Chattisgarh High Court
Aniruddha Kumar Singh vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 13 February, 2025
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2025:CGHC:7667-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 1587 of 2022
Aniruddha Kumar Singh S/o Shri Rajendra Prasad Singh Aged About 31
Years R/o Main Road Tapkara, Tahsil Pharsabahar, District Jashpur (C.G.)
... Petitioner(s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Department Of Home, Mahanadi Bhawan,
Naya Raipur, District Raipur (C.G.)
2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Station House Officer, Police Station Tapkara,
District Jashpur (C.G.)
3 - Abc D/o Xyz
---- Respondents
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Ishwar Jaiswal, Advocate
For Respondents/State : Mr. Malay Kumar Jain, Panel Lawyer
For Respondent No.3 : None, though served.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Digitally Order on Board
signed by
VEDPRAKASH
DEWANGAN
2
Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.
13/02/2025
1. The present Criminal Miscellaneous Petition under Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been filed by the petitioner for
quashing of the FIR dated 19.02.2022 of Crime No. 25 of 2022
registered at Police Station Tapkara, District Jashpur (C.G.) for the
offence under Sections 376(2)(n), 312 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities)
Act, 1989 (in short ‘SC/ST Act’) and also challenged the charge-sheet
dated 11.03.2022 along with the charge framed against him for the
offence under Sections 376(2)(n), 312 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of
SC/ST Act with the following prayer in the petition :-
“3.1 That, the petitioner above named most
respectfully prays to this Hon’ble Court to call for
entire record pertaining to Special Case(SC/ST) No.
05/2022 (State of Chhattisgarh V/s Aniruddha Kumar
Singh), pending trial before the learned Special Judge,
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 Jashpur
(Chhattisgarh).
3.2 That, the petitioner above named most respectfully
prays to this Hon’ble Court to quash the FIR dated
19.2.2022 lodged at police station Tapkara, District
Jashpur (Chhattisgarh) for offence U/S.376 (2) (n), 312
of IPC and section 3 (2) (v) of Scheduled Castes and
the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,
1989 and Charge Sheet U/s 173 of Cr.P.C. dated
11.03.2022 contained in Annexure-P/1.
3.3 That, the petitioner above named most respectfully
prays to this Hon’ble Court to quash the charges
framed against the petitioner under the provisions of
3
the Cr.P.C. for an alleged offense offence U/S.376 (2)
(n), 312 of IPC and section 3 (2) (v) of Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act, 1989 contained in Annexure-P/3.
3.4 That, the petitioner above named most respectfully
prays to this Hon’ble Court to set aside the criminal
proceedings in connection with Special Case (SC/ST)
No. 05/2022 (State of Chhattisgarh V/s Aniruddha
Kumar Singh), pending trial before the learned Special
Judge, Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 Jashpur
(Chhattisgarh) against the petitioner.
3.5 Any other relief, which this Hon’ble Court deems fit
and proper, may also kindly be granted to the
petitioner, in the interest of justice. An affidavit is filed
herewith”
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is an accused in the
aforesaid offence of Crime No. 25 of 2022, registered at Police Station
Tapkara for the aforesaid offences. The victim/respondent No.3 has
lodged a written report to the police on 19.02.2022 with the allegation
that she is working as Anganbadi Karyakarta since 2011 and the
present petitioner has committed rape upon her on 10.06.2018 on the
pretext of marriage. He regularly given some amount to her for house
hold expenses and also gave gifts time to time. After sometime when
she conceived pregnancy, he administered the abortion pills.
Whenever she asked him to marry with her, he evaded since last 4
years. On 18.02.2022, he performed marriage with another girl,
therefore, she lodged the report. The FIR has been registered against
the petitioner on 19.02.2022 and after investigation and recording
statement of the witnesses, charge-sheet has been filed before the
learned trial Court on 11.03.2022 for the offence under Sections 376(2)
4
(n), 312 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act. The learned trial
Court has taken cognizance and framed charge on 09.05.2022, which
are under challenge in the present petition.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the victim has not
stated anything in her written complaint nor her statement that she
was sexually abused by the appellant against her will or consent.
