Jharkhand High Court
Yadvendra Singh vs The State Of Jharkhand Through … on 13 June, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:15580
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Criminal Revision No. 1273 of 2023
---------
Yadvendra Singh, aged about 58 years, S/o Rukum Singh, resident of
Q. No.190/C, Vidyalaya Marg, Ashok Nagar, PO-Ashok Nagar, PS-
Argora, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand
… … Petitioner
Versus
The State of Jharkhand through Vigilance … … Opp. Party
———
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
———-
For the Petitioner : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Vishal Kumar Trivedi, Advocate
Mr. Jai Mohan Mishra, Advocate
For the Opp. Party : Md. Sahabuddin, SC-VII
Mr. Suraj Prakash, AC to SC-VII
----------
th
C.A.V. on 9 May, 2025 Pronounced on 13/06/2025
1. The instant petition filed under Section 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C is
directed against the order dated 22.06.2023 passed by the learned
Special Judge, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Ranchi in Misc. Criminal
Application No. 1553 of 2023 in connection with Ranchi Vigilance PS
Case No. 54 of 2016 corresponding to Vigilance (Spl.) Case No.57 of
2016 for the offence under sections 13(2) read with section 13((1) (e) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 whereby and whereunder, the
application filed by the petitioner seeking discharge has been rejected.
Factual Matrix:
2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the instant
petition which requires to be enumerated herein, read as under:
The petitioner had been made accused in Ranchi Vigilance P.S.
Case No. 54 of 2016 which was instituted on 12.07.2016 on the basis of
1
2025:JHHC:15580investigation report by the informant in P.E No.30 of 2013 dated
02.11.2013 alleging therein that the petitioner being the then Executive
Engineer, Rural Works Department, Ramgarh-cum-Executive
Engineer, NREP, Ramgarh has misused his post and earned excessive
amount in respect of his income.
It has further ben alleged that in comparison with the income of
the petitioner, he has spent 77% excess amount of his income. It has
further been alleged that the petitioner has spent Rs.62,69,600/- on
construction of his house situated in Housing Co-operative Society
Ltd., Ashok Nagar, Ranchi without being disclosed by him.
On the basis of aforesaid premises, the instant case has been
instituted against the accused petitioner Yadvendra Singh for the
offence under sections 13(2) read with section 13((1) (e) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
3. After investigation, a charge-sheet has been submitted against the
petitioner for the offence under sections 13(2) read with section 13((1)
(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
4. The petitioner filed an application for discharge being Misc. Criminal
Application No. 1553 of 2023 before the learned trial Court (Special
Judge) on the ground that the petitioner is innocent and has not
committed any offence as alleged in the FIR. He has falsely been
implicated in the instant case.
5. It is stated that complete data regarding his income i.e. Rs.1,33,55.596/-
in total including salary but only Rs.94,41,575/- have been considered
2
2025:JHHC:15580
by the Vigilance Department without mentioning the reasonable basis
as to why the Vigilance discarded the income shown by the petitioner
and the same has been discarded by the Vigilance in arbitrary manner.
Further his income from agriculture has also not been considered.
6. It has been stated that the petitioner’s wife has sold the land which was
being used for agriculture and the same has been mentioned in the sale
deed also as well as Income Tax Return filed by the wife of the
petitioner. Similarly, the income shown from Dairy has also not been
considered whereas Animal Husbandry Medical Officer, Ranchi has
given a certificate that wife of the petitioner was running a dairy, there
were six milking cows in her dairy. That milk used to supply to one
Rajhans Hotel, Puncha Bundu, Ranchi from the dairy of the petitioner’s
wife but the same has not been considered by Vigilance.
7. It has been stated that the income from the gift has not been considered
by the Vigilance whereas the petitioner and his wife received gifts from
the relatives and friends worth about Rs. 2,65,000/- on the occasion of
wedding in the year 1989 and afterwards on several occasions like
marriage anniversary of the petitioner, birthday of his children and
several other occasions. The petitioner used to receive gifts from his
relatives and friends.
8. It has further been stated that the income from the agreement for sale of
land has been shown by the petitioner as Rs. 15,00,000/- but the
Vigilance has considered only Rs. 10,00,000/- which was given by
cheque as well as in cash which is evident from the agreement and
Income Tax Return. The petitioner has given data of his total
3
2025:JHHC:15580
expenditure of Rs. 1,20,51,437/- but the vigilance has falsely and in
very arbitrary manner shown total expenditure as Rs. 1,67,14,768/-.
9. It has been stated that on education, he spent Rs. 3,46,567/- but the
vigilance has shown Rs. 4,83,967/- reasons best known to the
Vigilance. The check period was till March, 2013 and the valuation and
assessment of house and other things were done after the year 2015 and
as such the expenditure done by the petitioner from April, 2013
onwards has also been included during investigation which is not the
subject matter of the present case.
10. On the basis of the aforesaid ground the petitioner has prayed that he
has no concern with the alleged commission of crime and, as such, no
case is made out against him and he needs to be discharged.
11. The learned special Judge vide order dated 22.06.2023 had dismissed
the aforesaid application for discharge.
12. The present petitioner being aggrieved with the order dated 22.06.2023
has preferred the present revision petition.
Submission on behalf of the learned counsel for the Petitioner:
13. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner has taken the
following grounds in assailing the impugned order:
(i) The ground has been taken that no case is being made out under
Sections under sections 13(2) read with section 13((1) (e) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 if the entire material, as has
been collected in course of investigation by the prosecuting
agency, will be taken into consideration.
4
2025:JHHC:15580
(ii) The finding of the learned trial Court is perverse in the eye of
law being non-application of judicial mind hence unsustainable
in the eye of law;
(iii) The ground has also been taken that the impugned findings and
order of the learned trial Court suffer from an error of law and
manifestly wrong and are grossly unjust, as such, the same
deserves to be set aside.
(iv) The learned trial Court while passing the impugned order had
given a misconceived approach in as much as he had relied upon
the allegations which were made in the F.I.R. without
considering the materials provided by the petitioner which were
on-record.
(v) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has erroneously
erred in not considering that the P.E. Report being P.E. No. 30 of
2013 dated 02.11.2013 on the basis of which the whole case is
registered against the petitioner is not a part of either the FIR or
the Case diary which makes the case of prosecution doubtful and
shows a malafide approach of the prosecution.
(vi) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to
appreciate that the petitioner had given a complete data regarding
his income being Rs. 1,33,55,596/- in total including salary but
only Rs.94,41,575/- has been considered by the Vigilance
without mentioning the reasonable bases as to why the Vigilance
has arbitrarily discarded the income shown by the petitioner.
5
2025:JHHC:15580
(vii) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to
consider that the Vigilance has not considered the gifts received
by the petitioner and his family on various occasions which is
clearly mentioned in the Income Tax Returns filed by the
petitioner as well as his wife without assigning any reason
whatsoever.
