Telangana High Court
Y. Srinivasa Rao vs State Of Telangana on 12 March, 2025
*THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL
AND
*THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE RENUKA YARA
+WRIT PETITION No. 44073 of 2017
% 12-03-2025
#Sri Y. Srinivasa Rao. ...Petitioner
vs.
$The State of Telangana and others.
... Respondents
!Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri K. Durga Prasad.
^Counsel for Respondents:
Sri S. Rahul Reddy, learned Special
Government Pleader representing learned
Additional Advocate General.
<Gist :
>Head Note :
? Cases referred
1. (1980) 1 SCC 416
2. (2004) 1 SCC 225
3. (2008) 5 SCC 575
4. AIR 1966 SC 1318
5. AIR 1964 SC 207
6. (1977) 2 SCC 256
7. (1987) 1 SCC 424
8. (2013) 3 SCC 489
9. 2024 SCC OnLine SC 114
2
THE HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL
AND
THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE RENUKA YARA
WRIT PETITION No.44073 OF 2017
ORDER (per the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice):
This petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution
assails the constitutionality of G.O.Ms.No.82, dated 07.11.2015,
whereunder amendments are made to The Telangana State and
Sand Mining Rules, 2015 (for short, Rules of 2015), issued in
G.O.Ms.No.3, dated 08.01.2015. The principal challenge is made
to clause (iii) of Rule 10 of Rules of 2015 and it reads thus:
“(iii) An amount of Rs.200/- (Rupees two hundred only) per
metric Ton towards ‘regulating charges’ shall be paid to
Telangana State Mineral Development Corporation by the
transporter bringing sand incidentally from other sources and
obtain pass for movement in the State to control the sale price
of sand.”
Factual Background:
2. The petitioner is engaged in the business of supply of sand
and other material for construction activity. The petitioner has
supply agreement with various companies in the State of
Telangana. The Government of Maharashtra granted license for
sale and transport of sand from Gadchiroli District. The petitioner
transports sand from Maharashtra to Telangana. By way of
impugned G.O.Ms.No.82, an amount of Rs.200/- per metric ton is
imposed in the name of ‘Regulatory Charges’ which is required to
3be paid to the Telangana State Mineral Development Corporation
(Corporation). By issuing G.O.Ms.NO.82, the previous
G.O.Ms.No.3, dated 08.01.2015 (Annexure P.1) has been
amended. Because of this amendment, price of sand is enhanced
in the State of Telangana.
Contention of the petitioner:
3. Sri K. Durga Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner,
submits that as per Article 301 of the Constitution, the petitioner
has a freedom of trade and commerce. Although there exists no
restriction on movement of sand from one State to another State
including Telangana, it is pleaded in the ‘grounds’ that the
imposition of Regulatory Charges of Rs.200/- per metric ton is bad
in law and liable to be interfered with because (i) it runs contrary
to Section 15(1) of The Mines and Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Act, 1957 (for short, Act of 1957), (ii) the impugned
Rule 10(iii) of Rules of 2015 is contrary to Article 265 of the
Constitution, (iii) Section 15 (1A) (g) of the Act can be invoked only
in respect of mines and minerals extracted from the territory of
State of Telangana, (iv) the expression ‘other charges’ in Section
15 (1A) (g) means that they can be imposed in respect of mines
and mineral extracted from the State of Telangana and not in
respect of sand brought from outside the State of Telangana,
4
(v) the expression ‘other charges’ connotes a service by the State
as a ‘quid pro quo’ which is non-existent in the case of traders who
bring sand into the State of Telangana, (vi) the traders who bring
sand do not hold any lease or license from the State of Telangana
and hence, Regulatory Charges cannot be levied and (vii) the levy
of Regulatory Charges has no nexus with the control of price of
sand and, in fact, control of price of sand is not an obligation
imposed by any statute on the State of Telangana.
4. To support some of aforesaid ‘grounds’, learned counsel for
the petitioner submits that imposition of Rs.200/- per metric ton
towards Regulatory Charges is exorbitant. In support of this
contention, he placed reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court
in Kewal Krishan Puri v. State of Punjab 1 and State of U.P. v.
