Gauhati High Court
WP(C)/3248/2019 on 28 July, 2025
GAHC010107502019
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT AT GUWAHATI
(The High Court of Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh)
Principal Seat at Guwahati
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3248/2019.
No. 065134801 CT/GD,
Shri Parag Jyoti Nath,
S/o Sri Rajani Kanta Nath,
R/o Koitahidi, P.O. - Bongora,
P.S. - Polashbari Mirza, Dist. - Kamrup, Assam,
PIN - 871101.
...... Petitioner.
-Versus-
1. The Union of India,
Represented by the Home Secretary to the Government of India,
New Delhi,
PIN - 110001.
2. The Director General, Central Reserve Police Force,
Block No. 1, CGO Complex,
Lodhi Nagar, New Delhi,
PIN - 110003.
3. The Deputy Inspector General of Police,
Central Reserve Police Force,
Range Imphal, Manipur,
PIN - 795001.
4. The Commandant - 87 Battalion,
Central Reserve Police Force,
SCT/CIAT Complex, Unchathal, Jiribam, Manipur,
Guwahati, Assam,
PIN - 795116.
...... Respondents.
Page 1 of 42
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROBIN PHUKAN
Advocate for the Petitioner :- Mr. R.P. Sarma, Sr. Adv.,
Mr. P.N. Sarma.
Advocate for the respondents :- Mr. K.K. Parasar, CGC.
Date of Hearing :- 24.06.2025.
Date of Judgment & Order :- 28.07.2025.
JUDGEMENT & ORDER (CAV)
Heard Mr. R.P. Sarma, learned Senior counsel assisted by Mr. P.N.
Sarma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. K.K. Parasar, learned
Central Government Counsel (CGC hereinafter) for the respondents.
2. In this petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the
petitioner has challenged the order, No. P-VIII-5/2018-87-EC-2, dated
31.07.2018, issued by the respondent No. 4, by which the petitioner was
dismissed from his service with immediate effect.
Background facts:-
3. The backgrounds facts, leading to filing of this petition, are
adumbrated herein below:-
“The petitioner was serving as a Constable/GD of Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF hereinafter) in the 87th Battalion, Unchathal,
Jiribam, Manipur. He joined the service on 25.01.2006, andPage 2 of 42
discharged his duties with utmost sincerity and dedication. Since
the time of his joining, he was posted in various places, where he
discharged his duties with best of his ability and judgment and
there was no complaint in discharge of his duty except, however,
some complaints, regarding consumption of liquor, occasionally.
Thereafter, on 30.11.2017, at about 05.00 pm, he returned
to his camp, having performed his duties continuously for three
days as „Quarter-Guard‟. On account of performing his duties
continuously for three days as Quarter-Guard, he got exhausted
and felt tired, and with a view to get relax and relieve, he took
four pegs of wine in the force’s canteen. And while he was
relaxing and taking rest, he was again entrusted with the duty at
VIP Gate for two hours from 07:00 pm to 09:00 pm. As a result of
exhaustion in discharging his duty for whole day, he could not
remain stand and he fell down on the ground. Thereafter, he was
taken to the hospital and there medical test was conducted which
gave positive test of alcohol consumption.
Then a departmental enquiry was initiated against him. And
on the basis of the enquiry report, punishment of „Dismissal from
Service‟ with immediate effect was inflicted upon him, vide
impugned order No. P-VIII-5/2018-87-EC-2, dated 31.07.2018,
issued by the respondent No. 4, on the charge of allegedly lying in
the state of intoxication, by drinking alcohol, during the duty
hours on the duty of Morcha (Post).
Page 3 of 42
Thereafter, he had preferred an appeal, under Section 28(a)
of the CRPF Rules, 1955, before the Deputy Inspector General of
Police, CRPF, Range Imphal, Manipur, (respondent No. 3). But,
the respondent No. 3, vide its order No. R.XIII.87/2018-EC-I,
dated 16.10.2018, had dismissed the appeal.
It is the contention of the petitioner that on the alleged
basis of the alcoholic medical test and attending circumstances,
he was inflicted with the punishment of „Dismissal from Service‟,
which is a bolt from the blue and he was prejudiced. During
enquiry, though he was given an opportunity to adduce evidence,
yet, due to the scaring circumstances, as it happens in the Force,
for lower grade employees, and also on account of his health
condition, he could not made any attempt to adduce any evidence
of any member of his unit, as every member of the unit was
scared to give evidence in his favour on the face of scary eyes of
senior officers in his defense, except however himself. Although,
he had made a prayer for allowing him to perform his duty, but
the same was rejected by the official respondents, instead, he
was dismissed from service, which is arbitrary, discriminatory,
unjust, improper and against the principles of natural justice and
administrative fair play and as such, the same is liable to be set
aside and quashed.
It is the further contention of the petitioner that the prime
allegation against him is that of lying in the state of intoxication
by drinking alcohol during the period of duty, leaving aside his
Page 4 of 42
personal arms and ammunitions unattended. However, he was
not lying down there due to excess consumption of alcohol, but
due to over exhaustion of the body for continuous duty for three
days prior to entrustment with the duty at VIP Gate and as such,
the punishment of dismissal from service, so imposed upon him is
violative of the provisions of Article 14, 16, 21 and 311 of the
Constitution of India and therefore, the same is liable to be
interfered with.”
4. The respondent authorities have filed their affidavit-in-
opposition, wherein a stand has been taken that the petitioner was
enlisted in CRPF on 25.01.2006, and after completion of his basic
training, he was posted at 27th Battalion, CRPF with effect from
17.07.2007. Thereafter, he was posted in 210th COBRA Battalion and
thereafter, in 87th Battalion on 20.10.2014. And while he was posted in
210th COBRA Battalion, he was suffering from ADS (Alcohol
Dependence Syndrome), for which he was under LMC and treated at
Central Hospital, Guwahati. During his stay in 87th Battalion, on
09.08.2015, at about 21:40 hrs, on night guard duty at Morcha No. 04
of F/87 location, he had consumed liquor and misbehaved with his
Company Commander and cocked his personal weapon with wrong
intention. For this act of misconduct, a disciplinary inquiry was initiated
against him, vide 87th Battalion, CRPF Office Memo, dated 24.09.2015,
and during the course of inquiry, the charges leveled against him were
proved. Accordingly, after taking into account his 10 years long service
and family problems, a lenient view was taken to award minor
Page 5 of 42
punishment of withholding of 1 increment without cumulative effect,
vide 87th Battalion, CRPF Office Order, dated 15.07.2016.