Rather, it appears from the written complaint and the police statement
that their relationship was consensual, which continued for about 3-4
years. There is no any date mentioned as to when the petitioner has
denied for marriage and it is only when the petitioner has performed
marriage, she lodged the report against him. From the complaint itself,
it appears that the petitioner has provided some money to her for
domestic expenses and therefore, with the mala fide intention and with
oblique motive, she lodged the report against the petitioner.
He would further submit that since the victim was getting benefit
from the petitioner, either monetary or others, she involved in
relationship with the petitioner for a long time i.e. about 4 years and
when the petitioner married with another girl, she lodged the report.
Continuation of the sexual relationship for about 4 years would not
amount to rape. There is no ingredients that the petitioner has made a
false promise of marriage.
He would also submit that from the 164 CRPC statement of the
victim, it is quite clear that petitioner was also wanted to marry with
her, but it is their father who was not agree with their relationship and
for that reason, marriage could not be settled between them and thus,
5
the ingredients of the offence of rape is missing in the present case and
in view of their long relationship, no offence of rape is prima facie
appears to be made out to proceed with the trial of the case.
He would further submit that casual statement has been made by
the victim that when she conceived pregnancy, the abortion pills was
administered by the petitioner. There is no date and month has been
mentioned, there is no medical report with respect to her pregnancy
and absolutely no evidence except the bald statement of the victim that
she conceived pregnancy and the petitioner administered pills for
abortion, no offence of Section 312 of IPC is prima facie made out.
4. With regard to Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act, it is submitted that the
alleged offence is not made out against the petitioner as the
relationship between them was consensual and this offence is not a
substantive offence in itself. He would further contend that in the
absence of any offence under Sections 376, 312 of the IPC, no offence
under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act is made out.
5. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgment
of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Haji Iqbal Alias Bala
versus State of UP and others, Criminal Appeal No. 2343 of 2023
arising out of SLP Criminal No. 2988 of 2023 decided on 08.08.2023,
where it has been held that the Court while exercising its jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution of
India need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is
empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to
the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in
the course of investigation, and therefore, the petitioner is entitled for
6
discharge from the alleged offences and the impugned FIR is also liable
to be quashed.
6. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State vehemently
opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner
and has submitted that after investigation, charge sheet has been filed
and charges have been framed. There are sufficient evidence against
the petitioner to proceed with the trial of the case and the nature of
dispute in the present case requires complete trial. Whether or not the
victim was allured and subjected to sexually exploited on the pretext of
marriage, has to be determined after recording evidence of the parties.
At the stage of framing of charge or considering the petition under
Section 482 of CRPC for quashing of the FIR, the Court is not required
to meticulously examine the evidence, but only prima facie material is to
be seen to satisfy the existence of sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused. There is sufficient prima facie evidence available
in the charge sheet against the petitioner and his petition is liable to be
dismissed.
7. A notice was issued to the respondent No.3, but despite of service of
notice upon her, no one is appeared nor any representation has been
made on her behalf.
8. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
available in the case.
9. In the matter of Haji Iqbal Alias Bala (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme
Court has considered the scope of interference in exercise of inherent
powers under Section 482 of the CRPC or extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to get the FIR or criminal
7
proceedings quashed. In Para 14 of its judgment, the Hon’ble
Supreme Court has held that :
“14. At this stage, we would like to observe something
important. Whenever an accused comes before the
Court invoking either the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC)
or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings
quashed essentially on the ground that such
proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or
instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking
vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes
a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more
closely. We say so because once the complainant
decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior
motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he
would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well
drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The
complainant would ensure that the averments made in
the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence.
Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to
look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint
alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the
necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence
are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious
proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many
other attending circumstances emerging from the
record of the case over and above the averments and,
if need be, with due care and circumspection try to
read in between the lines. The Court while exercising
its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article
226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to
the stage of a case but is empowered to take into
account the overall circumstances leading to the
initiation/registration of the case as well as the
materials collected in the course of investigation. Take
for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been
registered over a period of time. It is in the background
8of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs
assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of
wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge
as alleged.”
