Delhi High Court
M/S Pc Jain Textile Pvt Ltd Through Its … vs Sh. Shyam Sunder Suri And Anr on 12 March, 2025
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on: 24thJanuary, 2025
Pronounced on: 12th March,2025
+ CS(COMM) 560/2023&I.A. No. 31874/2024
M/S PC JAIN TEXTILE PVT LTD THROUGH ITS
AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE .....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Harender Kr Sangwan & Mr.
Vidit Garg, Advocates
versus
SH. SHYAM SUNDER SURI AND ANR .....Defendants
Through: Mr. Prateek Jain and Mr. Vardaan
Mishra, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
JUDGMENT
ANISH DAYAL, J.
I.A. No. 31874/2024 (under Order XXXVII R 3(5) of CPC seeking leave
to defend)
1. This application has been filed under Order XXXVII Rule 3 (5) of
the Civil Code of Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC‘) seeking leave to defend on
behalf of defendants.
2. The suit was filed under Order XXXVII of CPC by plaintiff
seeking rendition of accounts with respect to contractual amounts due
under lease deed dated 6th April 2016, recovery of money due and
interest payable.
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3. The defendants were served summons for judgment on 11th May
2024 at their residence and the present application seeking leave to
defend is filed within the statutory period of 10 days.
4. Plaintiff claims to be the owner of built-up property bearing
number 26/1, 26/17 and 26/18, Najafgarh Road, Shivaji Marg, Moti
Nagar, New Delhi-110015 (‘suit property’), consisting of basement with
total carpet area of 2,500 square feet approximately, ground floor and
first floor with total carpet area of 15,000 square feet; and second floor.
5. In February 2016, defendant Nos.1 & 2 approached plaintiff for
taking the basement, ground floor and first floor on rent for commercial
purposes of running a banquet hall or restaurant. Defendants were
engaged in the business of hospitality and were running the business
under name and style of M/s Krishna Hospitality.
6. A lease deed dated 6th April 2016 was executed between the
parties qua ground floor and first floor of the said property; was duly
registered in the office of Sub Registrar II, Basai Darapur, New Delhi
(‘lease deed-I’). This was for a period of 8 years w.e.f. 01st May 2016 till
01st May 2024, with a lock in period of 5 years, monthly rent of Rs. 5
lacs, inclusive of tax rent to be paid on 10th of each calendar month and
15% escalation after the expiry of first 3 years and thereafter, every two
years.
7. Another lease deed dated 6th April 2016 was executed between the
parties, leasing out the basement of the property (‘lease deed-II’). This
lease deed was not registered and the registration was delayed on one
pretext or the other. Lease deed-II stipulated a lock in period of 5 years,
monthly rent of Rs. 2 lacs per month inclusive of tax, rent to be paid on
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10th of each calendar month, monthly rent with 15% escalation after the
expiry of first three years and then then after every two years.
8. After carrying out the fit-out work, defendants commenced a
banquet hall in the name ‘Coral Bells’ conjointly on the basement,
ground floor and first floor. Plaintiff claims that after the tenancy,
defendants started committing default in making payment of monthly
rent on time and that some of the cheques issued by defendants towards
payment of monthly rent, got dishonoured upon presentation.
9. As per clause 2 of lease deed-I, plaintiff was entitled to recover an
amount of Rs. 1,000/- as cheque bouncing charges and subsequent delay
charges of Rs. 2,000/- per day, till the amounts were paid up.
10. As per clause 2 of lease deed-II, plaintiff was entitled to recover
an amount of Rs.1,000/- as cheque bouncing charges and subsequent
delay charges at Rs. 5,000/- per day, till the deficiency was made up.
11. As per clause 8(k) of both the lease deeds, default in payment of
rent for more than two consecutive months, would trigger termination.
12. Plaintiff issued legal notice dated 25th April 2018 terminating the
lease deeds, calling upon defendants to vacate the property and pay the
rent and other charges. A reply was sent by defendants, however, they
refused to comply. Plaintiff claims that defendants continued to remain
in illegal possession and thereafter, plaintiff sold off the premises on 9th
August 2021.
13. It is also noted that defendants have handed over possession in
2021 itself. The claim, therefore, is for rental dues, mesne profits,
liquidated damages and calculated damages for the period up till 2021,
when plaintiff gave up the ownership.