VAM Organic Chemicals Ltd. 2. Lastly, he placed reliance on
another judgment of the Apex Court in Mumbai Agricultural
Produce Market Committee v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. 3. During
the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner fairly
submitted that during the pendency of this case, the Regulatory
Charges of Rs.200/- per metric ton is reduced to Rs.100/- per
1
(1980) 1 SCC 416
2
(2004) 1 SCC 225
3
(2008) 5 SCC 575
5
metric ton. In support of aforesaid submissions, he filed ‘brief
note’ in this case.
Contention of the Government:
5. Sri S. Rahul Reddy, Special Government Pleader
representing learned Additional Advocate General for the
respondents, supported the impugned GO and submits that
Article 301 of the Constitution is not attracted because no
prohibition is imposed on the movement of sand from one State to
another. The impugned amendment is inserted in consonance
with rule making power and there is no infirmity in it. He placed
reliance on the judgment of this Court in W.P.No.1809 of 2011
and batch, dated 25.04.2024.
6. No other point is pressed by learned counsel for the parties.
7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and
perused the record.
FINDINGS:
8. So far Article 301 of the Constitution of India is concerned,
the petitioner himself pleaded in pages 6 and 7 of the writ affidavit
that no law is made by the Government of Telangana imposing
restrictions on the movement of sand from one State to another
6
including Telangana. Thus, the argument based on Article 301 of
the Constitution must fail.
9. It was faintly argued that insertion of impugned rule is
against the rule making power flowing from Section 15(1) of the
Act of 1957. Section 15(1) permits the State Government to make
the rules by notifying the same in official gazette. The rule can be
made for grant of quarry lease, mining lease or other mineral
concessions in respect of mines and minerals and for the purposes
enacted therewith. Sub-section (1A) became part of statute with
effect from 10.02.1987, relevant portion of which reads thus:
“15. Power of State Governments to make rules in respect
of minor minerals.―
(1) The State Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, make rules for, regulating the grant of quarry leases,
mining leases or other mineral concessions in respect of minor
minerals and for purposes connected therewith.
(1A) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of
the foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of
the following matters, namely:―
(a) to (f)…
(g) the fixing and collection of rent, royalty, fees, dead
rent, fines or other charges and the time within which
and the manner in which these shall be payable;
(h) to (o)…”
(Emphasis Supplied)
10. Section 15(1) of the Act of 1957 is pregnant with the words
‘and for the purpose connected therewith’. This expression used at
7
the end of Section 15(1) makes it very wide and a conjoint reading
of Section 15(1) and 15(1A) makes it clear that law makers were
armed with the power to make rules for the purposes mentioned
in clause (g) of Sub-section (1A) of Section 15.
11. Section 15 (1A) of the Act of 1957 employed the expression
‘in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing power’. These words are of utmost significance and
makes it clear that law makers intended to enlarge the rule
making power and scope by using the words ‘in particular and
without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power’. The
foregoing power denotes the power conferred by sub-section (1) of
12. The phrase ‘notwithstanding anything in’ is used in
contradistinction to the phrase ‘subject to’ the latter conveying the
idea of a provision yielding place to another provision or other
provisions to which it is made subject (see Punjab Sikh Regular
Motor Service, Moudhapara, Rajpur v. Regional Transport
Authority, Raipur 4 and South India Corporation (P) Ltd. v.
Secy., Board of Revenue, Trivandrum 5). A non obstante clause
must also be distinguished from the phrase ‘without prejudice’. A
4
AIR 1966 SC 1318
5
AIR 1964 SC 207
8
provision enacted ‘without prejudice’ to another provision has not
the effect of affecting the operation of the other provision and any
action taken under it must not be inconsistent with such other
provision.
13. The text and context both are important while interpreting
the statute. The legislative intent is of utmost important. ‘Deha’
and ‘Dehi’ both are important (see Board of Mining Examination
and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee 6, RBI v. Peerless
General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd., 7 and Ajay Maken v.
Adesh Kumar Gupta 8).
14. The above provision makes it clear that the rule can be
framed for fixation and collection of rent, royalty fees, etc., and
further empowers to impose ‘other charges’. Thus, a conjoint
reading of Sections 15(1), 15(1A) and clause (g) makes it clear that
the law makers have not travelled beyond the scope of the rule
making power. The constitutional validity of clause (g) of Section
15(1A) of the Act of 1957 is not questioned. Thus, there exists a
power to ‘impose other charges’. In absence of challenge to the
enabling provision, the exercise of power under the said provision
6
(1977) 2 SCC 256
7
(1987) 1 SCC 424
8
(2013) 3 SCC 489
9
or insertion of another provision in the rules is in consonance with
enabling provision and cannot be interfered with. Thus, first
argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner deserves to be
and accordingly rejected.