10. In the matter of Uday v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2003) 4 SCC
46, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with Sections 375 & 90
and 376 of the IPC held in Para 23 and 25 as under :
“23. Keeping in view the approach that the Court must
adopt in such cases, we shall now proceed to consider
the evidence on record. In the instant case, the
prosecutrix was a grown up girl studying in a college.
She was deeply in love with the appellant. She was
however aware of the fact that since they belonged to
different castes, marriage was not possible. In any
event the proposal for their marriage was bound to be
seriously opposed by their family members. She
admits having told so to the appellant when he
proposed to her the first time. She had sufficient
intelligence to understand the significance and moral
quality of the act she was consenting to. That is why
she kept it a secret as long as she could. Despite this,
she did not resist the overtures of the appellant, and in
fact succumbed to it. She thus freely exercised a
choice between resistance and assent. She must have
known the consequences of the act, particularly when
she was conscious of the fact that their marriage may
not take place at all on account of caste
considerations. All these circumstances lead us to the
conclusion that she freely, voluntarily, and consciously
consented to having sexual intercourse with the
appellant, and her consent was not in consequence of
any misconception of fact.
25.There is yet another difficulty which faces the
prosecution in this case. In a case of this nature two
conditions must be fulfilled for the application of
Section 90 IPC. Firstly, it must be shown that the
consent was given under a misconception of fact.
9
Secondly, it must be proved that the person who
obtained the consent knew, or had reason to believe
that the consent was given in consequence of such
misconception. We have serious doubts that the
promise to marry induced the prosecutrix to consent to
having sexual intercourse with the appellant. She
knew, as we have observed earlier, that her marriage
with the appellant was difficult on account of caste
considerations. The proposal was bound to meet with
stiff opposition from members of both families. There
was therefore a distinct possibility, of which she was
clearly conscious, that the marriage may not take place
at all despite the promise of the appellant. The question
still remains whether even if it were so, the appellant
knew, or had reason to believe, that the prosecutrix
had consented to having sexual intercourse with him
only as a consequence of her belief, based on his
promise, that they will get married in due course. There
is hardly any evidence to prove this fact. On the
contrary the circumstances of the case tend to support
the conclusion that the appellant had reason to believe
that the consent given by the prosecutrix was the
result of their deep love for each other. It is not
disputed that they were deeply in love. They met often,
and it does appear that the prosecutrix permitted him
liberties which, if at all, is permitted only to a person
with whom one is in deep love. It is also not without
significance that the prosecutrix stealthily went out
with the appellant to a lonely place at 12 O’clock in the
night. It usually happens in such cases, when two
young persons are madly in love, that they promise to
each other several times that come what may, they will
get married. As stated by the prosecutrix the appellant
also made such a promise on more than one occasion.
In such circumstances the promise loses all
significance, particularly when they are over come with
emotions and passion and find themselves in
situations and circumstances where they, in a weak
moment, succumb to the temptation of having sexual
relationship. This is what appears to have happened in
this case as well, and the prosecutrix willingly
10consented to having sexual intercourse with the
appellant with whom she was deeply in love, not
because he promised to marry her, but because she
also desired it. In these circumstances it would be very
difficult to impute to the appellant knowledge that the
prosecutrix had consented in consequence of a
misconception of fact arising from his promise. In any
event, it was not possible for the appellant to know
what was in the mind of the prosecutrix when she
consented, because there were more reasons than one
for her to consent. ”
11. In the matter of Dr. Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar v. State of
Maharashtra reported in (2019) 18 SCC 191, the Hon’ble Supreme
Court in Para 15, 23 and 24 held as under :
“15. Section 375 defines the offence of rape and
enumerates six descriptions of the offence. The first
clause operates where the women is in possession of
her senses and, therefore, capable of consenting but
the act is done against her will and the second where it
is done without her consent; the third, fourth and fifth
when there is consent but it is not such a consent as
excuses the offender, because it is obtained by putting
her, or any person in whom she is interested, in fear of
death or of hurt. The expression “against her ‘will'”
means that the act must have been done in spite of the
opposition of the woman. An inference as to consent
can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities
of the case. “Consent” is also stated to be an act of
reason coupled with deliberation. It denotes an active
will in mind of a person to permit the doing of the act
complained of.