(viii) It has been contended that the learned trial Court failed to
consider that income from the agreement for sale of land has
been shown by the petitioner as Rs. 15,00,000/- but the vigilance
has considered only Rs. 10,00,000/- which was given by cheque
but the fact is that the petitioner has received Rs. 10,00,000/-
from cheque and Rs.5,00,000/- in cash which is evident from the
agreement and Income Tax Return.
(ix) It has been contended that the learned trial Court failed to
consider that the petitioner has given data of his total
expenditure as Rs.1,20,51,437/- but vigilance has falsely and in
very arbitrary manner shown total expenditure as
Rs. 1,67,14,768/-.
(x) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to
consider that at the time of registration of the FIR the alleged
difference in income and expenditure of the petitioner was about
77%, however, the Vigilance after submitting its Final Form has
mentioned it to be about 82.31%, difference in numbers and
figures by the Vigilance as well as the ACB clearly shows the ill
motive behind the present case against the petitioner.
6
2025:JHHC:15580
(xi) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to
consider that the Vigilance has harped on expenditure of
Rs. 62,69,629/- for expansion of his dwelling house by the
petitioner which was assessed by the Vigilance in February, 2015
but it is important to mention here that at the time of purchase of
the house, several parts that is ground floor, one room, bathroom,
toilet, kitchen, veranda, sitting on first floor, were already there
and the petitioner has made only expansion in the said house and
the real expenditure is only Rs. 18,49,235/- till March, 2013
which would be evident from the investigation report of the
Investigation Officer duly signed by him dated 22.08.2014.
(xii) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to
consider the fact that the assessment valuation of the house was
done in February, 2015 and the report included the expenditure
of the petitioner till the year 2015 whereas the check period was
of till March, 2013 which clearly shows the malafide intention
and dubious investigation done by the Vigilance in order to
create a malicious prosecution against the petitioner.
(xiii) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to
take into account that the petitioner has already submitted data of
his expenditure on the house from the year 2013 to 2015 to the
Vigilance to receiving section of the ADG, vigilance on
27.06.2016 but the same has not been considered by Vigilance.
(xiv) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to
consider that in the entire investigation Vigilance failed to
7
2025:JHHC:15580
consider that check period was of till March 2013 and the
valuation and assessment of house and other things were done
after 2015 and as such the expenditure done by the petitioner
from April 2013 onwards has also been included during
investigation which is not the subject matter of the present case
as the details given by the petitioner in the Form of A, B, C and
D was till March 2013 should not be included in the investigation
of present case.
(xv) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to
appreciate that entire investigation undertaken by the
Investigating Agency is silent on the aspect of other and alternate
sources of income of the petitioner even though the petitioner
had provided all such relevant documents to substantiate his
claim which suggests that false implication cannot be ruled out.
(xvi) It has been contended that the learned trial Court has failed to
appreciate that none of the alleged offences has been made out
against the petitioner.
(xvii) It has been contended that the learned trial Court neither
considered nor discussed the evidence of witnesses in their
entirety and miserably failed to adopt rationale approach to judge
the evidences by their intrinsic worth and the uniformity
of the witnesses.
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that it is, therefore, a fit case where the impugned order
needs to be interfered with.
8
2025:JHHC:15580
Submission on behalf of the learned counsel for the Respondent-State:
15. Mr. Md. Shahabuddin, learned State counsel, has taken the following
grounds in defending the order impugned:
(i) It has been contended that sufficient material has been surfaced
in course of investigation to the effect that the involvement of the
petitioner in the commission of alleged crime is there as would
be evident from both the case diary and in the charge-sheet.
(ii) There is enough material on record to frame charge against the
petitioner and accordingly the petition for discharge has been
rightly rejected. Further, there is no illegality or perversity or
material irregularity in the impugned orders calling for any
interference in revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The learned
trial Court has passed a well-reasoned order refusing to discharge
the petitioner.
(iii) On perusal of case record it is apparent that the investigating
Officer at para-66 and 67 of the case diary, firstly tried to obtain
the income tax details of the accused petitioner and his wife and
tried to obtain details of income and assets of the petitioner and
his wife accumulated through all legal sources. It has further
been contended that at para-89 and 212 of the case diary the
details of land purchased by the petitioner in the district-Reewa,
Madhya Pradesh and a plot purchased in Ashok Nagar have
come. It has further been contended that it would be evident from
para-58 of the case diary that the petitioner has deposited an
amount of Rs.2,10,702/- with the Society of Ashok Nagar for
9
2025:JHHC:15580membership which was a mandatory condition for purchase of
plot at Ashok Nagar, Ranchi.
(iv) It has further been contended that a committee was constituted
by Ministerial Secretariat and Vigilance Department, Jharkhand
headed by the then Executive Engineer (Technical Cell) to assess
the cost of construction of the said house at Ashok Nagar, which
was computed at Rs.62,69,600/- as against Rs.18,00,000/- and
odd shown by the petitioner.
(v) It has been contended that paragraph-195 and 219 of the case
diary provides for the details of expenses incurred by the
petitioner in providing education to his son and two daughters
and para-169 provides for the Life Insurance Scheme policies
purchased by the petitioner and two other separate policies for
his daughters to the tune of Rs.12,24,405/-.
(vi) It has been contended that the claim of the petitioner to have
agricultural incomes and the income earned by his wife through
dairy is baseless which would be evident from para-323 of the
case diary which shows the falsification of the claim of the
petitioner.
(vii) It has been contended that the petitioner any how managed to get
false certificate with respect of having six cows in the name of
his wife as para-339 of the case diary precisely states that there
was no written permission to the accused petitioner or his wife to
carry out any kind of dairy business. Further more, sale of such
10
2025:JHHC:15580dairy product was also could not be established, which would be
evident from para-281, 284 and 291 of the case diary.
(viii) It has been contended that so far as the income of the petitioner
with regard to agricultural income is concerned, it is false as
during investigation it has come on record that though the
petitioner owned nearly 4.96 acres of land, but the same was
non-irrigated land and even when there was no income received
by the petitioner as it would be evident from the para-394, 396,
407 and 408 of the case diary.
(ix) It has been contended that the details with respect to the income
from gift is false as the details with respect to the gift could not
be verified as per para-379 of the case diary.
16. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that it is, therefore, not a fit case where the impugned order
to be interfered with.
Analysis:
17. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and has also
gone through the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in the
impugned order as also the case diary.
18. In the background of the factual aspect stated hereinabove, the issues
which require consideration are-
(i) Whether the order dated 22.06.2023 by which the application for
discharge filed by the petitioner has been dismissed, can be said
to suffer from an error?
11
2025:JHHC:15580
(ii) Whether on the basis of the evidence which has been collected in
course of investigation, prima facie case against the petitioner is
made out or not?
19. Since both the issues are interlinked as such, they are taken up together.
20. At this juncture it would be appropriate to consider the ambit and scope
of the powers of the Court at the time of considering the discharge
application.