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Submissions by counsel for parties
14. The defendants alleged that the plaint is not maintainable on the
following grounds:
14.1 The lease deed was of 2016 and was allegedly terminated in 2018.
The suit was filed in 2023, which is barred under limitation. Defendants
submit that the cause of action, even as per plaint, first arose on 6th April
2016 when the parties entered into a lease and on all the dates
subsequently, when defendants failed to make the payment of rent.
14.2 Legal notice was issued on 25th April 2018, when the cause of
action again arose. Plaintiff, however, claims that a suit was filed in 2019
for recovery of arrears of rent, which was withdrawn with liberty to
claim the entire contractual dues. The said withdrawal was before the
District Judge (Commercial), West, Tis Hazari Courts and was recorded
by order dated 23rd October 2021. From 2019 onwards, there were some
part payments and till the defendants continued to be in possession i.e.
2021, the cause of action would still arise. After the withdrawal of the
suit on 23rd October 2021, mediation proceedings continued between the
parties under Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act 2015 from 7th
February 2022 to 25th January 2023. Present suit, was filed on 5th July
2023, after removing objections.
14.3 Defendants further claim, that the claim in the suit by plaintiff is
about Rs. 8.75 crores and only Rs. 1,200/- towards court fee have been
paid. Reference is made to ‘prayer b’ of the suit which seeks a money
decree for contractual amount due and payable as per the lease deeds, in
favour of plaintiff. However, plaintiff, has chosen not to determine the
said amount, though has done valuation of the suit at Rs. 8.7 crores in
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para 28 of the plaint. Even, as per the plaint, this amount was a
determined amount, based on the contract and, therefore, plaintiff was
obliged to pay the requisite court fees on the full and correct valuation.
14.4 Defendants submitted that lease deed-II, relating to the basement,
was unregistered and while raising an objection under Section 17 of the
Registration Act, 1908 (‘Registration Act‘), which mandates that leases
of immovable property for any term exceeding one year, have to be
registered compulsorily.
15. Plaintiff refutes the same, submitting that they are seeking
recovery of arrears of rent and damages for breach of terms and
conditions of the lease agreement and not exerting any rights over
immovable property. Reliance is placed on proviso to Section 49 of the
Registration Act, providing that an unregistered document affecting a
movable property may be received as evidence of a contract in a suit for
specific performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or as evidence
of any collateral transaction not required to be affected by the registered
instrument. In any event, defendants’ claim would require substantial
evidence to be led, in order to defeat the claim of plaintiff.
16. Defendants’ counsel adverted to termination notice dated 25th
April 2018, which in clause 3 stated that, the tenancy was for a period of
8 years and as per clause 5, sought to terminate the tenancy. In the reply
to the said legal notice, it was clearly stated that there was a lock in
period of 5 years w.e.f. 01st May 2016 till 30th April 2021. The question
of terminating tenancy, when there was no violation of terms and
conditions of the agreement, did not arise.
17. Plaintiff in its reply to the present application, has admitted the
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exact reiteration of clauses of lease deeds entered between the parties, by
defendants in its application, thereby agreeing to the lock in period of 5
years, as well.
18. Defendants claimed that the notice which was sent by plaintiff, did
not state as to which of the grounds in clause 8(k) of the lease deed were
not complied with and notice was, therefore, defective for being vague
and non-specific. He also submitted that as per clause 8(k) of the said
agreement, plaintiff was required to send a written intimation of 15 days,
thereby giving defendants a time period of 15 days to cure such breach.
However, plaintiffs straight away sent a termination notice upon
defendants.
19. To this, plaintiff has stated that several reminders were sent by
plaintiff to defendants on WhatsApp, before legal notice was issued
terminating the lease deed. Plaintiff has also filed the WhatsApp chats
along with additional documents, requesting defendants to clear five
months of pending dues.
20. As per defendants, just before termination, notice had been sent,
the bank account which has been produced by defendants, shows that
there have been payments of Rs. 3,00,000/- and Rs. 2,40,000/- on 16th
April 2018 and 19th April 2018, respectively. The question of non-
compliance therefore, did not arise. The bank statement was in fact,
appended to an email dated 4th May 2019 by the accountant of plaintiff
to the CA of the defendants.