Section 90 of the IPC defines “consent” known to be
given under fear or misconception:-
“Section 90: Consent known to be given under fear or
mis- conception.–A consent is not such a consent as it
intended by any section of this Code, if the con- sent is
11given by a person under fear of injury, or under a
misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act
knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was
given in consequence of such fear or misconception”
Thus, Section 90 though does not define “consent”, but
describes what is not “consent”. Consent may be
express or implied, coerced or misguided, obtained
willingly or through deceit. If the consent is given by
the complainant under misconception of fact, it is
vitiated. Consent for the purpose of Section 375
requires voluntary participation not only after the
exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the
significance and moral quality of the act, but also after
having fully exercised the choice between resistance
and assent. Whether there was any consent or not is to
be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant
circumstances.
23. Thus, there is a clear distinction between rape and
consensual sex. The court, in such cases, must very
carefully examine whether the complainant had actually
wanted to marry the victim or had mala fide motives
and had made a false promise to this effect only to
satisfy his lust, as the later falls within the ambit of
cheating or deception. There is also a distinction
between mere breach of a promise and not fulfilling a
false promise. If the accused has not made the promise
with the sole intention to seduce the prosecutrix to
indulge in sexual acts, such an act would not amount to
rape. There may be a case where the prosecutrix agrees
to have sexual intercourse on account of her love and
passion for the accused and not solely on account of
the misconception created by accused, or where an
accused, on account of circumstances which he could
not have foreseen or which were beyond his control,
was unable to marry her despite having every intention
to do. Such cases must be treated differently. If the
complainant had any mala fide intention and if he had
clandestine motives, it is a clear case of rape. The
acknowledged consensual physical relationship
12
between the parties would not constitute an offence
under Section 376 of the IPC.
24. In the instant case, it is an admitted position that the
appellant was serving as a Medical Officer in the
Primary Health Centre and the complainant was
working as an Assistant Nurse in the same health
centre and that the is a widow. It was alleged by her that
the appellant informed her that he is a married man and
that he has differences with his wife. Admittedly, they
belong to different communities. It is also alleged that
the accused/appellant needed a month’s time to get
their marriage registered. The complainant further
states that she had fallen in love with the appellant and
that she needed a companion as she was a widow. She
has specifically stated that “as I was also a widow and I
was also in need of a companion, I agreed to his
proposal and since then we were having love affair and
accordingly we started residing together. We used to
reside sometimes at my home whereas some time at his
home.” Thus, they were living together, sometimes at
her house and sometimes at the residence of the
appellant. They were in a relationship with each other
for quite some time and enjoyed each other’s company.
It is also clear that they had been living as such for
quite some time together. When she came to know that
the appellant had married some other woman, she
lodged the complaint. It is not her case that the
complainant has forcibly raped her. She had taken a
conscious decision after active application of mind to
the things that had happened. It is not a case of a
passive submission in the face of any psychological
pressure exerted and there was a tacit consent and the
tacit consent given by her was not the result of a
misconception created in her mind. We are of the view
that, even if the allegations made in the complaint are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety,
they do not make out a case against the appellant. We
are also of the view that since complainant has failed to
prima facie show the commission of rape, the complaint
13
registered under Section 376(2)(b) cannot be
sustained.”
12. In the matter of Sonu @ Subhas Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh
reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 181, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in
Para 7 held as under:-
“7. On the basis of the rival submissions and with the
assistance of the counsel, we have perused the FIR.
The FIR specifically records that the second
respondent had developed a friendship with the
appellant and that he had assured that he would marry
her. The FIR then records that the appellant and the
second respondent developed a physical relationship
which spread over a period of one and a half years,
during the course of which the second respondent
conversed with the parents and sister of the appellant.
It has been alleged in the FIR that the parents of the
appellant were agreeable to the couple getting married.
