Delhi High Court – Orders
Xxxx vs State Nct Of Delhi & Anr on 8 July, 2025
$~33
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CRL.REV.P. 91/2025 & CRL.M.A. 7003/2025
XXXX .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Jatin Raheja and Ms.
Mansi Joshi, Advocates.
versus
STATE NCT OF DELHI & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Sunil Kumar Gautam,
APP for the State with SI
Durgesh, PS Dwarka
North.
Mr. Jai Singh Yadav,
Advocate for R-2 (through
VC).
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
ORDER
% 08.07.2025
1. The present petition is filed challenging the order dated
03.02.2025 (hereafter ‘impugned order’), passed by learned
Additional Sessions Judge (‘ASJ’), South West District, Dwarka
Court, New Delhi, in SC No. 752/2024 arising out of FIR No.
395/2025, registered at Police Station Dwarka North (‘FIR’).
2. By the impugned order, the learned ASJ discharged
Respondent No.2 of the offence under Section 376 of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (‘IPC‘).
3. The brief facts of the case are as under:
3.1. On 23.08.2024, the FIR was registered for offences under
Sections 376/506 of the IPC against Respondent No.2, pursuant
to a complaint made by the petitioner. Petitioner alleged that she
came in contact with Respondent No.2 in the year 2023 since
they worked in the same office. It is alleged that RespondentCRL.REV.P. 91/2025 Page 1 of 12
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No.2 confessed his love to the petitioner and expressed his desire
to marry her. Even though the petitioner blocked Respondent
No.2, he allegedly kept trying to contact her and told her that he
was going to get divorced from his wife as she was torturing him.
Eventually, the petitioner accepted the proposal of Respondent
No.2. After a few days, Respondent No.2 allegedly took the
petitioner to a Hotel and forcefully established sexual relations
with her. Respondent No.2 repeatedly assured the petitioner that
he will marry her. It is alleged that in June, 2024, the petitioner
found out that she was pregnant, however, Respondent No.2
pressured her to get an abortion and assured that he would marry
her later. It is alleged that Respondent No.2 also gave
miscarriage inducing medicine by mixing it with chocolate to the
petitioner. On 07.08.2024, after the wife of Respondent No.2 left
their home, Respondent No.2 asked the petitioner to look for a
place for them to live in together, but he did not take any serious
steps towards marriage. When the petitioner demanded
commitment, Respondent No.2 allegedly asked her to move on
and expressed that he had no intention to marry her, despite
which, he kept establishing physical relations with the petitioner.
Respondent No. 2 ultimately blocked the contact of the
petitioner. On 16.08.2024, the wife of Respondent No.2 came to
the house of the petitioner and beat her. On the following day,
the petitioner forcefully entered the house of the petitioner and
tried to convince her to sort the matter. Respondent No.2 also
allegedly misbehaved with the petitioner.
3.2. On 24.08.2024, the statement of the victim was recorded
under Section 183 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023 (‘BNSS’). The petitioner reiterated the allegations and
stated that after she had entered into a relationship with
CRL.REV.P. 91/2025 Page 2 of 12
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Respondent No. 2, she found out through mutual acquaintances
that he is married and has two children. She stated that
Respondent No.2 told her that he was going to get divorced and
that he wanted to marry her instead, after which, the parties
established physical relations on multiple occasions.
3.3. Chargesheet was filed against Respondent No. 2 for the
offences under Sections 376/506/313 of the IPC.
3.4. By the impugned order, the learned ASJ discharged
Respondent No. 2 of the offence under Section 376 of the IPC.
Since the Court was one that was specially constituted to
adjudicate rape cases, considering the discharge of Respondent
No. 2 for the offence of rape, the learned ASJ did not consider it
apposite to comment upon allegations in relation to the other
offences. The matter was placed before the learned Principal
District and Sessions Judge, South West District for allocation of
the case to the appropriate Court for further proceedings.
3.5. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner filed the present
petition.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
learned ASJ has erroneously discharged Respondent No.2 of the
offence under Section 376 of the IPC by conducting a mini trial,
even though the petitioner had made clear allegations that she
was induced into entering sexual relations through deception.
5. He submits that the accused in his disclosure statement had
categorically stated that he had made a false promise to marry the
petitioner. He further submits that charges ought to have been
framed against the petitioner by the learned ASJ after it was
ascertained that there was a breach of the promise of marriage.