4.1. Thereafter, on 30.11.2017, he was found sleeping on the floor
in a state of intoxication on sentry duty in Morcha and to find out the
fact of his misconduct, a preliminary inquiry was conducted and upon
which, a departmental inquiry was initiated against him vide 87th
Battalion, CRPF Office Memo dated 23.12.2017. During the course of
enquiry, the charges leveled against him were proved and thereafter,
taking into the account the gravity of charge and his previous records
of service, punishment of „Dismissal from Service‟ was awarded to him
vide 87th Battalion, CRPF Office Order dated 31.07.2018.
4.2. Further stand of the respondent authorities is that the
contentions made by the petitioner in paragraph No. 4 of the writ
petition are baseless and therefore, the same is denied by the
respondent authorities and that in every post of duty, there is off time
in which the personnel can take adequate rest and that the petitioner
was on night guard duty at about 20:55 hrs, on 30.11.2017 and he
was found under the heavy influence of liquor and sleeping on the
floor of the Morcha in an intoxicated state and he had thrown away his
personal weapon, which is against the good orders and discipline of
force, leaving the camp security in danger and he urinated in the
Morcha itself and he was totally out of sense. It is the prime
responsibility of a Jawan to perform his duties attentively with
alertness in each sentry post.
Page 6 of 42
4.3. It is further stated that the pattern of duty as Quarter Guard, is
2 hours, followed by rest. As such, the question of over exhaustion of
body due to duty, does not arise and it was due to excessive
consumption of liquor, as per finding of medical report of the
petitioner and as such, it is established that on 30.11.2017, at about
22:00 hours, the petitioner had consumed alcohol and was under the
influence of alcohol and not due to duty performed by him as Quarter
Guard and he was given ample opportunity, at every stage of the
departmental inquiry, to defend him and the punishment was awarded
by the disciplinary authority after going through the departmental
proceedings, documentary evidence and facts.
4.4. It is further stated that the dismissal order issued by the
competent authority, vide order No. P VIII 5/2018-87-EC-2, dated
31.07.2018, is as per provision of Section 9(g) of CRPF Act, 1949
which is punishable under Section 11(1) of CRPF Act, 1949 read with
Rule 27 of CRPF Rules, 1955, which commensurate to the gravity of
the offence and under such circumstances, it is contended to dismiss
the petition.
5. Mr. Sarma, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner, submits
that the punishment, so imposed upon the petitioner, is grossly
disproportionate to the allegation leveled against him. Mr. Sarma
further submits that the petitioner was asked to attend duty
continuously for three days and after three days, when he was
released, he refreshed himself and thereafter, he consumed liquor for
the exhaustion. But, thereafter, he was again asked to attend duty at
Page 7 of 42
Morcha and because of over exhaustion he fell down and lying
unconscious and his personal weapon was lying beside him. Mr. Sarma
further submits that the petitioner has made a categorical contention
in respect of his three days continuous duties and thereafter, again he
was asked to attend duty at Morcha gate, and he attended the duty
and because of his over exhaustion he lied unconscious and referring
to the said contention, being made in the petition, at paragraph No. 4
& 10, Mr. Sarma submits that the respondent authorities had made an
evasive reply in respect of the same and that the respondent
authorities in its affidavit-in-opposition in paragraph No. 10 & 14 had
failed to controvert/traverse the contention made by the petitioner.
Mr. Sarma further submits that the departmental inquiry against the
petitioner was initiated for commission of less heinous offences, but
the punishment imposed upon him is for heinous offences and as
such, serious prejudice is caused to the petitioner for imposing
punishment for heinous offences and that during the departmental
inquiry, he could not adduce his evidence in defence as the junior
staffs scared to adduce evidence in his favour and on such count, also
the departmental inquiry is unfair. Mr. Sarma also submits that though
an appeal was preferred by the petitioner before appellate authority,
the same also came to be dismissed and that the petitioner had
rendered his service for 12 years 6 months without any stigma. Under
such circumstances, Mr. Sarma has contended to set aside the
impugned order.
Page 8 of 42
5.1. In support of his submission, Mr. Sarma has also referred to a
decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India
and Others vs. Diler Singh, reported in (2016) 13 SCC 71.
6. Per-contra, Mr. Parasar, learned CGC, submits that the
departmental inquiry was initiated for major punishment, under
Section 11 of the CRPF Act. He further submits that the petitioner was
never allotted duty continuously for three days and in between there
was gap for taking rest. Mr. Parasar further submits that on previous
occasions also, the petitioner was found guilty in a departmental
inquiry initiated against him, for the misconduct of consuming alcohol
and therefore, punishment of withholding of one increment was also
imposed upon him. Then again for the second time, he was found in
intoxicated state, while on duty, and that he was found lying down on
the floor and his personal weapon was also lying unattended and his
breath analysis was conducted by the doctor and it was found to be
1.79, and the statement of the doctor was recorded by the authority
and the same is available on the record and that while 0.08 is the
normal limit of breath analysis, but, his report was found to be 1.79
and the same is much higher in side. Mr. Parasar further submits that
he was suffering from ADS and he was treated for the same. Referring
to the decision referred by Mr. Sarma, learned senior counsel for the
petitioner, Mr. Parasar submits that the said decision is factually
distinguishable from the case of the present petitioner and that the
petitioner is 41 years old now and he is not in service for last 7 years.