21. To this, plaintiff stated that both the lease deeds have been
admitted, as well as the amounts due. The question of part payment prior
to the legal notice being sent would not be relevant, as far as the
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application for leave to defend is concerned.
22. Defendant stated that the earlier suit was filed for precisely the
same reliefs but was withdrawn. The lease was based on an unregistered
deed and, therefore, the issue of termination would not arise.
23. Lease deed stated that in the event of sale or transfer or disposal, it
will be subject to the rights of the lessee under lease deed; the lessee will
have no right to object in any manner with such sale and or transfer.
24. The defendant has relied upon the decisions in B.L. Kashyap &
Sons Ltd. v JMS Steels & Power Corporation & Anr. (2022) 3 SCC 294
and K.B. Saha & Sons (P) Ltd. v Development Consultant Ltd. (2008) 8
SCC 564.
25. B.L. Kashyap (supra) reiterates the principles, that grant of leave
to defend is the ordinary rule and denial of leave to defend is an
exception. Generally, the prayer for leave defend is to be denied in cases
where the defendant practically has no defence and is unable to give out
even a semblance of triable issues before the court. In this regard, the
Court’s observations are extracted as under:
“33. It is at once clear that even though in IDBI
Trusteeship [IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v.
Hubtown Ltd., (2017) 1 SCC 568 : (2017) 1 SCC (Civ)
386] , this Court has observed that the principles
stated in para 8 of Mechelec Engineers case [Mechelec
Engineers & Manufacturers v. Basic Equipment
Corpn., (1976) 4 SCC 687] shall stand superseded in
the wake of amendment of Rule 3 of Order 37 but, on
the core theme, the principles remain the same that
grant of leave to defend (with or without conditions) is
the ordinary rule; and denial of leave to defend is an
exception. Putting it in other words, generally, the
prayer for leave to defend is to be denied in such cases
where the defendant has practically no defence and is
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unable to give out even a semblance of triable issues
before the court.
33.1. As noticed, if the defendant satisfies the Court
that he has substantial defence i.e. a defence which is
likely to succeed, he is entitled to unconditional leave
to defend. In the second eventuality, where the
defendant raises triable issues indicating a fair or
bona fide or reasonable defence, albeit not a positively
good defence, he would be ordinarily entitled to
unconditional leave to defend. In the third eventuality,
where the defendant raises triable issues, but it
remains doubtful if the defendant is raising the same in
good faith or about genuineness of the issues, the trial
court is expected to balance the requirements of
expeditious disposal of commercial causes on one hand
and of not shutting out triable issues by unduly severe
orders on the other. Therefore, the trial court may
impose conditions both as to time or mode of trial as
well as payment into the court or furnishing security.
In the fourth eventuality, where the proposed defence
appears to be plausible but improbable, heightened
conditions may be imposed as to the time or mode of
trial as also of payment into the court or furnishing
security or both, which may extend to the entire
principal sum together with just and requisite interest.
33.2. Thus, it could be seen that in the case of
substantial defence, the defendant is entitled to
unconditional leave; and even in the case of a triable
issue on a fair and reasonable defence, the defendant is
ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave to defend. In
case of doubts about the intent of the defendant or
genuineness of the triable issues as also the probability
of defence, the leave could yet be granted but while
imposing conditions as to the time or mode of trial or
payment or furnishing security. Thus, even in such
cases of doubts or reservations, denial of leave to
defend is not the rule; but appropriate conditions may
be imposed while granting the leave. It is only in the
case where the defendant is found to be having noSignature Not Verified
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substantial defence and/or raising no genuine triable
issues coupled with the court’s view that the defence is
frivolous or vexatious that the leave to defend is to be
refused and the plaintiff is entitled to judgment
forthwith. Of course, in the case where any part of the
amount claimed by the plaintiff is admitted by the
defendant, leave to defend is not to be granted unless
the amount so admitted is deposited by the defendant in
the court.