6. He submits that the learned ASJ has failed to consider as
to whether Respondent No.2 had deceived the petitioner into
CRL.REV.P. 91/2025 Page 3 of 12
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believing that he would divorce his wife and marry her. He
submits that it was wrongly assumed that just because the
petitioner was aware of the marital status of Respondent No.2,
she could not have been deceived into engaging in sexual
relations with Respondent No.2.
7. Per contra, the learned counsel for Respondent No.2
submits that the learned ASJ has aptly considered the material on
record before discharging Respondent No.2 of the offence under
Section 376 of the IPC.
8. I have heard the counsel and perused the record.
9. At the outset, it is relevant to note that the scope of
interference by High Courts while exercising revisional
jurisdiction in a challenge to order framing charge is well settled.
The power ought to be exercised sparingly, in the interest of
justice, so as to not impede the trial unnecessarily. It is not open
to the Court to misconstrue the revisional proceedings as an
appeal and reappreciate the evidence unless any glaring
perversity is brought to its notice.
10. Since the petitioner has assailed the impugned order
whereby Respondent No.2 has been discharged of the offence
under Section 376 of the IPC, it will be apposite to succinctly
discuss the law with respect to framing of charge and discharge
as provided under Sections 227 and 228 of the CrPC. It is trite
law that the learned Trial Court while framing charges is not
required to conduct a mini-trial and has to merely weigh the
material on record to ascertain whether the ingredients
constituting the alleged offence are prima facie made out against
the accused persons. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of
Sajjan Kumar v. CBI : (2010) 9 SCC 368, has culled out the
CRL.REV.P. 91/2025 Page 4 of 12
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following principles in regards to the scope of Sections 227 and
228 of the CrPC:
“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles
emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the
charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to
sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding
out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused
has been made out. The test to determine prima facie case
would depend upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose
grave suspicion against the accused which has not been
properly explained, the court will be fully justified in
framing a charge and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the
broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before the court, any
basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there cannot
be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter
and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court
could form an opinion that the accused might have
committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for
conviction the conclusion is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused has committed the
offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value
of the material on record cannot be gone into but before
framing a charge the court must apply its judicial mind on
the material placed on record and must be satisfied that the
commission of offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on record
with a view to find out if the facts emerging therefrom
taken at their face value disclose the existence of all the
ingredients constituting the alleged offence. For this
limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected
even at that initial stage to accept all that the prosecution
states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense
or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to
suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the
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trial Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and
at this stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in
conviction or acquittal.”
(emphasis supplied)
11. In view of the above, it is clear that this Court, at this
stage, is not required to revaluate the evidence or hold a mini
trial as the same would tantamount to this Court assuming
appellate jurisdiction. Thus, all that has to be seen is whether the
learned Trial Court has adequately appreciated the material on
record and whether, given the material placed before it, there is
grave suspicion against the accused which is not properly
explained.
12. It is the case of the prosecution that Respondent No.2 had
established sexual relations with the petitioner on the false
pretext of marriage. It is alleged that the petitioner had
established consensual physical relations with Respondent No.2
solely for the reason that the accused had promised to marry her
after taking divorce from his wife.
13. The case of the prosecution in the present case is
essentially based on the statement of Respondent No.2. It is trite
law that mere testimony of the prosecutrix can be sufficient for
the purpose of conviction for the offence under Section 376 of
the IPC and the same requires no corroboration, however, to
frame charge under Section 376 of the IPC on allegations of false
promise to marry, it is to be seen whether a prima facie case is
made out that the person who has made the promise to marry was
dishonest from the beginning and had no intention of upholding
his word even at the time of making such a promise. Mere breach
of a promise to marry at a belated stage after significant time has
elapsed cannot be termed as a false promise. The Hon’ble Apex
CRL.REV.P. 91/2025 Page 6 of 12
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Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra :
(2019) 9 SCC 608, held that:
“12. This Court has repeatedly held that consent with respect
to Section 375 IPC involves an active understanding of the
circumstances, actions and consequences of the proposed
act. An individual who makes a reasoned choice to act after
evaluating various alternative actions (or inaction) as well
as the various possible consequences flowing from such
action or inaction, consents to such action…
xxx
14. In the present case, the “misconception of fact” alleged
by the complainant is the appellant’s promise to marry her.