Page 9 of 42
Under the above facts and circumstances, Mr. Parasar has contended
to dismiss the petition.
7. Having heard the submissions of learned counsel for both the
parties, I have carefully gone through the petition as well as the
documents placed on record and also the impugned order No. P-VIII-
5/2018-87-EC-2, dated 31.07.2018, issued by the respondent No. 4,
and also the decision, referred by Mr. Sharma in Diler Singh
(Supra).
8. Before a discussion is directed into the issues raised in this
petition, it would be in the interest of justice to understand the legal
proposition concerning the scope and power of the writ court to
interfere with the findings in disciplinary proceeding, specially with the
punishment imposed upon the charged officials. While dealing with the
issue, in the case of Noharlal Verma vs. District Cooperative
Central Bank Limited, Jagdalpur, reported in(2008) 14 SCC
445, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that normally in exercise of
power of judicial review, a writ court will not substitute its own
judgment or decision for the judgment or decision of the disciplinary
authority, unless it comes to the conclusion that it has shocked the
conscience of the Court, or the punishment is such that no reasonable
man would impose such punishment, or the decision is so absurd that
the decision maker, at the time of making the decision, must have
taken leave of his senses.
Page 10 of 42
9. In the case of State Bank of India v. Ram Lal Bhaskar &
Anr., reported in(2011) 10 SCC 249, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has
held that in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, the High Court does not sit as an appellate authority, over the
findings of the disciplinary authority, and so long as the finding of the
disciplinary authority are supported by some evidence, the High Court
does not re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different and
independent finding on the evidence.
10. In the case of Apparel Export Promotion Council vs.
A.K. Chopra, reported in (1999) 1 SCC 759, while dealing with
jurisdiction of High Court or Tribunal, it has been held that judicial
review, not being an appeal from a decision, but a review in the
manner in which the decision was arrived at, the Court while
exercising the power of judicial review, must remain conscious of the
fact that if the decision has been arrived at by the administrative
authority after following the principle established by law and the rules
of natural justice and the individual has received a fair treatment to
met the case against him, the Court cannot substitute its judgment for
that of the administrative authority on a matter which fell squarely
within the jurisdiction of that authority.
11. In the case of B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India & Ors.,
reported in(1995) 6 SCC 749,Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held that
the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is
presented, the appellate authority has co-extensive power to re-
appreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary
Page 11 of 42
enquiry, strict proof of legal evidence and finding on that evidence are
not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be
permitted to be canvassed before the court/tribunal.
11.1. In the said case, it has also been held as under:-
“A review of above legal position would establish
that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the
appellate authority, being fact finding authorities
have exclusive power to consider the evidence with
a view to maintain discipline. They are invested
with the discretion to impose appropriate
punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity
of the misconduct. The High Court or tribunal while
exercising the judicial review cannot normally
substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose
some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by
the disciplinary authority or the appellate
authority shocks the conscience of the High
Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould
relief, either directing the disciplinary
authority/appellate authority to consider the
penalty imposed or to shorten the litigation, it
may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose
appropriate punishment with cogent reason in
support thereof.”
12. In the case of Union of India & Ors. vs. Ex. Constable
Ram Karan,reported in(2022) 1 SCC 373, Hon‟ble Supreme Court
has held that High Court should not have substituted its own discretion
for that of the authority. What punishment was required to be
imposed, in the facts and circumstances of the case, was a matter
which fell exclusively within the jurisdiction of competent authority and
Page 12 of 42
the interference made by the High Court is in a cavalier manner while
recording the finding of penalty to be disproportionate without taking
into consideration the seriousness of the misconduct committed by the
respondent which is unpardonable and not sustainable in law.
13. Further, in the case of Diler Singh (Supra), while dealing
with similar issues, in paragraph No. 22, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has
held as under:-
“22. The learned counsel for the respondent has
submitted that even if the charges have been
proven, the punishment of dismissal in the
obtaining factual matrix is absolutely
Tharsh and shocking to the conscience. It is
his submission that the punishment is
disproportionate. The respondent was a part
of the disciplined force. He has left the
campus without prior permission, proceeded
to the market, consumed liquor and
quarrelled with the civilians. It has been
established that he had consumed liquor at
the market place, and it has been also
proven that he has picked up quarrel with
the civilians. It is not expected of a
member of the disciplined force to behave in
this manner. The submission, as has been
noted earlier, is that the punishment isPage 13 of 42
absolutely disproportionate. The test of
proportionality has been explained by this
Court in Om Kumar and others v. Union of
India, Union of India and another v. G.
Ganayutham and Union of India v. Dwarka
Prasad Tiwari. In Dwarka Prasad Tiwari
(supra), it has been held that unless the
punishment imposed by the disciplinary
authority or the appellate authority shocks
the conscience of the court/tribunal, there
is no scope for interference. When a member
of the disciplined force deviates to such an
extent from the discipline and behaves in an
untoward manner which is not conceived of,
it is difficult to hold that the punishment
of dismissal as has been imposed is
disproportionate and shocking to the
judicial conscience.”
14. The proposition of law, that can be crystallized from the
aforesaid discussion, is that the scope and power of writ court, to
interfere with the finding in disciplinary proceeding is very limited.
Normally in exercise of the power of judicial review, a writ court will
not substitute its own judgment for the decision of the disciplinary
authority, unless it had shock the conscience of the court, or the
punishment is such that no reasonable man would impose such
Page 14 of 42
punishment. If the decision has been arrived at by the administrative
authority, after following the principle established by law and the rule
of natural justice and if the individual has received a fair treatment to
meet the case against him, the court cannot substitute its own view
for that of the disciplinary authority. Adequacy of evidence or reliability
of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court and
the High Court does not re-appreciate the evidence and come to a
different finding on the evidence.
