Jharkhand High Court
Yaswant Kumar vs Sharda Vandna on 18 July, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC:20122-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No. 152 of 2024
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Yaswant Kumar, S/o Rajendra Sharma, R/o Teacher’s Colony Jaridih,
Jainamore, PO + PS Jaridih, Dist-Bokaro, At present R/o TGT- Hindi,
Jawahar Navodaya Vidyalaya, Patratu, Road No.05, PO & PS: PTPS, Distt.
Ramgarh. ... ... Petitioner/Appellant
Versus
Sharda Vandna, W/o Yaswant Kumar, D/o Hira Lal Sharma, At present R/o
Pokhartoli Shaket Nagar, Hinoo, PO + PS Doranda, Distt. Ranchi.
… … Respondent/Respondent
——
CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
——-
For the Appellant : Mr. Ranjan Kumar Singh, Advocate;
Mr. Santosh Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Shishir Raj, Advocate
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Order No.06/Dated:18th July, 2025
[Per, Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.]
1. The instant appeal preferred under Section19(1) of the Family Courts
Act, is directed against the judgment dated 21.12.2020 passed in Original Suit
No.368 of 2015 by the learned Principal Judge, Additional Family Court,
Ranchi, by which, the Suit filed under Section 13A of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955, has been dismissed on contest.
2. Notice was issued to the respondent-wife vide order dated 7.5.2025. In
pursuance thereof, appearance has been made through Mr. Shishir Raj, the
learned counsel who has filed his vakalatnama.
3. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent-wife has submitted
that before entering into the merits of the present case, IA No. 11615 of 2024
which has been filed by the appellant-husband under section 5 of the
Limitation Act, for condonation of delay of 1178 days, in filing the present
appeal, needs to be considered.
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4. This Court also thinks it proper to consider the limitation petition
before entering into the merits of the case.
I.A. No.11615 of 2024
5. Mr. Ranjan Kumar Singh, the learned counsel appearing for the
appellant-husband has submitted that delay of 1178 days’ in filing the present
First Appeal has sufficiently been explained in paragraph nos. 5 and 6 of the
instant Interlocutory Application.
6. The learned counsel has further referred to the statement made in
paragraph no.5 of the instant Interlocutory Application that the judgment
impugned was passed on 21.12.2020 when the lock down was there due to
Pandemic COVID-19.
7. It has been further submitted that period of Pandemic COVID-19 has
been excluded by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the Miscellaneous Application
No.21 of 2022 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No.03 of 2020, whereby and
whereunder the period of limitation during pandemic Covid-19 period has
been waived but without taking into consideration the aforesaid facts, the
office has pointed out delay of 1178 days.
8. It has further been submitted that the time has also been consumed in
arranging the documents and the money which was to be incurred in filing the
appeal and, as such, it is also one of the reasons for delay in filing the present
appeal.
9. While, on the other hand, Mr. Shishir Raj, the learned counsel for the
respondent-wife has contended that even accepting the fact that period of
Pandemic COVID-19 has been excluded by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the
instant I.A. may not be allowed reason being that impugned judgment is dated
21.12.2020 and the lock down was lifted in the month of March 2022 but the
instant appeal has been filed on 28.6.2024, as such, it is a case where the
limitation period was expired during the period of Pandemic COVID-19 and
even after lifting of the lock down, the appeal has not been filed within time
frame and, as such, it is not a fit case to consider the limitation petition on the
ground of Pandemic COVID-19.
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10. The learned counsel has further submitted that delay of 1178 days has
not sufficiently been explained and, hence, the said delay is not fit to be
condoned.
11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through
the submissions made on their behalf. This Court is conscious of the fact that
the period of delay is having no bearing for the purpose of condoning the
delay in exercise of power conferred under section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 rather the sufficient cause is necessary to be considered and if the party
concerned is in a position to make out the sufficient cause to condone the
delay then irrespective of the period of delay, the delay is to be condoned.
12. It requires to refer here that what is the meaning of ‘sufficient cause’.
The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Basawaraj & Anr. V. Spl. Land
Acquisition Officer,” [(2013)14 SCC 81)] in paragraph Nos. 9 to 15 has held
as under:
“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not
be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient”
is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to
answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient”
embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which
when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in
the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined
from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man.