As a matter of fact, the appellant returned to his home
town at Jhansi on 5 January 2018 when he had made a
phone call to her stating that she should come and visit
him so that they can get married. On travelling to
Jhansi at the behest of the appellant, the second
respondent was informed by the father of the appellant
that the appellant did not wish to marry her. The
contents of the statement under Section 164 of CrPC
also indicate that the second respondent had
“voluntarily developed relationship of husband-wife
with him”. The second respondent has then stated that
“now, he and his family members are refusing to marry
with me”. The second respondent has further stated
that “my sole grievance is that Sonu is refusing to
marry with me.”
13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Shambhu Kharwar v.
State of Uttar Pradesh reported in 2022 SCC Online SC 1032 in para
12 held as under:-
14
“12. In the present case, the issue which had to be
addressed by the High Court was whether, assuming all
the allegations in the charge-sheet are correct as they
stand, an offence punishable under Section 376 IPC
was made out. Admittedly, the appellant and the second
respondent were in a consensual relationship from
2013 until December 2017. They are both educated
adults. The second respondent, during the course of
this period, got married on 12 June 2014 to someone
else. The marriage ended in a decree of divorce by
mutual consent on 17 September 2017. The allegations
of the second respondent indicate that her relationship
with the appellant continued prior to her marriage,
during the subsistence of the marriage and after the
grant of divorce by mutual consent.”
14. With regard to Section 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(v)(a) SC/ST Act, in the matter
of Shaju Thomas v. Sub Inspector of Police reported in 2019 SCC
OnLine Ker 23039 the High Court of Kerala held that :
“…. Accordingly it is only to be held that since the
sexual incidents have happened only on the basis of
voluntary and consensual sexual relationship between
the petitioner and the 2 respondent, none of the vital
ingredients of the offence of rape as per Section 375 of
IPC are made out in this case. Since that is the position,
the offence as per Section 3(2) (v) of SC/ST (POA) Act,
which is not an independent substantive offence will
also crumble to the ground. The offence as per Section
3(2)(v) of the SC/ST (POA) Act is relating to commission
of an offence as per the IPC, which is included in the
schedule to the SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989. Section 3(2)(v)
of the SC/ST (POA) Act, 1989 stipulates that whoever
not being a member of SC/ST, commits any offence
under the IPC punishable with imprisonment for a term
of ten years or more against a person or property
knowing that such person is a member of SC/ST or
such property belongs to such member shall be
punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine etc.
So in the instant case, the gravamen of the allegation in
15relation to the offence as per Section 3(2)(v) of the said
Act is that as the petitioner has committed the offence
of rape as per Section 375 of IPC and that he has also
incidentally committed the offence as per Section 3(2)
(v) of the above said Act, as R-2 (alleged victim)
belongs to SC community. Since the prosecution for the
offence of rape has no legs to stand, it goes without
saying that equally the offence as per Section 3(2)(v) of
the said Act would also fall to the ground…..”
15. In the matter of Narain Trivedi and others v. State of UP reported in
2009 SCC OnLine All 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in para-9 held as
under:-
“9. As would appear from the language used by the
Legislature in section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act, it is clear that
this section does not constitute any substantive
offence and if any person not being a member of a
Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe commits any
offence under the Penal Code, 1860 punishable with
imprisonment for a term of ten years or more against a
person or property on the ground that such person is a
member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or such
property belongs to such member, then enhanced
punishment of life imprisonment would be awarded in
such case, meaning thereby that conviction and
sentence under section 3(2)(v) SC/ST, Act simplicitor is
not permissible and in cases where an offence under
the Penal Code, 1860 punishable with imprisonment for
a term of ten years or more is committed against a
person or property on the ground that such person is a
member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe or
such property belongs to such member, then in such
case the accused will be convicted and sentenced for
the offence under Penal Code, 1860 read with Section
3(2)(v) SC/ST Act with imprisonment for life and also
with fine. Therefore, in the present case, the appellants
could not be convicted and sentenced under section
3(2)(v) SC/ST Act simplicitor.”