15. Keeping the aforesaid proposition in mind now an endeavour
will be made to examine the case of the petitioner. A careful perusal of
the impugned order, dated 31.07.2018, reveals that only one article of
charge was framed against him, which is read as under:-
“That, Force No. 065134801 CT/GD Parag Jyoti Nath,
being in the post of Constable/GD, F/87 Bn. CRPF,
violated the provisions of Section 11(1) of the
Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949, read with
Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules 1955 by violating and
disobeying the instructions of the authority,
whereby on 30/11/2017 at about 2055 hrs., during
duty hours, he was found lying unconscious in an
intoxication state, on the floor of his duty post
and his personal weapons and L.M.G. were lying
unattended far away from his body. Therefore, the
act of the force, being against the provisions of
Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949 and Rule 27 of
the CRPF Rules 1955, pertaining to the Disciplines
and instructions of higher authorities, is
punishable.”
Page 15 of 42
15.1. Thereafter, taking the evidence, the Inquiry Officer had found
that the article of charge stands established. Accordingly, the
disciplinary authority had imposed the punishment of „Dismissal from
Service‟ with effect from 31.07.2018.
16. It is to be noted here that Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act
provides as under:-
Section 11. Minor punishments:-
(1) The Commandant or any other authority or
officer as may be prescribed, may, subject to
any rules made under this Act, award in lieu
of, or in addition to, suspension or dismissal
any one or more of the following punishments to
any member of the Force whom he considers to be
guilty of disobedience, neglect of duty, or
remissness in the discharge of any duty or of
other misconduct in his capacity as a member of
the Force, that is to say-
(a) reduction in rank;
(b) fine of any amount not exceeding one
month's pay and allowances;
(c) confinement to quarters, lines or camp for
a term not exceeding one month;
(d) confinement in the quarter-guard for not
more than twenty-eight days, with or
without punishment drill or extra guard,
fatigue or other duty; andPage 16 of 42
(e) removal from any office of distinction or
special emolument in the Force.
(2) Any punishment specified in clause (c) or
clause (d) of sub-section (1) may be awarded by
any gazetted officer when in command of any
detachment of the Force away from headquarters,
provided he is specially authorised in this
behalf by the Commandant.
(3) The assistant commandant, a company officer or
a subordinate officer, not being below the rank
of subedar or inspector, commanding a separate
detachment or an outpost, or in temporary
command at the headquarters of the Force, may,
without a formal trial, award to any member of
the Force who is for the time being subject to
his authority any one or more of the following
punishments for the commission of any petty
offence against discipline which is not
otherwise provided for in this Act, or which is
not of a sufficiently serious nature to require
prosecution before a criminal Court, that is to
say,–
(a) confinement for not more than seven days
in the quarter-guard or such other place
as may be considered suitable, with
forfeiture of all pay and allowances
during its continuance;
(b) punishment drill, or extra guard, fatigue
or other duty, for not more than thirty
days, with or without confinement to
quarters, lines or camp;
Page 17 of 42
(c) censure or severe censure:
Provided that this punishment may be
awarded to a subordinate officer only by
the Commandant.
(4) A jemadar or sub-inspector who is temporarily
in command of a detachment or an outpost may,
in like manner and for the commission of any
like offence, award to any member of the Force
for the time being subject to his authority any
of the punishments specified in clause (b) of
sub-section (3) for not more than fifteen days.
16.1. It is also to be noted here that the Section 9 of the CRPF Act
deals with more heinous offences which are quoted below:-
Every member of the Force who–
(a) begins, excites, causes or conspires to cause
or joins in any mutiny, or, being present at
any mutiny, does not use his utmost endeavour
to suppress it, or knowing, or having reason
to believe in, the existence of any mutiny, or
of any intention or conspiracy to mutiny or of
any conspiracy against the State does not,
without delay, give information thereof to his
superior officer; or
(b) uses, or attempts to use, criminal force to,
or commits an assault on, his superior
officer, whether on or off duty, knowing or
having reason to believe him to be such; or
(c) shamefully abandons or delivers up any post or
guard which is committed to his charge, or
which it is his duty to defend; orPage 18 of 42
(d) directly or indirectly holds correspondence
with, or assists or relieves any person in
arms against the State or omits to discover
immediately to his superior officer any such
correspondence coming to his knowledge;
or who, while on active duty:–
(e) disobeys the lawful command of his superior
officer; or
(f) deserts the Force; or
(g) being a sentry, sleeps upon his post or quits
it without being regularly relieved or without
leave; or
(h) leaves his commanding officer, or his post or
party, to go in search of plunder; or
(i) quits his guard, picquet, party or patrol
without being regularly relieved or without
leave; or
(j) uses criminal force to, or commits an assault
on, any person bringing provisions or other
necessaries to camp or quarters, or forces a
safeguard or breaks into any house or other
place for plunder, or plunders, destroys or
damages property of any kind; or
(k) intentionally causes or spreads a false alarm
in action or in camp, garrison or quarters; or
(l) displays cowardice in the execution of his
duty, shall be punishable with transportation
for life for a term of not less than seven
years or with imprisonment for a term whichPage 19 of 42
may extend to fourteen years or with fine
which may extend to three months’ pay or with
fine to that extent in addition to such
sentence of transportation or imprisonment.