21. It is well settled that at the time of framing of charge meticulous
examination of evidence is not required, however the evidence can be
sifted or weighed at least for the purpose of recording a satisfaction that
a prima facie case is made out for framing charge to proceed in the
case. Further the trial Court is not required to discuss the evidence for
the purpose of conducting a trial but the discussion of the materials on
record is required to reflect the application of judicial mind for finding
that a prima-facie case is made out against the petitioner.
22. It is settled connotation of law that at the stage of framing of charge,
the probable defence of the accused is not to be considered and the
materials, which are relevant for consideration, are the allegations made
in the First Information Report/complaint, the statement of the
witnesses recorded in course of investigation, the documents on which
the prosecution relies and the report of investigation submitted by the
prosecuting agency. The probative value of the defence is to be tested
at the stage of trial and not at the stage of framing of charge and at the
stage of framing of charge minute scrutiny of the evidence is not to be
made and even on a very strong suspicion charges can be framed.
12
2025:JHHC:15580
23. Further it is settled position of law that at the stage of framing the
charge, the trial Court is not required to meticulously examine and
marshal the material available on record as to whether there is
sufficient material against the accused which would ultimately result in
conviction. The Court is prima facie required to consider whether there
is sufficient material against the accused to presume the commission of
the offence. Even strong suspicion about commission of offence is
sufficient for framing the charge, the guilt or innocence of the accused
has to be determined at the time of conclusion of the trial after evidence
is adduced and not at the stage of framing the charge and, therefore, at
the stage of framing the charge, the Court is not required to undertake
an elaborate inquiry for the purpose of sifting and weighing the
material.
24. The issue of discharge was the subject matter before the Hon’ble
Supreme Court in the case of “State of Tamilnadu, by Inspector of
Police in Vigilance and Anti-Corruption v. N. Suresh Rajan”, (2014)
11 SCC 709, wherein at paragraphs no. 29, 32.4, 33 and 34 the Hon’ble
Apex Court has been observed as under:-
“29. We have bestowed our consideration to the rival submissions
and the submissions made by Mr. Ranjit Kumar commend us.
True it is that at the time of consideration of the applications
for discharge, the court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the
prosecution or act as a post office and may sift evidence in
order to find out whether or not the allegations made are
groundless so as to pass an order of discharge. It is trite that at
the stage of consideration of an application for discharge, the
court has to proceed with an assumption that the materials
brought on record by the prosecution are true and evaluate the
said materials and documents with a view to find out whether13
2025:JHHC:15580the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value disclose
the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged
offence. At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be
gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the
matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a
conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is
whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has
been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the
accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court
thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the
basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can
frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come
to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence.
The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.
32.4. While passing the impugned orders [N. Suresh
Rajan v. Inspector of Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No.
528 22 of 2009, order dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)], [State v. K.
Ponmudi, (2007) 1 Mad LJ (Cri) 100], the court has not sifted
the materials for the purpose of finding out whether or not there
is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused but
whether that would warrant a conviction. We are of the opinion
that this was not the stage where the court should have
appraised the evidence and discharged the accused as if it was
passing an order of acquittal. Further, defect in investigation
itself cannot be a ground for discharge. In our opinion, the
order impugned [N. Suresh Rajan v. Inspector of
Police, Criminal Revision Case (MD) No. 528 of 2009, order
dated 10-12-2010 (Mad)] suffers from grave error and calls for
rectification.
33. Any observation made by us in this judgment is for the
purpose of disposal of these appeals and shall have no bearing
on the trial. The surviving respondents are directed to appear
before the respective courts on 3-2-2014. The Court shall
proceed with the trial from the stage of charge in accordance
with law and make endeavour to dispose of the same
expeditiously.
34. In the result, we allow these appeals and set aside the order
of discharge with the aforesaid observations.
14
2025:JHHC:15580
25. It has been further held in the case of “Asim Shariff v. National
Investigation Agency“, (2019) 7 SCC 148, that mini trial is not
expected by the trial Court for the purpose of marshalling the evidence
on record at the time of framing of charge. It has been held at paragraph
no. 18 of the said judgment as under:–
“18. Taking note of the exposition of law on the subject laid down by
this Court, it is settled that the Judge while considering the question of
framing charge under Section 227 CrPC in sessions cases (which is
akin to Section 239 CrPC pertaining to warrant cases) has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited
purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the
accused has been made out; where the material placed before the
court discloses grave suspicion against the accused which has not
been properly explained, the court will be fully justified in framing the
charge; by and large if two views are possible and one of them giving
rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion against
the accused, the trial Judge will be justified in discharging him. It is
thus clear that while examining the discharge application filed under
Section 227 CrPC, it is expected from the trial Judge to exercise its
judicial mind to determine as to whether a case for trial has been
made out or not. It is true that in such proceedings, the court is not
supposed to hold a mini trial by marshalling the evidence on record.”
26. It is further settled position of law that defence on merit is not to be
considered at the time of stage of framing of charge and that cannot be
a ground of discharge. A reference may be made to the judgment as
rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in “State of Rajasthan v. Ashok
Kumar Kashyap“, (2021) 11 SCC 191. For ready reference paragraph
no. 11 of the said judgment are quoted below:-
“11. While considering the legality of the impugned
judgment [Ashok Kumar Kashyap v. State of Rajasthan, 2018
SCC OnLine Raj 3468] and order passed by the High Court, the
law on the subject and few decisions of this Court are required
to be referred to.
15
2025:JHHC:15580
11.1. In P. Vijayan [P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala, (2010) 2 SCC
398 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1488], this Court had an occasion to
consider Section 227 CrPC What is required to be considered at
the time of framing of the charge and/or considering
the discharge application has been considered elaborately in the
said decision. It is observed and held that at the stage of
Section 227, the Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to
find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. It is observed that in other words, the
sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature of
the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced
before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious
circumstances against the accused so as to frame a charge
against him. It is further observed that if the Judge comes to a
conclusion that there is sufficient ground to proceed, he will
frame a charge under Section 228 CrPC, if not, he
will discharge the accused. It is further observed that while
exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the
prosecution, it is not necessary for the court to enter into the
pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of
evidence and probabilities which is really the function of the
court, after the trial starts.
11.2. In the recent decision of this Court in M.R. Hiremath
[State of Karnataka v. M.R. Hiremath, (2019) 7 SCC
515 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 109 : (2019) 2 SCC (L&S) 380], one
of us (D.Y. Chandrachud, J.) speaking for the Bench has
observed and held in para 25 as under : (SCC p. 526)
“25. The High Court [M.R. Hiremath v. State, 2017 SCC
OnLine Kar 4970] ought to have been cognizant of the fact that
the trial court was dealing with an application
for discharge under the provisions of Section 239 CrPC. The
parameters which govern the exercise of this jurisdiction have
found expression in several decisions of this Court. It is a settled
principle of law that at the stage of considering an application
for discharge the court must proceed on the assumption that the
material which has been brought on the record by the
prosecution is true and evaluate the material in order to
determine whether the facts emerging from the material, taken16
2025:JHHC:15580on its face value, disclose the existence of the ingredients
necessary to constitute the offence. In State of T.N. v. N. Suresh
Rajan [State of T.N. v. N. Suresh Rajan, (2014) 11 SCC
709 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 529 : (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 721],
adverting to the earlier decisions on the subject, this Court held
: (SCC pp. 721-22, para 29)
’29. … At this stage, probative value of the materials has to be
gone into and the court is not expected to go deep into the
matter and hold that the materials would not warrant a
conviction. In our opinion, what needs to be considered is
whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has
been committed and not whether a ground for convicting the
accused has been made out. To put it differently, if the court
thinks that the accused might have committed the offence on the
basis of the materials on record on its probative value, it can
frame the charge; though for conviction, the court has to come
to the conclusion that the accused has committed the offence.