16
16. From perusal of the material available in the charge sheet, it is clearly
seen that there is no material except the statement of the victim. There
was a promise to marriage by the petitioner and intentionally in order
to get benefit, the petitioner maintained relations with her. But from the
very beginning, facts of marriage and caste were known to him. It also
reflects that the petitioner and the victim were in relationship for about
4 years and during that period, the allegation of pregnancy was also
levelled, but subsequently aborted by the petitioner. However, there is
no material or document to establish such allegation. It is also
complained by the victim that the petitioner had provided monetary
benefit and gifts to her time to time to meet her routine expenses. The
victim is a member of scheduled caste, which is not disputed, and at
the relevant time, she was 30 years of age. She is working as
Anganbadi Karyakarta, whereas the petitioner was aged about 31
years, and both fell in love and entered into love relation. The victim
had made a conscious decision after active application of mind to the
things that had happened. It is not a case of a passive submission in
the face of any psychological pressure exerted, and there was a tacit
consent, which was not the result of a misconception created in her
mind.
Further, it is also noticeable that there was no previous enmity
between their family members. Therefore, it cannot be presumed that
the petitioner made a physical relation with the victim just to deceive
her.
17
17. From perusal of the FIR and its contents and also from the perusal of
the statement of the victim and witnesses recorded under Section 161
of CRPC, and the statement of the victim recorded under Section 164
of CRPC, it appears that it is a case of consensual relationship, as
both of them came in contact since 2018. They were in a relationship
with each other for about 4 years and enjoyed each other’s company.
The victim is a well-educated lady, who knows the pros and cons of
such a relationship and entered into it with wide and open eyes based
on her consent and volition. Under the indisputable factual position in
the case, it cannot be held that the consent of the victim was obtained
on the basis of the misconception of fact or fraud.
18. With regard to the offence of atrocities, it is held in the case of Shaju
Thomas (supra) and Narain Trivedi (supra) that the offences under
Sections 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act are not substantive offences, even
though the Sections 376 and 376 (2)(n) of the IPC are not scheduled
offences. There is no allegation that the petitioner entered into the
relationship with the victim only on the ground that she belongs to the
Scheduled Tribes community though according to the final report, he
was aware of the caste of the victim and both agreed to a consensual
relationship on account of love and affection. However, at the cost of
repetition, it is pertinent to note here that there is no evidence to show
that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was
a member of the Scheduled Tribes community. The offences
punishable under Sections 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act will not be
attracted automatically just because the victim belongs to the specified
community.
18
19. With regard to Section 312 of the IPC, in the present case, there is
little evidence to establish that the petitioner had caused the victim to
miscarry. No material has been brought on record to establish the
allegation of abortion of the pregnancy. In the statement recorded
under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., there is an allegation with regard to
pregnancy and abortion but in the absence of any medical report, it
cannot be said that the petitioner played an active role in abortion. The
essential ingredient of Section 312 I.P.C. is ‘causing miscarriage
without woman’s consent’. Thus, apart from the victim stating so, there
is no evidence whatsoever to establish that the petitioner had
committed the said offence. On a prima facie consideration, this Court
comes to the conclusion that Section 312 of the Indian Penal Code is
not attracted in the instant case.
20. From the overall consideration of the material available in the charge
sheet and also in the light of the aforesaid judgments, we are of the
considered view that if the contents of the FIR and subsequent charge
sheet are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, they
do not make out the offences under Sections 376(2)(n), 312 of IPC
and Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act against the petitioner.
21. For the foregoing reasons, the present petition is allowed and the FIR
of Crime No. 25 of 2022 registered at Police Station Tapkara for the
offence under Sections 376(2)(n), 312 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of
SC/ST Act is hereby quashed. Consequently, the charges framed
against the petitioner on 09.05.2022 for the offence under Sections
376(2)(n), 312 of IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act are also
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quashed. Consequently, the proceedings of the Special Case (SC/ST)
No. 5 of 2022 pending before the learned Special Judge, Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989,
Jashpur is also quashed.
22. A copy of this order be forwarded to the trial Court for necessary steps
and information.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
ved