyderabad. It is manufacture of cigarettes falling

under Chapter 24 of the Central Excise Tariff. It also

manufactures shells which are consumed captively in packing

of cigarettes. Cigarettes are sold in packets of 10s or 20s on

the basis of MRP. Admittedly, there was a dispute regarding

classification of shells under Chapter 49 which states that the

duty was NIL and subsequently the same was classified under

3.3.86. The Jurisdictional Assistant Commissioner has

classified the same as 48.18.13 and the appellant has already

paid duty. It is not in dispute that @15% in advance under
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sub-heading as per said letter, dated 12.03.1986, he has paid

duty under protest and thus matter was carried to CEGAT

wherein the learned CEGAT has clarified under sub-heading

4818.90 upto 29-02-1988 and under sub-heading 4823.90

from, 01-03-88 onwards and directing the same under

chapter sub-heading 4823.1990 from 01.03.1955 attracting

duty @ 12% which was later reduced to 10%. It is also

admitted that refund claim is on account of decision of the

Tribunal i.e., subject to Section 12-B of the Act of the Central

Excise Act, 1944, reads as under:

“12B. Presumption that incidence of duty has
been passed onto the buyer-

Every person who has paid the duty of excise on
any goods under this Act shall, unless the contrary is
proved by him, he deemed to have passed on the full
incidence of such duty to the buyer of such goods.”

12. The appellant vide letter, dated 14.03.1986 has

agreed to pay duty at the rate of 15% on the claims made for

the period from 01.03.1986 to 13.09.1994. During which

period, the said classification was still limited. The main

contention of the appellant is that the said product was

consumed for the purpose of packaging of cigarettes, they had

definitely paid duty under protest. Pursuant to the order
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passed by the Collector, the appellant is seeking for refund of

excess claim made, as it has not extended the incidence of

such duty to the buyer of such goods. Admittedly, the

cigarettes are only in respect of adjudication of classification

but not the valuation of the said goods. It appears that there

is no finalization of assessment of the goods, and it was

pending only for provisional assessment. Even after

classification, it appears that the revenue Department has not

made any efforts to finalize the assessment. In the absence of

finalization of the assessment, the entire case revolves around

refund of the duty which is paid by the appellant. Since the

said payments were made provisionally and once the tenancy

is fixed, differential duty could be discharged after

certification of the actual cost. It is evident from the record

that there is no finalization of the same.

13. Finalization or evaluation of entire product or the

goods delayed, counsel for the appellant has placed reliance

on the judgment cited above. Once the classification has

been made, the next step is whether refund of duty was under

protest or not. The other aspect is in view of amendment

being made to the Central Excise Act 1984, the aspect of
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‘unjust enrichment’ came on record. The ‘unjust enrichment’

has come to light and once without finalization of the

provisional assessment, the same cannot be treated as an

unjust enrichment and the same cannot be rejected. The

claim of the petitioners cannot be rejected or refund refused

only on the ground that it is amounts to unjust enrichment.

Once the assessment is provisional, it is deemed to be on all

counts that is not selectively provisional as there is no such

provision in Rule 9(b) of the Rules, 1944. As per provisional

assessment, duty was paid on receipt of provisional

assessment order under protest and the said order is based

on assumptions, which cannot be accepted. It is settled

proposition of law that as on the date, the principle of ‘unjust

enrichment’ is inapplicable prior to 25.06.1999, for such

proceedings, under Rule 9 (b) of the Rules, and the issue is no

longer re integra. The appellant failed to prove that the duty

was not passed on to the customers, as such, it has to be

presumed that the said duty was not passed on to the

customers, and it amounts to ‘unjust enrichment’. Learned

counsel for the appellant made her submissions relying upon

the judgment in C.C.E., C. & S.T., Bhubaneswar-I v.

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Pradeep Phosphates Limited 9 , wherein the High Court of

Orissa confirmed that the order passed by the Customs,

Excise & Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, dated 25.06.2007

and held that Pradeep Phosphates Limited cannot be said

to be guilty of ‘unjust enrichment’ so that they need not be

called upon to furnish documents to prove that they have not

passed on the excise burden to the customers. Learned

counsel for the appellant contended that the said ruling is

very much relevant to the present case as the very

assessment was provisional. At the stage of provisional

assessment, the Appellant need not prove before the

authorities that there was no such passing of the duty on to

the customers. She also further relied upon the judgment of

Commissioner of Central Excise v. T.V.S. Suzuki Limited,

Hosur 10 and contended that the delay accounted in

finalization of provisional assessment would not defeat the

right of the assessees by subsequent amendment of

25.06.1999. She rightly contended that the refund application

was made on 16.12.1995 and the same was finalized in the

year 1997. It is not the case of the respondent that the said

9
MANU/OR/0616/2008, dated 18.03.2008
10
Civil Appeal No.2416 of 2000 & batch, dated 06.08.2003
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amendment would be applicable retrospectively in respect of

the claims which are made prior to 1999, i.e., the date when

the amendment has come into force. Neither Section 11B of

the Central Excise Act nor the subsequent amendment to

Section 9B of the Act, 1944 would be attracted for invocation

of the principle of ‘unjust enrichment’ parallel to Mafatlal

Industries case (supra).