Specifically in the context of a promise to marry, this Court
has observed that there is a distinction between a false
promise given on the understanding by the maker that it
will be broken, and the breach of a promise which is made
in good faith but subsequently not fulfilled.
xxx
16. Where the promise to marry is false and the intention of
the maker at the time of making the promise itself was not
to abide by it but to deceive the woman to convince her to
engage in sexual relations, there is a “misconception of
fact” that vitiates the woman’s “consent”. On the other
hand, a breach of a promise cannot be said to be a false
promise. To establish a false promise, the maker of the
promise should have had no intention of upholding his word
at the time of giving it. The “consent” of a woman under
Section 375 is vitiated on the ground of a “misconception of
fact” where such misconception was the basis for her
choosing to engage in the said act.
xxx
18. To summarise the legal position that emerges from the
above cases, the “consent” of a woman with respect to
Section 375 must involve an active and reasoned deliberation
towards the proposed act. To establish whether the
“consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising
out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be
established. The promise of marriage must have been a
false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of
being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise
itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct
nexus to the woman’s decision to engage in the sexual act.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. In the case of Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of
Maharashtra : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471, the Hon’ble Apex
Court reiterated the legal principles concerning consensual
CRL.REV.P. 91/2025 Page 7 of 12
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relationships and the initiation of criminal proceedings on
allegations of sexual relationship on the false promise of
marriage. The Hon’ble Apex Court quashed the FIR against the
appellant therein and held as under :
“22…… Thus, in a situation where physical relationship is
maintained for a prolonged period knowingly by the woman,
it cannot be said with certainty that the said physical
relationship was purely because of the alleged promise made
by the appellant to marry her. Thus, unless it can be shown
that the physical relationship was purely because of the
promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the
physical relationship without being influenced by any other
consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of
consent under misconception of fact.
xxx
27…. In our opinion, the longer the duration of the
physical relationship between the partners without protest
and insistence by the female partner for marriage would be
indicative of a consensual relationship rather than a
relationship based on false promise of marriage by the male
partner and thus, based on misconception of fact.
28. Moreover, even if it is assumed that a false promise of
marriage was made to the complainant initially by the
appellant, even though no such cogent evidence has been
brought on record before us to that effect, the fact that the
relationship continued for nine long years, would render the
plea of the complainant that her consent for all these years
was under misconception of fact that the Appellant would
marry her implausible. Consequently, the criminal liability
attached to such false promise would be diluted after such a
long passage of time and in light of the fact that no protest
was registered by the complainant during all those years.
Such a prolonged continuation of physical relationship
without demurral or remonstration by the female partner, in
effect takes out the sting of criminal culpability and
neutralises it.
29. It will be very difficult to assume that the complainant
who is otherwise a mature person with two grown up
children, was unable to discover the deceitful behaviour of
the appellant who continued to have sexual relationship with
her for such a long period on the promise of marriage. Any
such mendacious act of the appellant would have been
exposed sooner without having to wait for nine years. The
inference one can draw under the circumstances is that there
was no such false promise made to the complainant by the
appellant of marriage by continuing to have physical
relationship so as to bring this act within the province of
Section 376 IPC and therefore, there was no vitiation of
CRL.REV.P. 91/2025 Page 8 of 12This is a digitally signed order.
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consent under misconception of fact.
xxx
31. In our view if criminality is to be attached to such
prolonged physical relationship at a very belated stage, it
can lead to serious consequences. It will open the scope for
imputing criminality to such long term relationships after
turning sour, as such an allegation can be made even at a
belated stage to drag a person in the juggernaut of
stringent criminal process. There is always a danger of
attributing criminal intent to an otherwise disturbed civil
relationship of which the Court must also be mindful.”
(emphasis supplied)
15. While discharging Respondent No.2, the learned ASJ
noted that the statement given by the petitioner clearly reflects
that she was already aware of the marital status of the accused. It
was also noted that the allegations were in regard to the accused
establishing physical relations with the petitioner on assurance
that he will marry her. It was thus observed that the petitioner
was well aware of the marital status of the accused and as the
petitioner was a mature working woman, she was also fully
aware as to the consequences of her actions. It was further noted
that merely because divorce proceedings were going on, the same
does not give any ground to the petitioner to believe that the
marriage would have taken place in any fixed time. It was
observed that the MLC indicates history of consensual sex and
while there may have been a breach of promise by the accused,
however, the same is not equivalent to the promise by itself being
false.