15. In the writ affidavit, a ground is taken that impugned rule is
contrary to Article 265 of the Constitution. However, no amount
of oral argument was advanced to substantiate the same.
16. A microscopic reading of Section 15 (1A)(g) of the Act of 1957
makes it clear that it does not confine the power of imposition of
other charges on the minerals extracted from the territory of
Telangana State only. Sub-section (1A) makes the provision much
wider and there is nothing to suggest that the other charges can
be imposed on the minerals extracted only from the State of
Telangana.
17. It is pleaded that regulatory charges so imposed have no
nexus with the contrary of price of sand, but no amount of
argument is also advanced in this regard.
18. This is trite that any statutory provision can be called in
question on limited ground. In a recent judgment in Naresh
Chandra Agrawal v. Institute of Chartered Accountants of
10
India 9, the Apex Court considered previous judgments and culled
out the principles as under:
“22…
15. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality or
validity of a subordinate legislation and the burden is upon
him who attacks it to show that it is invalid. It is also well
recognized that a subordinate legislation can be challenged
under any of the following grounds:
(a) Lack of legislative competence to make the subordinate
legislation.
(b) Violation of fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution of India.
(c) Violation of any provision of the Constitution of India.
(d) Failure to conform to the statute under which it is made or
exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling Act.
(e) Repugnancy to the laws of the land, that is, any enactment.
(f) Manifest arbitrariness/unreasonableness (to an extent
where the court might well say that the legislature never
intended to give authority to make such rules)”
19. As discussed above, the impugned rule cannot be interfered
with for lack of legislative competence. Sub-section (1A) and
clause (g) of Section 15 of the Act of 1957 make the provision very
wide and we are unable to hold that the impugned rule is inserted
exceeding the limits of authority conferred by the enabling
provision.
20. The learned counsel for the petitioner has not advanced any
argument that the petitioner’s fundamental rights guaranteed by
the Constitution are infringed. As per the petitioner’s own saying,
Article 301 of the Constitution has not been infringed because no
9
2024 SCC OnLine SC 114
11
restriction is imposed on movement of sand from one State to
another. Thus, impugned rule cannot be said to be arbitrary,
without jurisdiction or unconstitutional on the above parameters.
21. The judgments of the Apex Court in Kewal Krishan Puri
(supra), VAM Organic Chemicals Ltd. (supra) and Mumbai
Agricultural Produce Market Committee (supra) were cited to
establish that imposition of impugned charges are exorbitant in
nature.
22. A plain reading of judgment in Kewal Krishan Puri (supra)
shows that in that case ‘on the basis of facts and figures placed
before it’, the Apex Court opined that there was no justification in
raising the fee from Rs.2 to Rs.3/-. Para 54 of this judgment in no
uncertain terms makes it clear that in the given facts of the said
case, the Apex Court came to hold that enhancement of fee is bad
in law. The said matter relates to Punjab Agricultural Produce
Markets Act, 1961 and the Apex Court dealt with the concept of
fee. In the instant case, the said judgment and judgment in VAM
Organic Chemicals Ltd. (supra) cannot be pressed into service.
Even otherwise, in our opinion, the amount of Rs.200/- per metric
ton cannot be said to be exorbitant or arbitrary. The power of
fixation of such amount is within the province of the law makers
12
and this Court cannot sit as an appellate authority to take a
different view unless such imposition or fixation of amount is so
exorbitant and disproportionate that it shocks the conscience of
the Court.
23. Coming to other judgment of the Apex Court in VAM
Organic Chemicals Ltd. (supra), the said matter relates to
imposition of license fee on industrial alcohol. Considering the
statute in hand, the Apex Court gave certain findings which are of
no assistance to the petitioner because it deals with a different
entity, different statute and altogether different product. Thus,
impugned rule cannot be interfered with on the ground that
amount of regulating charge of Rs.200/- per metric ton is
exorbitant.
24. In view of foregoing discussion, the petition deserves to be
and accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
Miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.
___________________
SUJOY PAUL, ACJ
___________________
RENUKA YARA, J
12th March, 2025.
TJMR