16.2. Section 10 deals with less heinous offences, which are quoted
herein below:-
Every member of the Force who:-
(a) is in a state of intoxication when on, or after
having been warned for, any duty or on parade
or on the line of march; or
(b) strikesor attempts to force any sentry; or
(c) being in command of a guard, piquet or patrol,
refuses to receive any prisoner or person duly
committed to his charge, or without proper
authority releases any person or prisoner
placed under his charge, or negligently suffers
any such prisoner or person to escape; or
(d) being under arrest or in confinement, leaves his
arrest or confinement, before he is set at
liberty by lawful authority; or
(e) is grossly insubordinate or insolvent to his
superior officer in the execution of his
office; or
(f) refuses to superintend or assist in the making
of any field-work or other work of any
description ordered to be made either in
quarters or in the field; orPage 20 of 42
(g) strikes or otherwise ill-uses any member of the
Force subordinate to him in rank or position;
or
(h) designedly or through neglect injuries or loses
or fraudulently disposes of his arms, clothes,
tools, equipments, ammunition or accoutrements,
or any such articles entrusted to him or
belonging to any other person; or
(i) malingers or feigns or produces disease or
infirmity in himself, or intentionally delays
his cure, or aggravates his disease or
infirmity; or
(j) with intent to render himself or any other
person unfit for service, voluntarily causes
hurt to himself or any other person; or
(k) does not, when called upon by his superior
officer so to do or upon ceasing to be a member
of the Force forthwith deliver up, or duly
account for, all or any arms, ammunition,
stores, accoutrements or other property issued
or supplied to him or in his custody or
possession as such member; or
(l) knowingly furnishes a false return or report of
the number or state of any men under his
command or charge or of any money, arms,
ammunition, clothing, equipments, stores or
other property in his charge, whether belonging
to such men or to the Government or to any
member of, or any person attached to the Force,
or who, through design or culpable neglect,
Page 21 of 42
omits or refuses to make or send any return or
report of the matters aforesaid; or
(m) absents himself without leave, or without
sufficient cause over-stays leave granted to
him; or
(n) is guilty of any act or omission which, though
not specified in this Act, is prejudicial to
good order and discipline; or
(o) contravenes any provision of this Act for which
no punishment is expressly provided;
or who, while not on active duty,–
(p) commits any of the offences specified in clauses
(e) to (l) (both inclusive) of section 9, shall
be punishable with imprisonment for a term
which may extend to one year, or with fine
which may extend to three months’ pay, or with
both.
16.3. And Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955 reveals that it prescribes
the procedure for the award of punishment.
17. In the instant case, perusal of the sole article of charge reveals
that the proceeding was initiated for less heinous offences as provided
under Section 10(a) of the Act. Further, the article of charge, which is
reproduced herein above, indicates that the same relates to lying
unconscious by the petitioner in an intoxicated state on the floor of his
duty post and his personal weapon was also lying unattended away
from his body.
Page 22 of 42
18. It also appears from the petition and also from the submission
of Mr. Sharma, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that he
has not challenged the evidence and finding so recorded in the
disciplinary proceeding. Nor he had disputed the allegation of
consumption of liquor and lying unconscious in the Morcha at the duty
hours. What he has challenged is that his dismissal from service by the
authority without considering the background facts leading to his
consumption of liquor and lying unconscious in the Morcha at duty
hours.
18.1. It is the categorical contention of the petitioner that he was
allotted duty for three continuous days and after being released, he
got refreshed and admittedly, he consume four pegs of wine and
thereafter, he was again asked to attend the duty at Morcha gate.
While the petitioner was on duty continuously for three days and
thereafter, while he was taking rest in the camp, after consumption of
liquor for relaxation, then he was again asked to attend the duty at
Morcha. And under such circumstances, it is quite natural that a
person would suffer over exhaustion. Besides, he was under the
influence of liquor, which he had admittedly taken while taking rest
before he was asked to attend duty at Morcha. And under such
circumstances, it is also quite natural that he fell asleep and his arm
was lying unattended in the Morcha.
18.2. The averment of allotment of duty for three days continuously,
so made by the petitioner in paragraph No.4 and 5 of his petition
remained un-traversed in the affidavit filed by the respondent
Page 23 of 42
authorities. Mr. Sharma, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner
has rightly pointed this out during argument. Having gone through the
affidavit-in-opposition filed by the respondent No. 3, in paragraph
No.10, I find that the respondent No.3 had simply denied the
averment made by the petitioner in paragraph No.4. The denial seems
to be evasive. A general denial or a vague statement of non-
admission is insufficient to counter the petitioner’s factual assertions.
18.3. In the given factual scenario, the doctrine of non-traversal can
be invoked herein this case that failure to traverse a pertinent plea
allows the court to infer its admission, as provided in the Order VIII
Rule 5 CPC, and the statement and averment made in para No. 4 and
5 of the petition have to be accepted as admission by the respondent
authority. Reliance on the judgment to apply the doctrine of non-
traverse is made to the case of (1) Controller of Court of Ward,
Kolhapur & Anr. V. G.N. Gharpade, reported in AIR 1973 SC
627, and also on a decision passed by (2) Gobinda Chandra Das v.
State of West Bengal, reported in 1989 (2) CAL LT (HC) 63.
Again in the case of Sushil Kumar v. Rakesh Kumar, reported
in(2003) 8 SCC 673, Hon‟ble Supreme has highlighted the
obligations under Order VIII Rules 3 and 5 of CPC regarding
admissions and denials, holding that vague denials could constitute
admissions.
18.4. The petitioner has also challenged the fairness of the
disciplinary proceeding on the ground that while the departmental
inquiry was initiated for minor punishment, under Section 11(1) of the
Page 24 of 42
CRPF Act, the punishment so imposed upon him appears to be grossly
disproportionate.
18.5. This contention of the petitioner, however, left this Court
unimpressed in as much as the disciplinary proceeding was admittedly
initiated under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949 which provides for
minor punishment. And, punishment imposed upon the petitioner is
“Dismissal from Service” which is indeed a major punishment. But, it is
no more res-integra , in view of the decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court
in the case of Union of India vs. Gulam Mohammad Bhatt
reported in (2005) 13 SCC 228, that punishment of dismissal of
service can be informed under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act. In the
said case, it has been held as under:-
“5. A bare perusal of Section 11 shows that it
deals with minor punishment as compared to
the major punishments prescribed in the
preceding section. It lays down that the
Commandant or any other authority or officer,
as may be prescribed, may, subject to any
rules made under the Act, award any one or
more of the punishments to any member of the
Force who is found guilty of disobedience,
neglect of duty or remissness in the
discharge of his duty or of other misconduct
in his capacity as a member of the Force.