The law does not permit a mini trial at this stage.'”
27. The Hon’ble Apex Court has further dealt with the proper basis for
framing of charge in the case of “Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of
Delhi)” , (2008) 2 SCC 561 wherein at paragraphs 11, 12 and 14 it has
been held as under:-
“11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on record with
a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at
their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients
constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not
expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on
record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a
ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and
not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At
that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which
leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence
of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would
justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of
the commission of that offence.
17
2025:JHHC:15580
12. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy [(1977) 2 SCC
699 : 1977 SCC (Cri) 404], a three-Judge Bench of this Court
had observed that at the stage of framing the charge, the Court
has to apply its mind to the question whether or not there is any
ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the
accused. As framing of charge affects a person’s liberty
substantially, need for proper consideration of material
warranting such order was emphasised.
14. In a later decision in State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni [(2000)
6 SCC 338 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 1110] this Court, referring to
several previous decisions held that : (SCC p. 342, para 7)
“7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing
charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court
is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the
materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the
accused.”
28. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Palwinder Singh v. Balvinder
Singh”, (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 850 has been pleased to hold that charges
can also be framed on the basis of strong suspicion. Marshaling and
appreciation of the evidence is not in the domain of the Court at that
point of time.
29. Further it is pertinent to mention here that power to discharge an
accused was designed to prevent harassment to an innocent person by
the arduous trial or the ordeal of prosecution. How that intention is to
be achieved is reasonably clear in the section itself. The power has been
entrusted to the Sessions Judge who brings to bear his knowledge and
experience in criminal trials. Besides, he has the assistance of counsel
for the accused and Public Prosecutor. He is required to hear both sides
before framing any charge against the accused or for discharging him.
If the Sessions Judge after hearing the parties frames a charge and also
18
2025:JHHC:15580
makes an order in support thereof, the law must be allowed to take its
own course. Self-restraint on the part of the High Court should be the
rule unless there is a glaring injustice which stares the court in the face.
The opinion on any matter may differ depending upon the person who
views it. There may be as many opinions on a particular matter as there
are courts but it is no ground for the High Court to interdict the trial. It
would be better for the High Court to allow the trial to proceed.
Reference in this regard may be taken from the judgment as rendered
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in “Stree Atyachar Virodhi
Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia“, (1989) 1 SCC 715.
30. Further, the difference between the approach with which the Court
should examine the matter in the discharge has been explained by the
Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander“, (2012)
9 SCC 460, in the following words:–
“17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the
trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the
accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under
both these provisions, the court is required to consider the
“record of the case” and documents submitted therewith and,
after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or
where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground
for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it
shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the
Section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that
there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the
charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of
law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the
existence of constituents of an offence and the facts leading to
that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It
may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine
distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the19
2025:JHHC:15580Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and
judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to
say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form
an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an
offence, is an approach which is impermissible in terms of
Section 228 of the Code.
30. We have already noticed that the legislature in its wisdom
has used the expression “there is ground for presuming that the
accused has committed an offence”. This has an inbuilt element
of presumption once the ingredients of an offence with reference
to the allegations made are satisfied, the Court would not doubt
the case of the prosecution unduly and extend its jurisdiction to
quash the charge in haste. A Bench of this Court in State of
Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa (1996) 4 SCC 659 referred to
the meaning of the word “presume” while relying upon Black’s
Law Dictionary. It was defined to mean “to believe or accept
upon probable evidence”; “to take as proved until evidence to
the contrary is forthcoming”. In other words, the truth of the
matter has to come out when the prosecution evidence is led, the
witnesses are cross-examined by the defence, the incriminating
material and evidence is put to the accused in terms of Section
313 of the Code and then the accused is provided an opportunity
to lead defence, if any. It is only upon completion of such steps
that the trial concludes with the court forming its final opinion
and delivering its judgment. Merely because there was a civil
transaction between the parties would not by itself alter the
status of the allegations constituting the criminal offence.
31. Thus, it is evident that the law regarding the approach to be adopted by
the Court while considering an application for discharge of the accused
person the Court has to form a definite opinion, upon consideration of
the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, that there
is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. However,
while framing charges, the Court is not required to form a definite
opinion that the accused is guilty of committing an offence. The truth
of the matter will come out when evidence is led during the trial. Once
20
2025:JHHC:15580the facts and ingredients of the Section exist, the court would presume
that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge
accordingly and the Court would not doubt the case of the prosecution.
32. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case
of “Sajjan Kumar v. CBI“, (2010) 9 SCC 368, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has considered the scope of Sections 227 and 228 CrPC. The
principles which emerged therefrom have been taken note of in para 21
as under:
“21. On consideration of the authorities about the scope of
Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles
emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing the
charges under Section 227 CrPC has the undoubted power to
sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been
made out. The test to determine prima facie case would depend
upon the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose grave
suspicion against the accused which has not been properly
explained, the court will be fully justified in framing a charge
and proceeding with the trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the
documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities, etc.
However, at this stage, there cannot be a roving enquiry into the
pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court could
form an opinion that the accused might have committed offence,
it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is21
2025:JHHC:15580required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
has committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of
the material on record cannot be gone into but before framing a
charge the court must apply its judicial mind on the material
placed on record and must be satisfied that the commission of
offence by the accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is required to
evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to
find out if the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value
disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the
alleged offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it
cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept all that
the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to
common sense or the broad probabilities of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to
suspicion only, as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial
Judge will be empowered to discharge the accused and at this
stage, he is not to see whether the trial will end in conviction or
acquittal.”
33. In the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case
of “M.E. Shivalingamurthy v. CBI“, (2020) 2 SCC 768, the above
principles have been reiterated in para-17, 18, 28 to 31 and the
Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained as to how the matters of grave
suspicion are to be dealt with. The aforesaid paragraphs of the report
are quoted as under:
“17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We
refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier
decisions viz. P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala and discern the
following principles:
17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to
suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the trial
Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused.
22
2025:JHHC:15580
17.2. The trial Judge is not a mere post office to frame the
charge at the instance of the prosecution.
17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find
out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding.
Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the police
or the documents produced before the Court.
17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce
to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it
is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence
evidence, if any, “cannot show that the accused committed
offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding
with the trial”.
