Laxminarayan Gayakwad vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 11 March, 2025

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Chattisgarh High Court

Laxminarayan Gayakwad vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 11 March, 2025

Author: Narendra Kumar Vyas

Bench: Narendra Kumar Vyas

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                                                                           2025:CGHC:11960

                                                                                         NAFR

                            HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

                                              REVP No. 46 of 2025

                   1 - Laxminarayan Gayakwad S/o Setram Gayakwad Aged About 31 Years
                   Category - Sc, R/o. Village - Lacchanpur, Post - Bitkuli, Tehsil - Bhatapara,
                   Thana - Karhi Bazar, District - Balodabazar - Bhatapara Chhattisgarh.
                   Presently Posted As Constable.
                                                                                   ... Petitioner

                                                      versus

                   1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary, Department Of Home,
                   Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya, P.S. And Post - Rakhi, Atal Nagar Nawa
                   Raipur,             District           Raipur            Chhattisgarh

                   2 - Director, Director General Of Police (D.G.P.), Police Head Quarter
                   (P.H.Q.) Sector-19, Ps. And Post - Rakhi, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur,
                   District                      Raipur                       Chhattisgarh

                   3 - Chhattisgarh Professional Examination Board (Vyapam), Through
                   Secretary, Vyapam Bhavan, North Block, Sector -19, Nava Raipur, Atal
                   Nagar, District - Raipur, Chhattisgarh, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
                                                                               ... Respondents

For Petitioners : Mr. Shyam Kumar, Advocates

For Respondent : Dr. Saurabh Pandey, Dy. Advocate General and
Mr. Sanjeev Pandey, Dy. Advocate General
KISHORE
KUMAR
DESHMUKH

Digitally signed
Hon’ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas
by KISHORE
KUMAR
DESHMUKH
Date: 2025.03.11
Order on Board
16:37:13 +0530

11.03.2025

1. The default pointed out by the Registry is overruled.

2. The petitioner has filed the present review petition under Order

Section 114 of Civil Procedure Code being aggrieved by the
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impugned order dated 20.05.2024 (Annexure – P/1) passed in

WP(S) No. 3393 of 2023 for review of the order.

3. The Petitioner in review petition has contended that out of total 975

posts advertised by the State female candidates could have

applied for 728 posts only as the post of Platoon Commander was

exclusively reserved for male candidates and 30% of posts

reserved for female candidates is 218.40, as such only 4368

female candidates should have been selected for appearing in the

mains examination whereas after the order passed by this Court

on 20.05.2024 the respondents have initiated the proceedings

wherein they have called upon the candidates of ex-servicemen for

second stage of final selection process.

4. The learned counsel for the State opposing the submissions would

submit that the respondent State in pursuance of direction given in

the order dated 20.05.2024 by this Court have initiated the

proceedings and would submit that after following the reservation

roster as well as reservation given to the ex-servicemen and have

called the 370 male candidates who will find place next below the

list of candidates who have been called for second stage of

selection process and their physical proficiency test and interview

has been conducted, and results of the selected candidates are to

be issued in final stage. It has been further contended that in the

garb of clarification of the order, they are attempting a new case

and if any irregularity has been committed then it is for challenge

before the appropriate forum. It has been further submitted that

since this Court in its order has directed for additional 370 male
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candidates in the original candidates i.e 4755+370 which comes to

5125. Accordingly, after adding these 370 posts, 20 posts have to

be increased for ex-servicemen to maintain the quota of

reservation provides for ex-servicemen as per the rules, thus, they

have followed the due process of law and no illegality or

irregularity from the face of the record has been committed by

them to recall or review the order. Thus, no ground for review is

made out by the petitioner and would pray for rejection of review

petition with cost.

5. Considering the submissions that since reservation for woman

candidates in Platoon Commander post has been quashed by this

Court the post will be filled up by male candidates and it will be

proportionately distributed among the various categories including

the ex-servicemen, therefore, there is no apparent mistake on the

face of the record which has necessitated this Court to recall or

review the order. Even otherwise, law with regard to review and its

ground for review has been well settled by the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in catena of decisions. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case

of S. Tirupathi Rao vs. M. Lingamaiah decided on 22.07.2024

reported in MANU/SC/0727/2024 in paragraphs 11 to 17, 20 and

21 has held as under:-

“11. While proceeding to determine the correctness of the
impugned order vis-a-vis the exercise of review jurisdiction,
we ought to remind ourselves of certain cardinal principles.
The exercise of review jurisdiction is not an inherent power
given to the court; the power to review has to be specifically
conferred by law. In civil proceedings, review jurisdiction is
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governed by Section 114 read in conjunction with order XLVII
of the Code of Civil Procedure and the court has to be
certain that the elements prescribed therein are satisfied
before exercising such power. This Court in Kamlesh Verma
v. Mayawati MANU/SC/0810/2013 : 2013:INSC:526 : (2013)
8 SCC 320 has succintl observed that:

19. Review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and
have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of
Order 47 Rule 1 Code of Civil Procedure.