14. Section 11B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 reads

as follows:

“11B. Claim of refund of [duty and interest, if any, paid on such
duty].-

(1) Any person claiming refund of any (duty of excise and interest, if any,
paid on such duty) may make an application for refund of such (duty and
interest if any, paid on such duty) to the (Assistant Commissioner of
Central Excise or Deputy Commissioner of Central Excise) before the
expiry of (one year) (from the relevant date) (( in such form and manner)
as may be prescribed and the application shall be accompanied by such
documentary or other evidence to establish that the amount of “(duty of
excise and interest, if any, paid on such duty) in relation to which such
refund is claimed was collected from or paid by him and the incidence of
such (duty and interest if any, paid on such duty) had not been passed
on by him to any other person:

15. Section 9B of the Central Excise Act, 1944 reads
as follows:

“9B. Power of Court to publich name, plac of business etc., of
persons convicted under the Act.- (1) Where any person is convicted under
this Act for contravention of any of the provisions thereof, it shall be competent
for the Court convicting the person to cause the name and place of business or
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cea_41_2008

residence of such person, nature of the contravention, the fact that the person
has been so convicted and such other particulars as the Court may consider to
be appropriate in the circumstances of the case, to be published at the expense
of such person, in such newspapers or in such manner as the Court may direct.

(2) No publication under sub-section (1) shall be made until the period for
preferring an appeal against the order of the Court has expired without
any appeal having been preferred, or such an appeal, having been
preferred, has been disposed of.

(3) The expenses of any publication under sub-section (1) shall be
recoverable from the convicted person as if it were a fine imposed by the
Court)”

16. As it is observed from the entire material on record

that the excess duty which was paid by the appellant is not

an excess payment and it is only basing on the provisional

assessment made under Section 9B of the Act, 1944.

Therefore, the question of ‘unjust enrichment’ could not

attract for the reason that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the

case of Commissioner of Central Excise, Chennai v.

T.V.S.Suzuki Ltd 11, wherein it was held that the concept of

‘unjust enrichment’ could not be finalized by way of

provisional assessments. It was also held that the provisions

of sub-rule (5) of Rule 9B erstwhile Central Excise Rules,

1944 cannot be said to be retrospective in operation. The

Hon’ble Supreme Court also introduced sub-rule (5) of Rule

9B of the Rules, 1944. The proposal came into force on
11
2003 (156) E.L.T.161 (S.C)
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25.06.1999 and the authorities concerned and the Hon’ble

Supreme Court have rejected the contention of the

Department that the refund claim should be adjudicated in

accordance with the law as enforced on 25.06.1999 and the

Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the decision to decide

according to the law laid down in Mafatlal Industry‘s case

(supra), wherein it was held that the burden of proof is passed

onto the Department to show that the appellant has passed

on the duty incident to final customers. The facts and the

relevant material placed before this Court. Undoubtedly, the

said payment was made under protest and subject to

assessment of the said product, the appellant was entitled for

refund the same. But initially, the same was rejected on the

ground that there was an ‘unjust enrichment’, and there is no

proof filed by the appellant to show that the duty paid was

passed on to the consumer. The said aspect of ‘unjust

enrichment’ was neither raised earlier nor proceedings were

initiated as on the date of the finalization of the final

assessment and the same was subsequent to 25.06.1999.

17. In the present case, the refund application is made

on 16.12.1995 and it was not finalized till 1997. As such,
26
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Section 11 (b) of the Act 1944 is applicable or subsequent

amendment of Rule 9(b) of the Rule, 1944 would be attracted

for invocation of principle of ‘unjust enrichment’. The

contention of the respondent is that the appellant has not

entertained for refund on the ground of ‘unjust enrichment.’

When the same itself is not applicable to the present facts of

the case, the question of unjust enrichment itself is not

applicable. Therefore, the question of burden of proving that

the said duty was not passed on to the customers does not

arise and the said amounts are paid by the appellant under

protest. It is contended that the said product was only for the

captive consumption. As the same is being for the captive

consumption, the contention of the appellant appears to be

just and fair and the same has to be accepted. The intention

of the respondent in raising the plea of ‘unjust enrichment’

which is not even applicable to the present set of facts as the

same is subsequent to the amendment, which clearly shows

that there are mala fides on the part of the respondent. As

rightly held, as per Rule 9B (5) of the Rules, 1944, it does not

prescribe any specific form or application to seek refund of

the claim and that once the provisional assessment has been
27
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cea_41_2008

finalized the proper officer has to make the necessary

adjustment. As per Rule 9(d) of the Rules, 1944 as it provides

for an automatic benefit to the assessee upon finalization of

the assessment. In Photographic’s case, this bench has no

hesitation to hold that the provisional assessment was

finalized and the refund must be processed automatically

upon finalization. In the present case, as we said provisional

assessment was already finalized in the year 1997. As

provisional assessment is finalized, the necessary prerequisite

for refund as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CCE &

Customs, Mumbai‘s case.

18. Further, it is specifically stated that the refund

application, which was placed before the Assistant

Commissioner, contains the entire set of documents, such as

tax returns, challans PLA register etc. This bench is of the

opinion that the assessee is entitled to refund of excess duty

paid for finalization of provisional assessment and the

contention of the respondent that the appellant is not entitled

for the refund on the ground of ‘unjust enrichment’ cannot be

accepted for the reasons mentioned above
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19. Accordingly, this bench, after considering the

entire material and after assessing the facts and

circumstances of the case and also the judgments cited, is of

the considered opinion that the appellant has made out a

ground to interfere in the impugned order.

20. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and the Final

Order No.731 of 2007, dated 28.06.2007, in Appeal

No.E/408/2005 on the file of Customs, Excise and Service

Tax Appellate Tribunal, South Zonal Bench, Bangalore, is set

aside and the respondent is directed to refund the amount of

Rs.1,12,30,127/- along with interest at the rate of 6% per

annum to the appellant from the date of the appellant’s had

made the application for refund till the date of realization.

There shall be no order as to costs.

Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal

shall stand closed.

_________________________________
JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY

__________________________________________
JUSTICE NARSING RAO NANDIKONDA
Date:12.06.2025
Note:

L.R.copy to be marked
(B/o)
YVL



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