17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials
giving rise to the grave suspicion.
17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total
effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the
court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on.
This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving
inquiry into the pros and cons.
17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value
of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material
brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as
true.
17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the
strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a
charge and refusing to discharge the accused.
18. The defence of the accused is not to be looked into at the
stage when the accused seeks to be discharged under Section
227 CrPC (see State of J&K v. Sudershan Chakkar). The
expression, “the record of the case”, used in Section 227 CrPC,
is to be understood as the documents and the articles, if any,
produced by the prosecution. The Code does not give any right
to the accused to produce any document at the stage of framing
of the charge. At the stage of framing of the charge, the
submission of the accused is to be confined to the material
23
2025:JHHC:15580
produced by the police (see State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath
Padhi).
28. It is here that again it becomes necessary that we remind
ourselves of the contours of the jurisdiction under Section 227
CrPC. The principle established is to take the materials
produced by the prosecution, both in the form of oral statements
and also documentary material, and act upon it without it been
subjected to questioning through cross-examination and
everything assumed in favour of the prosecution, if a scenario
emerges where no offence, as alleged, is made out against the
accused, it, undoubtedly, would ensure to the benefit of the
accused warranting the trial court to discharge the accused.
29. It is not open to the accused to rely on the material by way
of defence and persuade the court to discharge him.
30. However, what is the meaning of the expression “materials
on the basis of which grave suspicion is aroused in the mind of
the court’s”, which is not explained away? Can the accused
explain away the material only with reference to the materials
produced by the prosecution? Can the accused rely upon
material which he chooses to produce at the stage?
31. In view of the decisions of this Court that the accused can
only rely on the materials which are produced by the
prosecution, it must be understood that the grave suspicion, if it
is established on the materials, should be explained away only
in terms of the materials made available by the prosecution. No
doubt, the accused may appeal to the broad probabilities to the
case to persuade the court to discharge him.”
34. In the case of “Asim Shariff v. NIA“, (supra), it has been held by the
Hon’ble Apex Court that the words ‘not sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused’ clearly show that the Judge is not a
mere post office to frame the charge at the behest of the prosecution,
but has to exercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the
24
2025:JHHC:15580
prosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the Court to
enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into a weighing and
balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really his function
after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, the Judge has merely to
sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient
ground for proceeding against the accused. The sufficiency of ground
would take within its fold the nature of the evidence recorded by the
police or the documents produced before the Court which ex
facie disclose that there are suspicious circumstances against the
accused so as to frame a charge against him.
35. Recently, the Full Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case
of “Ghulam Hassan Beigh v. Mohd. Maqbool Magrey“, (2022) 12
SCC 657 has elaborately discussed the issue of framing of charge and
has held in paragraph 27 which reads as under:
“27. Thus from the aforesaid, it is evident that the trial
court is enjoined with the duty to apply its mind at the
time of framing of charge 14 and should not act as a
mere post office. The endorsement on the charge-sheet
presented by the police as it is without applying its
mind and without recording brief reasons in support of
its opinion is not countenanced by law. However, the
material which is required to be evaluated by the court
at the time of framing charge should be the material
which is produced and relied upon by the prosecution.
The sifting of such material is not to be so meticulous
25
2025:JHHC:15580as would render the exercise a mini trial to find out the
guilt or otherwise of the accused. All that is required at
this stage is that the court must be satisfied that the
evidence collected by the prosecution is sufficient to
presume that the accused has committed an offence.
Even a strong suspicion would suffice. Undoubtedly,
apart from the material that is placed before the court
by the prosecution in the shape of final report in terms
of Section 173 CrPC, the court may also rely upon any
other evidence or material which is of sterling quality
and has direct bearing on the charge laid before it by
the prosecution.”
36. Thus, from aforesaid legal propositions it can be safely inferred that if,
upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents
submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused
and the prosecution in this behalf, the Judge considers that there is no
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he
shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so and if,
after such consideration and hearing as aforesaid, the Judge is of the
opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has
committed an offence, the trial Court shall frame the charge. Therefore,
the stage of discharge is a stage prior to framing of the charge and once
the Court rejects the discharge application, it would proceed for
framing of charge. At the stage of discharge, the Judge has merely to
sift and weigh the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is
26
2025:JHHC:15580
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused and in other
words, the sufficiency of grounds would take within its fold the nature
of the evidence recorded by the police or the documents produced
before the court which ex facie disclose that there are suspicious
circumstances against the accused so as to frame the charge against him
and after that if the Judge comes to a conclusion that there is sufficient
ground to proceed, he will frame a charge and, if not, he
will discharge the accused.
37. While exercising its judicial mind to the facts of the case in order to
determine whether a case for trial has been made out by the
prosecution, it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the pros and
cons of the matter or into a weighing and balancing of evidence and
probabilities which is really the function of the court, after the trial
starts.
38. It is considered view that at this stage of the instant case, the Court was
only required to consider whether a prima facie case has been made out
or not and whether the accused is required to be further tried or not
because at the stage of framing of the charge and / or considering
the discharge application, the mini trial is not permissible.
39. In the backdrop of aforesaid case laws and judicial deduction, this
Court is now proceeding to examine the fact so as to come to the
conclusion as to whether the evidence which has been collected in
course of investigation and has been brought on record, as would be
available in the impugned order prima facie case against the petitioner
is made out or not?
27
2025:JHHC:15580
40. It is evident from record that present petitioner is an accused in
connection with Ranchi Vigilance P.S. Case No. 54/2016,
corresponding to Vigilance (Spl.) Case No. 57/2016. On 19/02/2022
cognizance of the offence u/s 13 (2) r/w section 13 (1) (e) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 has been taken against the present
petitioner.
41. Further prosecution has alleged that the then Executive Engineer, Rural
Work Department, Work Division, Ramgarh cum Executive Engineer,
NREP, Ramgarh has misused his post and amassed disproportionate
assets. During the check period with effect from year 1987 to
31.03.2013 his actual income was Rs. 95,47,119/- whereas his
expenditure was Rs. 1,74,05,609/- and thereby he amassed
disproportionate assets to the tune of Rs. 78,58,490/- which is 82.31%
to his known sources of income.
42. It is evident from the record that charge-sheet has been submitted under
Section 13 (2) r/w 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Vide order no. 53/J. dated 06/10/2017, the sanction for prosecution of
accused-petitioner has been issued by the Principal Secretary cum
Legal Remembrancer, Law Department, Jharkhand, Ranchi.
43. It would be apt to mention herein Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of
Corruption Act, 1988 which runs as follows:
“13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.–(1) A public
servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct–
***
28
2025:JHHC:15580
(e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at
any time during the period of his office, been in possession for
which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of
pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known
sources of income.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section, “known sources
of income” means income received from any lawful source and
such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the
provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being
applicable to a public servant.”
44. From perusal of the aforesaid Section it is apparent that a public servant
is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct under
Section 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, if the said
public servant or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at
any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which
the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources
or property disproportionate to his “known sources of income”.