16. It is argued that the learned ASJ was unduly weighed by
the fact that the petitioner was aware of the marital status of
Respondent No.2 and it has not been duly considered as to
whether the accused had deceived the petitioner to induce her
consent. It is alleged that the petitioner continued the relationship
with the accused even after finding out about his marital status as
CRL.REV.P. 91/2025 Page 9 of 12
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she was under the impression that he would divorce his wife. It is
pertinent to note that apart from clearly admitting in the FIR that
she was aware of the marital status of the accused, it is
categorically mentioned that when the petitioner insisted on
commitment, the accused communicated his intention to not
marry her and asked her to move on. It is mentioned that despite
the same, the parties continued to establish physical relations.
The relevant portion of the FIR is reproduced hereunder:
“When I started demanding a commitment, he began
avoiding me and eventually told me that he had no intention
of marrying me. He suggested that I find another man and
move on. Yet, he kept getting physically involved with me.
When I finally realized he was manipulating me, I asked him
to give me a written statement confirming that he wouldn’t
marry me. He refused, saying it would be an insult to him.
Then, he blocked me and stopped answering my calls.”
17. Considering that the parties continued to engage in
physical relations even after the accused had explicitly
communicated his intention to not marry the petitioner, prima
facie, it is improbable that the consent of the petitioner was
tethered on any misconception of fact in relation to the promise
of marriage.
18. Even otherwise, there is no material on record to show that
the promise made by the accused to marry the petitioner was
false at the very outset and that the same was made in bad faith.
As per the case of the prosecution, the parties entered into a
relationship in the year 2023 and were together till the accused
ultimately blocked the petitioner in August, 2024. It appears
from the FIR that the wife of the accused had only left their
matrimonial home on 07.08.2024 and for the majority of their
relationship, the wife of the petitioner was living with him. Even
so, the relationship between the petitioner and the accused
continued over a period of time where the petitioner was aware
CRL.REV.P. 91/2025 Page 10 of 12
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that the divorce of the accused had not been finalised.
19. The learned ASJ has also rightly noted that the petitioner
is a mature woman who was gainfully employed as well. Being
an adult, the petitioner continued a relationship with the accused,
out of her own volition, and it cannot be said that she did not
understand the significance and consequences of her actions. It is
relevant to note that undisputably, the accused was undergoing
divorce proceedings at the time when he entered into the
relationship with the petitioner and the present case is not one
where the petitioner had established physical relations with the
accused under any misconception of fact in this regard.
20. Much emphasis has also been laid by the counsel for the
petitioner on the alleged admission made by Respondent No.2 in
his disclosure statement. Concededly, the statement relied upon
by the petitioner was recorded pursuant to the arrest of
Respondent No. 2, and such a confession cannot be relied upon.
21. It is argued that having found that there was a breach of
the promise of marriage, the learned ASJ ought to have framed
the charges and put the accused to trial for the offence of rape. In
the opinion of this Court, the said argument is untenable. While
conviction can be based solely on the statement of a prosecutrix,
however, mere presence of bald averments in relation to promise
of marriage being false is insufficient to frame charges against an
accused in such circumstances. It is imperative that the statement
of the prosecutrix is able to canvas such circumstances that relay
credibility to the case of the prosecution in this regard and show
that the promise was made in bad faith. Otherwise, the Court will
be bound to frame charges in every case where there is even a
breach of the promise of marriage.
CRL.REV.P. 91/2025 Page 11 of 12
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22. Considering the totality of circumstances, in the opinion of
this Court, grave suspicion is not raised against Respondent No.2
insofar as the offence under Section 376 of the IPC is concerned.
This Court is of the opinion that the material on record does not
establish a prima facie case against Respondent No.2 so as to
warrant subjecting the petitioner to a trial for the aforesaid
offence.
23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court finds no
reason to interfere with the impugned order.
24. The present petition is dismissed in the aforesaid terms.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
JULY 8, 2025
CRL.REV.P. 91/2025 Page 12 of 12
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