According to the High Court the only
Page 25 of 42
punishments which can be awarded under this
section are reduction in rank, fine,
confinement to quarters and removal from any
office of distinction or special emolument in
the Force. In our opinion, the interpretation
is not correct, because the section says that
these punishments may be awarded in lieu of,
or in addition to, suspension or dismissal.
6. The use of the words “in lieu of, or in
addition to, suspension or dismissal”,
appearing in sub-section (1) of Section 11
before clauses (a) to (e) shows that the
authorities mentioned therein are empowered
to award punishment of dismissal or
suspension to the member of the Force who is
found guilty and in addition to, or in lieu
thereof, the punishment mentioned in clauses
(a) to (e) may also be awarded.”
And again in para 7 it has been held that:-
“7. … It is, therefore, clear that Section 11
deals with only those minor punishments which
may be awarded in a departmental inquiry and
a plain reading thereof makes it quite clear
that a punishment of dismissal can certainly
be awarded thereunder even if the delinquentPage 26 of 42
is not prosecuted for an offence under
Section 9 or Section 10.”
18.6. The above proposition stands affirmed in the case of Diler
Singh (supra) also.
19. Another contention made by Mr. Sharma, the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner is that during the departmental inquiry, the
petitioner could not adduce his evidence in defence, as the junior
staffs scared to adduce evidence in his favour and consequently, the
petitioner could not defend his case properly. The petitioner had
made categorical contention in this regard in paragraph No. 11 of his
petition. And on such count also, the finding in the departmental
inquiry, appears to be unfair.
19.1. It is also to be mentioned here that in respect of the assertions
made in paragraph 11 of the petition also, the respondent authority, in
their affidavit-in-opposition had made evasive reply and in view of
decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Sushil Kumar (supra), this
vague denials would constitute admissions.
19.2. Moreover, from a careful perusal of the impugned order of
dismissal (Annexure-1) following circumstances emerges:-
(i) When the Charge Sheet, the Articles of Charges, List of
Documents and List of Witnesses were furnished to the
petitioner vide letter dated 23.12.2017, with a direction to
remain present before the Enquiry Officer, the petitionerPage 27 of 42
did not furnish any representation/application in response
to the memorandum issued to him.
(ii) The petitioner also did not submit any letter/intimation to
the Commandant -87 Battalion, though he was informed
that if he needs any assistance for his defence he may
recommend three force members below the rank of
Assistant Commandant to the Commandant-87th Battalion
out of which one member shall be appointed as Defense
Assistant.
(iii) When the petitioner was asked to join the enquiry
proceeding and to adduce witness/evidence, the petitioner,
vide his representation dated 28.05.2018, submitted to the
Enquiry Officer, confessed that he was in an intoxicated
state due to over drinking of alcohol.
(iv) The impugned order also indicates that the petitioner was
given the opportunity to cross-examine all the witnesses so
examined by the Enquiry Officer. But, in the impugned
order there is no indication that the petitioner had cross-
examined the witnesses. However, the relevant file
produced by the learned CGC before the Court indicates
that none of the ten witnesses examined by the presenting
officer was cross-examined by the petitioner herein.
(v) While he was asked to adduce evidence, the petitioner has
filed representation admitting consumption of liquor, which
Page 28 of 42
goes to show that he did not understand the nature and
consequence thereof. He filed the representation due to
lack of proper guidance and instruction as he was not
represented by any assistant.
(v) After completion of enquiry, the Enquiry Officer had
submitted his report and a copy of the report was
furnished to the petitioner on 07.06.2018 with a direction
to appear before the Enquiry Officer, within 10 days of
receipt of the letter, if he want to adduce any witness,
evidence in his defence, otherwise it will be construed that
he does not want to adduce any witness or evidence in his
defence. And the petitioner then submitted a
representation dated 20.06.2018, stating that he was in
sleeping condition due to over consumption of liquor.
(vi) Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer, after completion of enquiry,
presented the report vide his letter dated 25.06.2018.
(vii) The Disciplinary Authority had also found that the Enquiry
Officer had completed the proceeding by following the due
process of law and that the petitioner was given
reasonable opportunity to defend his case.
(viii) Then acting upon the said Enquiry Report, the Disciplinary
Authority found the articles of charges proved and
thereafter, passed the impugned order dated 31.07.2018.
Page 29 of 42
19.3. As discussed herein above, Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955
provides for procedure for the award of punishment.
Rule (c) The procedure for conducting a departmental
enquiry shall be as follows:-
(1) The substance of the accusation shall be reduced
to the form of a written charge which should be
as precise as possible. The charge shall be read
out to the accused and a copy of it given to him
before the commencement of the enquiry.
(2) At the commencement of the enquiry the accused
shall be asked to enter a plea of “guilty” or
“not guilty” after which evidence necessary to
establish the charge shall be let in. The
evidence shall be material to the charge and may
either be oral or documentary, if oral:
(i) it shall be direct:
(ii) it shall be recorded by the Officer
conducting, the enquiry himself in the
presence of the accused:
(iii) the accused shall be allowed to cross
examine the witnesses.
(3) When documents are relied upon in support of the
charge, they shall be put in evidence as
exhibits and the accused shall, before he isPage 30 of 42
called upon to make his defence be allowed to
inspect such exhibits.
(4) The accused shall then be examined and his
statement recorded by the officer conducting the
enquiry. If he accused has pleaded guilty and
does not challenge the evidence on record, the
proceedings shall be closed for orders. If he
pleads “Not guilty”, he shall be required to
file a written statement and a list of such
witnesses as he may wish to cite in his defence
within such period, which shall in any case be
not less than a fortnight, as the officer
conducting enquiry may deem reasonable in the
circumstances of the case. If he declines to
file a written statement, he shall again be
examined by the officer conducting the enquiry
on the expiry of the period allowed.
(5) If the accused refuses to cite any witnesses or
to produce any evidence in his defence, the
proceedings shall be closed for orders. If he
produces any evidence the officer conducting the
enquiry shall proceed to record the evidence. If
the officer conducting the enquiry considers
that the evidence of any witness or any document
which the accused wants to produce in hisPage 31 of 42
defence is not material to the issues involved
in the case he may refuse to call such witness
or to allow such document to be produced in
evidence, but in all such cases he must briefly
record his reasons for considering the evidence
inadmissible. When all relevant evidence has
been brought on record, the proceedings shall be
closed for orders.