45. Thus, it is evident that within the purview of this section, “known
sources of income” means income received from any lawful source and
such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of
any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to public servant.
46. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “State of Tamil Nadu v. R.
Soundirarasu”, (2023) 6 SCC 768 while considering the core of the
Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act as well as parameters of discharge has
observed that the explanation to Section 13(1)(e) defines the expression
“known sources of income” and states that this expression means the
income received from any lawful source and also requires that the
receipt should have been intimated by the public servant in accordance
29
2025:JHHC:15580
with any provisions of law, rules or orders for the time being applicable
to a public servant. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of the
aforesaid case is being quoted as under
“34. Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act including Explanation
thereto reads as under:
“13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.–(1) A public
servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct–
***
(e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at
any time during the period of his office, been in possession for
which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of
pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known
sources of income.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section, “known sources
of income” means income received from any lawful source and
such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the
provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being
applicable to a public servant.”
35. The Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) defines the expression
“known sources of income” and states that this expression
means the income received from any lawful source and also
requires that the receipt should have been intimated by the
public servant in accordance with any provisions of law, rules
or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. This
Explanation was not there in the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 (for short “the 1947 Act”). Noticing this fact in Jagan M.
Seshadri v. State of T.N. [Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of
T.N., (2002) 9 SCC 639 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 1494], this Court has
observed as under : (SCC p. 642, para 7)
“7. A bare reading of Section 30(2) of the 1988 Act shows
that any act done or any action taken or purported to have
been done or taken under or in pursuance of the repealed
Act, shall, insofar as it is not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under or in
pursuance of the corresponding provisions of the Act. It does
not substitute Section 13 in place of Section 5 of the 1947 Act.
Section 30(2) is applicable ‘without prejudice to the
30
2025:JHHC:15580
application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897′. In
our opinion, the application of Section 13 of the 1988 Act to
the fact situation of the present case would offend Section 6
of the General Clauses Act, which, inter alia provides that
repeal shall not (i) affect the previous operation of any
enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered
thereunder, or (ii) affect any investigation, legal proceedings
or remedy in respect of any such rights, privilege, obligation,
penalty, forfeiture or punishment. Section 13, both in the
matter of punishment as also by the addition of the
Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) is materially different from
Section 5 of the 1947 Act. The presumption permitted to be
raised under the Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) was not
available to be raised under Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947 Act.
This difference can have a material bearing on the case.”
36. The Explanation to Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act has the
effect of defining the expression “known sources of income”
used in Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act. The Explanation to
Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act consists of two parts. The first
part states that the known sources of income means the income
received from any lawful source and the second part states that
such receipt should have been intimated by the public servant in
accordance with the provisions of law, rules and orders for the
time being applicable to a public servant.
37. Referring to the first part of the expression “known sources
of income” in N. Ramakrishnaiah v. State of A.P. [N.
Ramakrishnaiah v. State of A.P., (2008) 17 SCC 83 : (2010) 4
SCC (Cri) 454], this Court observed as under : (SCC pp. 86-87,
para 17)
“17. ‘… 6. The emphasis of the phrase “known sources of
income” in Section 13(1)(e) [old Section 5(1)(e)] is clearly
on the word “income”. It would be primary to observe that
qua the public servant, the income would be what is attached
to his office or post, commonly known as remuneration or
salary. The term “income” by itself, is elastic and has a wide
connotation. Whatever comes in or is received is income. But,
however, wide the import and connotation of the term
“income”, it is incapable of being understood as meaning
receipt having no nexus to one’s labour, or expertise, or
31
2025:JHHC:15580
property, or investment, and being further a source which
may or may not yield a regular revenue. These essential
characteristics are vital in understanding the term “Income”.
Therefore, it can be said that, though “income” in receipt in
the hand of its recipient, every receipt would not partake the
character of income. Qua the public servant, whatever return
he gets from his service, will be the primary item of his
income. Other income which can conceivably be income qua
the public servant will be in the regular receipt from (a) his
property, or (b) his investment. A receipt from windfall, or
gains of graft crime or immoral secretions by persons prima
facie would not be receipt from the “known source of
income” of a public servant.’ [Ed. : As observed in State of
M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta, (2004) 1 SCC 691 at p. 697,
para 6]”
38. The above brings us to the second part of the Explanation,
defining the expression “such receipt should have been
intimated by the public servant” i.e. intimation by the public
servant in accordance with any provisions of law, rules or
orders applicable to a public servant.
39. The language of the substantive provisions of Section 5(3) of
the 1947 Act before its amendment, Section 5(1)(e) of the 1947
Act and Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act continues to be the
same though Section 5(3) before it came to be amended was
held to be a procedural section in Sajjan Singh v. State of
Punjab [Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 464].
Section 5(3) of the 1947 Act before it came to be amended w.e.f.
18-12-1964 was interpreted in C.S.D. Swami v. State [C.S.D.
Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7], and it was observed: (C.S.D.
Swami case [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7], AIR pp.
10-11, paras 5-6)
“5. Reference was also made to cases in which courts had
held that if plausible explanation had been offered by an
accused person for being in possession of property which was
the subject-matter of the charge, the court could exonerate
the accused from criminal responsibility for possessing
incriminating property. In our opinion, those cases have no
bearing upon the charge against the appellant in this case,
because the section requires the accused person to32
2025:JHHC:15580“satisfactorily account” for the possession of pecuniary
resources or property disproportionate to his known sources
of income. Ordinarily, an accused person is entitled to
acquittal if he can account for honest possession of property
which has been proved to have been recently stolen [see
Illustration (a) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872]. The
rule of law is that if there is a prima facie explanation of the
accused that he came by the stolen goods in an honest way,
the inference of guilty knowledge is displaced. This is based
upon the well-established principle that if there is a doubt in
the mind of the court as to a necessary ingredient of an
offence, the benefit of that doubt must go to the accused. But
the legislature has advisedly used the expression
“satisfactorily account”. The emphasis must be on the word
“satisfactorily”, and the legislature has, thus, deliberately
cast a burden on the accused not only to offer a plausible
explanation as to how he came by his large wealth, but also
to satisfy the court that his explanation was worthy of
acceptance.