12. That the provisions contained in Section 114 and Order
XLVII of he Code of Civil Procedure relating to review of an
order or decree are mandatory in nature and any petition for
review not satisfying the rigours therein cannot be
entertained ex debito justitiate, by a court of law, is trite.

13. There is a plethora of decisions analysing the statutory
provisions governing the exercise of review jurisdiction;

however, we would be referring to a few of them for the
purpose of the present exercise. Suffice it to note that
despite legal proceedings having commenced with institution
of the civil suit as far back as in 1953, the present
controversy has, as its source, a writ petition between the
first Respondent and the Tahsildar preferred in 2009.
Although the explanation to Section 141 of the Code of Civil
Procedure makes it clear that provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure
would not apply to proceedings Under Article 226
of the Constitution, there is authority in abundance that the
principles flowing from the Code of Civil Procedure may
safely be taken as a guide to decide writ proceedings but to
the extent the same can be made applicable.

14. To put it plainly, Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure
provides three grounds for review:

1) discovery of new and important matter or evidence
which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within
the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by
the applicant at the time when the decree was passed,
or order made; or

2) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or

3) for any other sufficient reason, which must be
analogous to either of the aforesaid grounds.

15. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev.
Mar Paulose Athanasius MANU/SC/0003/1954
:

1954:INSC:72: AIR 1954 SC 526, this Court approved the
view that the third ground “any other sufficient cause” must
mean a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to
the first two grounds. The same view has been reiterated in
a recent decision of this Court in State (NCT of Delhi) v. K.L.
Rathi Steels Ltd. MANU/SC/0488/2024
. This Court affirmed
that the scope of the third ground had to be narrowly
construed so as to not traverse beyond the orbit of the first
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two grounds.

16. Since the Division Bench (review) invoked the first
clause, we hasten to emphasize that an applicant seeking
review on the basis of discovery of new evidence has to
demonstrate: first, that there has been discovery of new
evidence, of which he had no prior knowledge or that it could
not be produced at the time the decree was passed or the
order made despite due diligence; and secondly, that the
new evidence is material to the order/decree being reviewed
in the sense that if the evidence were produced in court
when the decree was passed or the order made, the
decision of the court would have been otherwise. Ultimately,
it is for the court to decide whether a review sought for by an
applicant, if granted, would prevent abuse of the process of
law and/or miscarriage of justice.

17. When the ground for review sought is that of discovery of
new evidence, this Court in State of West Bengal v. Kamal
Sengupta MANU/SC/3011/2008
: 2008:INSC:759: 2008) 8
SCC 612 has clarified that the same must be evidence which
should be materially important to the decision taken. The
following passage is instructive:

21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a
review is sought on the ground of discovery of new
matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be
relevant and must be of such a character that if the same
had been produced, it might have altered the judgment.

In other words, mere discovery of new or important
matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex
debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review
has also to show that such additional matter or evidence
was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise
of due diligence, the same could not be produced before
the court earlier.

20. This Court in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma V. Aribam
Pishak Sharma MANU/SC/0004/1979
: (1979) 4 SCC 389
while clarifying the ambit of the review jurisdiction has
categorically held that a decision cannot be reviewed merely
because it is erroneous on merits, since that would fall
squarely within the province of a court exercising appellate
jurisdiction.

21. In Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury
MANU/SC/0098/1995
: (1995) 1 SCC 170, this Court affirmed
the ratio in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma (supra) and further
expounded that review proceedings were not by way of an
appeal, and would have to be strictly confined to the scope
and ambit of Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Procedure
. It was further held that an error apparent on the
face of the record must be such an error which must strike
one on mere looking of the record, obviating the need for
long-drawn reasonings on two possible opinions.
This Court
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in Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik MANU/SC/8039/2006:

2006:INSC:159: (2006) 4 SCC 78, while reiterating the
decisions in Meera Bhanja (supra) and Aribam Tuleshwar
Sharma
(supra), drew out the narrow contours within which
review jurisdiction of this Court had to be exercised and held
that Order XLVII, Code of Civil Procedure does not allow for
the rehearing of a dispute merely because a party had not
highlighted all aspects of the case.”

6. Considering the facts of the case and also considering the law on

review, I am of the view that the petitioner is unable to point out any

apparent mistake on the face of the order passed by this Court

which may be a ground to review the order passed by this Court.

Thus, the review petition deserves to be dismissed and accordingly,

it is dismissed.

Sd/-

(Narendra Kumar Vyas)
Judge
Deshmukh

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