(6) If the Commandant has himself held the enquiry,
he shall record his findings and pass orders
where he has power to do so. If the enquiry has
been held by any officer other than the
Commandant, the officer conducting the enquiry
shall forward his report together with the
proceedings to the Commandant who shall record
his findings and pass order where he has power
to do so.
(7)DELETED vide GSR 75 dated 26.1.80
(cc) Notwithstanding anything contained in this
rule:
(i) Where any penalty is imposed on a
member of the Force on the ground of
conduct which has led to his
conviction on a criminal charge: or
(ii) Where the authority competent to
impose the penalty is satisfied forPage 32 of 42
reasons to be recorded by it in
writing that is not reasonably
practicable to hold an enquiry in
the manner provided in these rules:
or
(iii) Where the Director General is
satisfied that in the interest of
security of the State, it is not
expedient to hold any enquiry in the
manner provided in these rules, the
authority competent to impose the
penalty may consider the
circumstances of the case and make
such order ther on as it deems fit.
(ccc) When a member of the Force has been tried
and acquitted by a criminal court, he
shall not be punished departmentally under
this rule on the same charge or on a
similar charge upon the evidence cited in
the criminal case, whether actually led or
not except with the prior sanction of the
Inspector General.
(d)(1)Where two or more members of the Force,
including those on deputation to the Force
are concerned in any case, the Inspector
General or any authority competent to
impose the penalty of dismissal from
service on all such members of the ForcePage 33 of 42
may make an order directing that
disciplinary action against all of them
may be taken in a common proceeding.
Note- Where in such a proceeding, the misconduct of
a deputationist is to be dealt with, the consent of
the disciplinary authority competent to impose the
penalty of dismissal shall be obtained for the
taking of such a disciplinary action.
(2) such order shall specify-
(i) the authority which may function as the
disciplinary for such a common proceeding;
(ii) the penalties specified in the table of sub-
rule (a) above which such disciplinary
authority shall be competent to impose;
(iii) whether such disciplinary authority shall
hold the Departmental enquiry himself or may
designate any other enquiry officer for that
purpose; and,
(iv) that the enquiry shall be held in accordance
with the provisions of sub rule (a) and sub
rule (c)”.
20. It is to be noted here that the requirement following the
procedure has been emphasized by Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case
of D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., reported in (1993)
3 SCC 259 as under:-
Page 34 of 42
“11. The law must therefore be now taken to be
well-settled that procedure prescribed for
depriving a person of livelihood must meet the
challenge of Article 14 and such law would be
liable to be tested on the anvil of Article 14
and the procedure prescribed by a statute or
statutory rule or rules or orders affecting
the civil rights or result in civil
consequences would have to answer the
requirement of Article 14. So it must be
right, just and fair and not arbitrary,
fanciful or oppressive. There can be no
distinction between a quasi-judicial function
and an administrative function for the purpose
of principles of natural justice. The aim of
both administrative inquiry as well as the
quasi-judicial inquiry is to arrive at a just
decision and if a rule of natural justice is
calculated to secure justice or to put it
negatively, to prevent miscarriage of justice,
it is difficult to see why it should be
applicable only to quasi-judicial inquiry and
not to administrative inquiry. It must
logically apply to both.
12. Therefore, fair play in action requires that
the procedure adopted must be just, fair and
reasonable. The manner of exercise of the
power and its impact on the rights of the
person affected would be in conformity with
the principles of natural justice. Article 21
clubs life with liberty, dignity of person
with means of livelihood without which the
glorious content of dignity of person would be
reduced to animal existence. When it is
Page 35 of 42
interpreted that the colour and content of
procedure established by law must be in
conformity with the minimum fairness and
processual justice, it would relieve
legislative callousness despising opportunity
of being heard and fair opportunities of
defence. Article 14 has a pervasive processual
potency and versatile quality, equalitarian in
its soul and allergic to discriminatory
dictates. Equality is the antithesis of
arbitrariness. It is, thereby, conclusively
held by this Court that the principles of
natural justice are part of Article 14 and the
procedure prescribed by law must be just, fair
and reasonable.
13. In Delhi Transport Corpn. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor
Congress [1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC
(L&S) 1213]this Court held that right to
public employment and its concomitant right to
livelihood received protective umbrella under
the canopy of Articles 14 and 21 etc. All
matters relating to employment include the
right to continue in service till the employee
reaches superannuation or until his service is
duly terminated in accordance with just, fair
and reasonable procedure prescribed under the
provisions of the Constitution and the rules
made under proviso to Article 309 of the
Constitution or the statutory provisions or
the rules, regulations or instructions having
statutory flavour. They must be conformable to
the rights guaranteed in Parts III and IV of
the Constitution. Article 21 guarantees rightPage 36 of 42
to life which includes right to livelihood,
the deprivation thereof must be in accordance
with just and fair procedure prescribed by law
conformable to Articles 14 and 21 so as to be
just, fair and reasonable and not fanciful,
oppressive or at vagary. The principles of
natural justice are an integral part of the
guarantee of equality assured by Article 14.
Any law made or action taken by an employer
must be fair, just and reasonable. The power
to terminate the service of an
employee/workman in accordance with just, fair
and reasonable procedure is an essential
inbuilt of natural justice. Article 14 strikes
at arbitrary action. It is not the form of the
action but the substance of the order that is
to be looked into. It is open to the Court to
lift the veil and gauge the effect of the
impugned action to find whether it is the
foundation to impose punishment or is only a
motive. Fair play is to secure justice,
procedural as well as substantive. The
substance of the order is the soul and the
effect thereof is the end result.