In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not
have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide
on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it
cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or
“remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of
each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court
concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the
court exercises discretion, It has to be exercised judiciously. The
applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any
“sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a
satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow
the application for condonation of delay. The court has to
examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device
to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building
Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee (AIR 1964 SC 1336), Mata Din
v. Α. Narayanan ((1969) 2 SCC 770: AIR 1970 SC 1953] Parimal
v. Veena ((2011) 3 SCC 545: (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1: AIR 2011 SC
1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai ((2012) 5 SCC 157: (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 AIR 2012 SC
1629].)
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a
“sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a
good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can
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only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a
lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.
11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only
so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause
has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular
case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v.
Shyamlal ((2002) 1 SCC 535: AIR 2002 SC 100) and Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao ((2002) 3 SCC 195: AIR 2002 SC 1201).)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all
its rigour when the statuto so prescribes. The court has no power
to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the
court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard
but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has
consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive
factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks
to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated
unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.
According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts. The courts have
expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence
of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims
have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant
might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that
persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with
reasonable diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of
Insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents
disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in
equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost
by a party’s own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and
Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. ((2005) 7 SCC 510), Rajender
Singh v. Santa Singh ((1973) 2 SCC 705: AIR 1973 SC 2537) and
Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project ((2008) 17 SCC
448 (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907).)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. Stato of Kamataka ((2002) 4 SCC
578: 2002 SCC (Crl) 830 AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that
judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to
legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
((1992) 1 SCC 225 1992 SCC (Cri) 93: AIR 1992 SC 1701].
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the
“sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason
which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In
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case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on
his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation
of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant
to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
13. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs.
Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely because
sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case, there is
no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12, it has
been held as hereunder:-
“12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof
of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of
the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If
sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that
ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to
enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This
aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all
relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or
its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the
enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient
cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as
the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as
to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to
it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona
fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the
court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the
Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is
called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of
Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations
which have been expressly made material and relevant by the
provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same
manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be
decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In
the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion
should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from
the general criticism made against the appellant’s lack of
diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been
adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the
learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant’s
application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it
was appellant’s duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within
the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid
ground.
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14. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation
application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause for
condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it is
bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a right is
accrued in favour of the other side and, as such, it is necessary to look into the
bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and
laches on its part.
15. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party should
not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its
part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged
that the party has “not acted deliberately” or “remained inactive”. However,
the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to
enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever
the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant
must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from
prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the
Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.
16. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party
concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided
on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible,
reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble
Apex Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan
Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SCC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as
hereunder:-
“12. Thus, it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause”
within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of
the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice when no
negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a
party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would
constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts
of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting
or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking
steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed
with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject
the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal
drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and
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refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or
want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the
other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not
lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time
prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which
should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-
like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical
view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be
rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and
law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and
irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates,
either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such
a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the
matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of
the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.”
17. This Court after referring to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex
Court wherein the word ‘sufficient cause’ has been interpreted, adverting to
the cause shown on behalf of the appellant-husband in the instant
Interlocutory Application in order to come to the conclusion as to whether the
cause which has been shown on behalf of the appellant in the present
Interlocutory Application can be said to be ‘sufficient cause’ for the purpose
of condoning the delay of 1178 days.
18. The ground has been taken that judgment passed on 21.12.2020 and
during that period the country was suffering from the Pandemic COVID-19
and due to that the instant appeal could not have been filed on time.
19. The Hon’ble Apex Court has also taken into consideration as to how to
deal with the period of limitation when the country was suffering from
unavoidable situation of approaching the Court of law by taking suo moto
cognizance of the said aspect of the matter. The relevant part of the said order
is reproduced hereinbelow:
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No.3 of 2020
IN RE: COGNIZANCE FOR EXTENSION OF LIMITATION.