6. Another argument bearing on the same aspect of the case,
is that the prosecution has not led evidence to show as to
what are the known sources of the appellant’s income. In this
connection, our attention was invited to the evidence of the
investigating officers, and with reference to that evidence, it
was contended that those officers have not said, in terms, as
to what were the known sources of income of the accused, or
that the salary was the only source of his income. Now, the
expression “known sources of income” must have reference
to sources known to the prosecution on a thorough
investigation of the case. It was not, and it could not be,
contended that “known sources of income” means sources
known to the accused. The prosecution cannot, in the very
nature of things, be expected to know the affairs of an
accused person. Those will be matters “specially within the
knowledge” of the accused, within the meaning of Section
106 of the Evidence Act. The prosecution can only lead
evidence, as it has done in the instant case, to show that the
accused was known to earn his living by service under the
Government during the material period. The prosecution33
2025:JHHC:15580would not be justified in concluding that travelling allowance
was also a source of income when such allowance is
ordinarily meant to compensate an officer concerned for his
out-of-pocket expenses incidental to journeys performed by
him for his official tours. That could not possibly be alleged
to be a very substantial source of income. The source of
income of a particular individual will depend upon his
position in life with particular reference to his occupation or
avocation in life. In the case of a government servant, the
prosecution would, naturally, infer that his known source of
income would be the salary earned by him during his active
service. His pension or his provident fund would come into
calculation only after his retirement, unless he had a
justification for borrowing from his provident fund. We are
not, therefore, impressed by the argument that the
prosecution has failed to lead proper evidence as to the
appellant’s known sources of income. It may be that the
accused may have made statements to the investigating
officers as to his alleged sources of income, but the same,
strictly, would not be evidence in the case, and if the
prosecution has failed to disclose all the sources of income of
an accused person, it is always open to him to prove those
other sources of income which have not been taken into
account or brought into evidence by the prosecution.”
(emphasis supplied)
40. Even after Section 5(3) was deleted and Section 5(1)(e) was
enacted, this Court in Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar [State
of Maharashtra v. Wasudeo Ramchandra Kaidalwar, (1981) 3
SCC 199 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 690] has observed that the
expression “known sources of income” occurring in Section
5(1)(e) has a definite legal connotation which in the context
must mean the sources known to the prosecution and not sources
relied upon and known to the accused. Section 5(1) (e), it was
observed by this Court, casts a burden on the accused for it uses
the words “for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily
account”. The onus is on the accused to account for and
satisfactorily explain the assets. Accordingly, in Wasudeo
Ramchandra Kaidalwar [State of Maharashtra v. Wasudeo
34
2025:JHHC:15580
Ramchandra Kaidalwar, (1981) 3 SCC 199 : 1981 SCC (Cri)
690] it was observed : (SCC pp. 204-205, paras 11-13)
“11. The provisions of Section 5(3) have been subject of
judicial interpretation. First the expression “known sources
of income” in the context of Section 5(3) meant “sources
known to the prosecution”. The other principle is equally
well-settled. The onus placed on the accused under Section
5(3) was, however, not to prove his innocence beyond
reasonable doubt, but only to establish a preponderance of
probability. These are the well-settled principles : see C.S.D.
Swami v. State [C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC
7]; Sajjan Singh v. State of Punjab [Sajjan Singh v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1964 SC 464] and V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P.
[V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P., AIR 1966 SC 1762] The
legislature thought it fit to dispense with the rule of evidence
under Section 5(3) and make the possession of
disproportionate assets by a public servant as one of the
species of the offence of criminal misconduct by inserting
Section 5(1)(e) due to widespread corruption in public
services.
12. The terms and expressions appearing in Section 5(1)(e) of
the Act are the same as those used in the old Section 5(3).
Although the two provisions operate in two different fields,
the meaning to be assigned to them must be the same. The
expression “known sources of incomes” means “sources
known to the prosecution”. So also, the same meaning must
be given to the words “for which the public servant cannot
satisfactorily account” occurring in Section 5(1)(e). No
doubt, Section 4(1) provides for presumption of guilt in cases
falling under Sections 5(1)(a) and (b), but there was, in our
opinion, no need to mention Section 5(1)(e) therein. For, the
reason is obvious. The provision contained in Section 5(1)(e)
of the Act is a self-contained provision. The first part of the
section casts a burden on the prosecution and the second on
the accused. When Section 5(1)(e) uses the words ‘for which
the public servant cannot satisfactorily account’, it is implied
that the burden is on such public servant to account for the
sources for the acquisition of disproportionate assets. The
High Court, therefore, was in error in holding that a public
35
2025:JHHC:15580
servant charged for having disproportionate assets in his
possession for which he cannot satisfactorily account, cannot
be convicted of an offence under Section 5(2) read with
Section 5(1)(e) of the Act unless the prosecution disproves all
possible sources of income.
13. That takes us to the difficult question as to the nature and
extent of the burden of proof under Section 5(1)(e) of the Act.
The expression “burden of proof” has two distinct meanings
(1) the legal burden i.e. the burden of establishing the guilt,
and (2) the evidential burden i.e. the burden of leading
evidence. In a criminal trial, the burden of proving
everything essential to establish the charge against the
accused lies upon the prosecution, and that burden never
shifts. Notwithstanding the general rule that the burden of
proof lies exclusively upon the prosecution, in the case of
certain offences, the burden of proving a particular fact in
issue may be laid by law upon the accused. The burden
resting on the accused in such cases is, however, not so
onerous as that which lies on the prosecution and is
discharged by proof of a balance of probabilities. The
ingredients of the offence of criminal misconduct under
Section 5(2) read with Section 5(1) (e) are the possession of
pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to the
known sources of income for which the public servant cannot
satisfactorily account. To substantiate the charge, the
prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring
a case under Section 5(1)(e), namely, (1) it must establish
that the accused is a public servant, (2) the nature and extent
of the pecuniary resources or property which were found in
his possession, (3) it must be proved as to what were his
known sources of income i.e. known to the prosecution, and
(4) it must prove, quite objectively, that such resources or
property found in possession of the accused were
disproportionate to his known sources of income. Once these
four ingredients are established, the offence of criminal
misconduct under Section 5(1)(e) is complete, unless the
accused is able to account for such resources or property.
The burden then shifts to the accused to satisfactorily account
for his possession of disproportionate assets. The extent and
36
2025:JHHC:15580
nature of burden of proof resting upon the public servant to
be found in possession of disproportionate assets under
Section 5(1)(e) cannot be higher than the test laid by the
Court in Jhingan case [V.D. Jhingan v. State of U.P., AIR
1966 SC 1762] i.e. to establish his case by a preponderance
of probability. That test was laid down by the court following
the dictum of Viscount Sankey, L.C.,
in Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions
[Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935]
A.C. 462 (HL)]. The High Court has placed an impossible
burden on the prosecution to disprove all possible sources of
income which were within the special knowledge of the
accused. As laid down in Swami case [C.S.D.
Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7], the prosecution cannot, in
the very nature of things, be expected to know the affairs of a
public servant found in possession of resources or property
disproportionate to his known sources of income i.e. his
salary. Those will be matters specially within the knowledge
of the public servant within the meaning of Section 106 of
the Evidence Act, 1872. Section 106 reads:
‘106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.–
When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any
person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him.’
In this connection, the phrase the “burden of proof” is
clearly used in the secondary sense, namely, the duty of
introducing evidence. The nature and extent of the burden
cast on the accused is well-settled. The accused is not bound
to prove his innocence beyond all the reasonable doubt. All
that he need to do is to bring out a preponderance of
probability.”
47. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspects and settled legal
proposition this Court is now adverting to the impugned order. It
appears that the learned trial Court has also taken in to consideration
that in his statement u/s 164 of the Cr.P.C., witness namely, Jitendra
Chaudhary, District Animal Husbandry Officer has stated that without
spot verification, he issued wrong certificate in the name of Nilima
37
2025:JHHC:15580Singh wife of Yadvendra Singh (present petitioner) to the effect that
she has purchased six cows.
48. In order impugned it has been mentioned that Smt. Nilima Singh, wife
of present petitioner has claimed that she runs dairy business. But vide
letter no. 46 dated 25/03/2017, Sri B.P. Verma, the then Secretary,
Ashok Nagar Society had to the Investigating Officer that the petitioner
and his wife Nilima Singh were not allowed to run dairy business from
their house no. 190C, School Road, Ashok Nagar (paragraph 339 of the
case diary). Witnesses namely, Shivlal Prajapati (paragraph 403) and
Ramsajivan Prajavati (paragraph-404) have not corroborated the
statement of Nilima Singh, regarding her income from agriculture.
49. Allegedly, during the check period the actual income of accused-
petitioner was Rs. 95,47,119/- whereas his expenditure was
Rs. 1,74,05,609/- and thereby he amassed disproportionate assets to the
tune of Rs. 78,58,490/- which is 82.31% to his known sources of
income.
50. Thus, this Court finds that there is specific allegation against the
petitioner of having disproportionate assets to the tune of
Rs. 78,58,490/- which is 82.31% to his known sources of income and
also there is specific allegation that the petitioner acquired
disproportionate assets and could not give any satisfactory explanation
regarding sources of disproportionate assets as such the explanations
regarding the source for acquisition of such disproportionate assets
given by him appears to be false during the investigation of the case.
38
2025:JHHC:15580
51. From perusal of case record, statements of witnesses as referred in the
impugned order, materials available on record and in view of law laid
down by the Hon’ble Apex Court as referred hereinabove, this Court is
of the considered view that prima-facie sufficient materials are
available on the record for framing of charge u/s 13 (2) r/w section 13
(1) (e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against the present
petitioner.
52. It needs to refer herein that the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of
“Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan“, (2001) 9 SCC 631 has observed
that the revisional power under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot
be exercised in a routine and casual manner. While exercising such
powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in
the manner as the trial and the appellate Courts are required to do.
Revisional powers could be exercised only when it is shown that there
is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the
framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report
even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do
not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged.
53. Thus, it is evident that the revisional power can only be exercised to
correct patent error of law or procedure which would occasion
unfairness, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be
compared with the appellate power. A Revisional Court cannot
undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is
undertaken by the trial Court or the appellate Court. This power can
only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the
39
2025:JHHC:15580
proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be
true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute
the offence for which the accused has been charged.
54. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Asian Resurfacing of Road
Agency (P) Ltd. v. CBI“, (2018) 16 SCC 299 has held that interference
in the order framing charges or refusing to discharge is called for in the
rarest of rare case only to correct the patent error of jurisdiction.
55. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “State of Tamil Nadu v. R.
Soundirarasu”,(supra) has held in paragraph 81 to 83 as under:
81. The High Court has acted completely beyond the settled
parameters, as discussed above, which govern the power
to discharge the accused from the prosecution. The High Court
could be said to have donned the role of a chartered accountant.
This is exactly what this Court observed in Thommandru
Hannah Vijayalakshmi [CBI v. Thommandru Hannah
Vijayalakshmi, (2021) 18 SCC 135]. The High Court has
completely ignored that it was not at the stage of trial or
considering an appeal against a verdict in a trial. The High
Court has enquired into the materials produced by the accused
persons, compared with the information compiled by the
investigating agency and pronounced a verdict saying that the
explanation offered by the accused persons deserves to be
accepted applying the doctrine of preponderance of
probability. This entire exercise has been justified on account of
the investigating officer not taking into consideration the
explanation offered by the public servant and also not taking
into consideration the lawful acquired assets of the wife of the
public servant i.e. Respondent 2 herein.
82. By accepting the entire evidence put forward by the accused
persons applying the doctrine of preponderance of probability,
the case put up by the prosecution cannot be termed as
“groundless”. As observed by this Court in C.S.D. Swami
[C.S.D. Swami v. State, AIR 1960 SC 7] that the accused might
have made statements before the investigating officer as to his
alleged sources of income, but the same, strictly, would not be
evidence in the case.
83. Section 13(1)(e) of the 1988 Act makes a departure from the
principle of criminal jurisprudence that the burden will always
lie on the prosecution to prove the ingredients of the offences
charged and never shifts on the accused to disprove the charge
framed against him. The legal effect of Section 13(1)(e) is that it
40
2025:JHHC:15580
is for the prosecution to establish that the accused was in
possession of properties disproportionate to his known sources
of income but the term “known sources of income” would mean
the sources known to the prosecution and not the sources known
to the accused and within the knowledge of the accused. It is for
the accused to account satisfactorily for the money/assets in his
hands. The onus in this regard is on the accused to give
satisfactory explanation. The accused cannot make an attempt
to discharge this onus upon him at the stage of Section
239CrPC. At the stage of Section 239CrPC, the court has to
only look into the prima facie case and decide whether the case
put up by the prosecution is groundless.”
56. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that Hon’ble Apex Court while
appreciating the legal effect of Section 13(1)(e) has categorically
observed that it is for the prosecution to establish that the accused was
in possession of properties disproportionate to his known sources of
income but the term “known sources of income” would mean the
sources known to the prosecution and not the sources known to the
accused and within the knowledge of the accused. It is for the accused
to account satisfactorily for the money/assets in his hands. The onus in
this regard is on the accused to give satisfactory explanation. The
accused cannot make an attempt to discharge this onus upon
prosecution at the stage of Section 239 Cr.PC.
57. It requires to refer herein that the ambit and scope of exercise of power
of discharge, are fairly well settled which has been elaborately
discussed in the preceding paragraph and as per settled proposition of
law no comprehensive assessment of the materials or meticulous
consideration of the possible defences need to be undertaken at this
stage nor any exercise of weighing materials in golden scales is to be
undertaken at this stage. The only deliberation at the stage of discharge
41
2025:JHHC:15580
is as to whether prima facie case was made out or not and whether the
accused is required to be further tried or not.
58. Further, it is well settled that the revisional power cannot be parallelled
with appellate power. The Revisional Court cannot undertake
meticulous examination of the material on record as is undertaken by
the Trial Court or the Appellate Court.
59. Hence, on the basis of discussion made herein above, this Court is of
the considered view that, there is no illegality in the impugned order
dated 22.06.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, CBI in Misc.
Criminal Application No. 1553 of 2023 in connection with Ranchi
Vigilance PS Case No. 54 of 2016 corresponding to Vigilance (Spl.)
Case No.57 of 2016.
60. Accordingly, this Court do not find any justifiable reason to interfere
with the order dated 22.06.2023, consequently, the instant criminal
revision petition is hereby dismissed.
61. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
Sudhir/-
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
Dated:.13/06/2025
AFR
42
[ad_1]
Source link