14. It is thus well-settled law that right to life
enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution
would include right to livelihood. The order
of termination of the service of an
employee/workman visits with civil
consequences of jeopardising not only his/her
livelihood but also career and livelihood of
dependents. Therefore, before taking any
action putting an end to the tenure of anPage 37 of 42
employee/workman fair play requires that a
reasonable opportunity to put forth his case
is given and domestic inquiry conducted
complying with the principles of natural
justice. In D.T.C. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor
Congress [1991 Supp (1) SCC 600 : 1991 SCC
(L&S) 1213] the Constitution Bench, per
majority, held that termination of the service
of a workman giving one month’s notice or pay
in lieu thereof without inquiry offended
Article 14. The order terminating the service
of the employees was set aside.
20.1. Again in the case of A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India,
reported in (1969) 2 SCC 262, Hon‟ble Supreme Court has held as
under:-
“20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to
secure justice or to put it negatively to
prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules
can operate only in areas not covered by any
law validly made. In other words they do not
supplant the law of the land but supplement
it. The concept of natural justice has
undergone a great deal of change in recent
years. In the past it was thought that it
included just two rules namely:
(1) no one shall be a judge in his own case
(Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and(2) no decision shall be given against a party
without affording him a reasonable hearing
(audi alteram partem).
Page 38 of 42
Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and
that is:-
that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held
in good faith, without bias and not
arbitrarily or unreasonably.
But, in the course of years many more subsidiary
rules came to be added to the rules of natural
justice. Till very recently it was the opinion of
the courts that unless the authority concerned was
required by the law under which it functioned to
act judicially there was no room for the
application of the rules of natural justice. The
validity of that limitation is now questioned. If
the purpose of the rules of natural justice is to
prevent miscarriage of justice one fails to see why
those rules should be made inapplicable to
administrative enquiries. Often times it is not
easy to draw the line that demarcates
administrative enquiries from quasi-judicial
enquiries. Enquiries which were considered
administrative at one time are now being considered
as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at a just
decision is the aim of both quasi-judicial
enquiries as well as administrative enquiries. An
unjust decision in an administrative enquiry may
have more far reaching effect than a decision in a
quasi-judicial enquiry. As observed by this Court
in Suresh Koshy George v. University of
Kerala [1968 SCC OnLine SC 9] the rules of natural
justice are not embodied rules. What particular
rule of natural justice should apply to a given
case must depend to a great extent on the facts and
Page 39 of 42
circumstances of that case, the framework of the
law under which the enquiry is held and the
constitution of the Tribunal or body of persons
appointed for that purpose. Whenever a complaint is
made before a court that some principle of natural
justice had been contravened the court has to
decide whether the observance of that rule was
necessary for a just decision on the facts of that
case.”
21. In the given factual backdrop and having perused the relevant file
of departmental inquiry, so produced by the learned CGC and having
tested the impugned order, on the anvil of Article 14 and the
procedure prescribed by the CRPF Act and the statutory Rules made
there under that affecting the civil rights or result in civil
consequences, this Court is unable to derive satisfaction that while
conducting the enquiry, the enquiry officer had followed the procedure
prescribed in Rule 27 (c)(1)(2)(3) and (4) of the CRPF Rules 1955, in
its letter and spirit.
22. Thus, what can be crystalised from the above discussion is that
on the relevant date i.e. on 30.11.2017, the petitioner, after returning
to his camp, having performed his duties continuously for three days
as „Quarter-Guard‟, he took four pegs of wine in the force’s canteen
with a view to get relaxed. It is not the case of the respondent
authority that he had consumed liquor at the duty hours and nothing
was recovered from the Morcha, where he was performing his duty. It
is an admitted fact that he consumed four pegs of wine, with a view to
relax, in the force canteen. Thereafter, while he was taking rest then
Page 40 of 42
again he was asked to attend duty at VIP Gate for two hours from
07:00 pm to 09:00 pm. During which period he was found lying
unconscious in the floor of the Morcha. The contention of the
petitioner that as a result of exhaustion in discharging his duty for
whole day, he could not remain stand and he fell down on the ground
remained un-traversed by the respondent authority. Besides, during
departmental inquiry, the petitioner was not properly represented and
due to lack of proper advice and guidance the petitioner did not even
cross-examined the witnesses, not to speak of adducing witness.
Besides, his unit members were scared to give evidence in his favour
on the face of scary eyes of senior officers in his defense. Throughout
the inquiry he had only admitted having consumed liquor. Thus, it
cannot be said that the petitioner had received a fair treatment to
meet the case against him as held by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in
the case of A.K. Chopra (Supra).
23. In the backdrop of above facts and circumstances, the
punishment of dismissal from service, so imposed by the respondent
No. 3, upon the petitioner, appears to be grossly disproportionate. It is
not in dispute that on previous occasion also one disciplinary
proceeding was initiated against him for consumption of liquor and
misbehaved with his Company Commander and cocked his personal
weapon with wrong intention. During the course of inquiry, the
charges leveled against him were proved. Accordingly, after taking into
account his 10 years long service and family problems, a lenient view
Page 41 of 42
was taken to award minor punishment of withholding of increment for
one year without cumulative effect vide Order dated 15.07.2016.
24. Though Mr. Parasar, learned CGC submits that the punishment
is commensurate with the gravity of the article of charge, yet, the said
submission left this Court unimpressed. This Court is not oblivious of
the requirement of being disciplined for being worked in a disciplined
force, but in the given facts and circumstances on the record, this
Court is unable to agree with the submission of Mr. Parasar, learned
CGC that the punishment so imposed upon the petitioner
commensurate with the article of charges.
25. Thus, this Court is inclined to interfere with the impugned
order, dated 31.07.2018, issued by the respondent No. 4, by which
the petitioner was dismissed from his service with immediate effect.
Accordingly, the same stands set aside and quashed. Consequently,
the petitioner shall be re-instated in service with immediate effect with
all service benefits.
26. Accordingly, this petition stands disposed of, leaving the parties
to bear their own cost.
JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
Page 42 of 42
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