........ .............. Petitioner (s)
Versus
....... .............. Respondent (s)
1. Due to the onset of COVID-19 pandemic, this Court took suo motu
cognizance of the situation arising from difficulties that might be
faced by the litigants across the country in filing
petitions/applications/suits/appeals/all other proceedings within the7
2025:JHHC:20122-DBperiod of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation
or under any special laws (both Central or State). By an order dated
23.03.2020 this Court extended the period of limitation prescribed
under the general law or special laws whether compoundable or not
with effect from 15.03.2020 till further orders. The order dated
23.03.2020 was extended from time to time. Though, we have not
seen the end of the pandemic, there is considerable improvement.
The lockdown has been lifted and the country is returning to
normalcy. Almost all the Courts and Tribunals are functioning either
physically or by virtual mode. We are of the opinion that the order
dated 23.03.2020 has served its purpose and in view of the changing
scenario relating to the pandemic, the extension of limitation should
come to an end.
2. We have considered the suggestions of the learned Attorney
General for India regarding the future course of action. We deem it
appropriate to issue the following directions:
1. In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal,
application or proceeding, the period from 15.03.2020 till
14.03.2021 shall stand excluded. Consequently, the balance
period of limitation remaining as on 15.03.2020, if any,
shall become available with effect from 15.03.2021.
2. In cases where the limitation would have expired during
the period between 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021,
notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation
remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90
days from 15.03.2021. In the event the actual balance
period of limitation remaining, with effect from 15.03.2021,
is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.
3. The period from 15.03.2020 till 14.03.2021 shall also stand
excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4)
and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A
of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other
laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting
proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can
condone delay) and termination of proceedings.
4. The Government of India shall amend the guidelines for
containment zones, to state. “Regulated movement will be allowed
for medical emergencies, provision of essential goods and services,
and other necessary functions, such as, time bound applications,
including for legal purposes, and educational and job-related
requirements.”
5. The Suo Motu Writ Petition is disposed of accordingly.
20. Later on, the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 10.01.2022
passed in Miscellaneous Application No. . 21 OF 2022 in Miscellaneous
Application No. 665 of 2021 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) NO. 3 OF 2020
has extended the period. In Suo Motu Writ Petition (c) No. 3 of 2020
with Miscellaneous Application No. 21 of 2022 & Miscellaneous Application
No. 665/2021 dated 10.01.2022 The Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:
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III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the
period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the
actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall
have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event
the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect
from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall
apply.
21. In the backdrop of the aforesaid, the matter would have been different
herein if the period of limitation had expired during the period which has been
excluded by virtue of the direction passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the
aforesaid case. In order to consider as to whether even excluding the period
of limitation as per the direction of the Hon’ble Apex Court, the delay can be
condoned or not?
22. The judgment is dated 21.12.2020 and the appeal has been filed on
28.6.2024. Since the period of exclusion as per the direction passed by the
Hon’ble Apex Court is up to 28.02.2022 but the appeal has been filed on
28.6.2024 which is much beyond the period of exclusion as has been directed
by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for calculating the limitation by excluding the
period when the country was facing the rigor of Pandemic COVID-19.
23. Hence the ground which has been taken that due to prevalence of
Pandemic COVID-19, the appeal could not have been filed appears to be not
a sufficient cause, reason being that the appeal has been filed even after the
period which was directed to be excluded by the Hon’ble Apex Court.
24. The second ground, as stated in paragraph no. 6 of the instant
Interlocutory Application is that the time was consumed in arranging the
documents and the expenditure which was to be incurred in filing the appeal
shall be read with paragraph no.5 wherein the ground of the effect of the
Pandemic COVID-19 has been taken and since we have come to the
conclusion that the benefit of period of exclusion, as per the direction passed
by the Hon’ble Apex Court, is not allowed to be given as the appeal was filed
much beyond the period of exclusion.
25. Further, the ground which has been shown either in paragraph no. 5 or
paragraph no.6 cannot be said to be sufficient ground for condonation of
delay. Since, the delay has not sufficiently been explained, this court is of the
view that the instant Interlocutory Application cannot be allowed causing the
miscarriage of justice to the respondent.
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26. Accordingly, the instant Interlocutory Application is hereby dismissed.
27. In consequence of dismissal of the present Interlocutory Application,
the instant First Appeal also stands dismissed.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
KNR /-
AFR
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