33.3. Therefore, while dealing with an application
seeking leave to defend, it would not be a correct
approach to proceed as if denying the leave is the rule
or that the leave to defend is to be granted only in
exceptional cases or only in cases where the defence
would appear to be a meritorious one. Even in the case
of raising of triable issues, with the defendant
indicating his having a fair or reasonable defence, he
is ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave to defend
unless there be any strong reason to deny the leave. It
gets perforce reiterated that even if there remains a
reasonable doubt about the probability of defence,
sterner or higher conditions as stated above could be
imposed while granting leave but, denying the leave
would be ordinarily countenanced only in such cases
where the defendant fails to show any genuine triable
issue and the court finds the defence to be frivolous or
vexatious.”
(emphasis added)
26. The Court in B.L. Kashyap (supra) relied upon the principles laid
down in IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v Hubtown Ltd. (2017) 1 SCC
568, in which it was stated as under:
“17. Accordingly, the principles stated in para 8 of
Mechelec case [Mechelec Engineers & Manufacturers
v. Basic Equipment Corpn., (1976) 4 SCC 687] will
now stand superseded, given the amendment of Order
37 Rule 3 and the binding decision of four Judges inSignature Not Verified
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Milkhiram case [Milkhiram (India) (P) Ltd. v.
Chamanlal Bros., AIR 1965 SC 1698 : (1966) 68 Bom
LR 36] , as follows:
17.1. If the defendant satisfies the court that he has a
substantial defence, that is, a defence that is likely to
succeed, the plaintiff is not entitled to leave to sign
judgment, and the defendant is entitled to
unconditional leave to defend the suit.
17.2. If the defendant raises triable issues indicating
that he has a fair or reasonable defence, although not
a positively good defence, the plaintiff is not entitled to
sign judgment, and the defendant is ordinarily entitled
to unconditional leave to defend.
17.3. Even if the defendant raises triable issues, if a
doubt is left with the trial Judge about the defendant’s
good faith, or the genuineness of the triable issues, the
trial Judge may impose conditions both as to time or
mode of trial, as well as payment into court or
furnishing security. Care must be taken to see that the
object of the provisions to assist expeditious disposal
of commercial causes is not defeated. Care must also
be taken to see that such triable issues are not shut out
by unduly severe orders as to deposit or security.
17.4. If the defendant raises a defence which is
plausible but improbable, the trial Judge may impose
conditions as to time or mode of trial, as well as
payment into court, or furnishing security. As such a
defence does not raise triable issues, conditions as to
deposit or security or both can extend to the entire
principal sum together with such interest as the court
feels the justice of the case requires.
17.5. If the defendant has no substantial defence and/or
raises no genuine triable issues, and the court finds
such defence to be frivolous or vexatious, then leave to
defend the suit shall be refused, and the plaintiff is
entitled to judgment forthwith.
17.6. If any part of the amount claimed by the plaintiff
is admitted by the defendant to be due from him, leave
to defend the suit, (even if triable issues or aSignature Not Verified
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substantial defence is raised), shall not be granted
unless the amount so admitted to be due is deposited by
the defendant in court.”
(emphasis added)
27. In K.B. Saha (supra), it was held by the Supreme Court that
documents required to be registered if unregistered, are not admissible in
evidence and can, however, be used for collateral purpose. The collateral
transaction must be independent of, or divisible from, the transaction to
effect which the law required registration and if a document is
inadmissible in evidence, none of its terms can be admitted in evidence.
The observations of the Court in extenso are as under: –
33. In Rana Vidya Bhushan Singh v. Ratiram [(1969) 1 UJ
86 (SC)] the following has been laid down:
“A document required by law to be registered, if
unregistered, is inadmissible as evidence of a
transaction affecting immovable property, but it may
be admitted as evidence of collateral facts, or for
any collateral purpose, that is for any purpose other
than that of creating, declaring, assigning, limiting
or extinguishing a right to immovable property. As
stated by Mulla in his Indian Registration Act, 7th
Edn., at p. 189:
‘The High Courts of Calcutta, Bombay,
Allahabad, Madras, Patna, Lahore, Assam,
Nagpur, Pepsu, Rajasthan, Orissa, Rangoon
and Jammu & Kashmir; the former Chief Court
of Oudh; the Judicial Commissioner’s Court of
Peshawar, Ajmer and Himachal Pradesh and
the Supreme Court have held that a document
which requires registration under Section 17
and which is not admissible for want of
registration to prove a gift or mortgage or sale
or lease is nevertheless admissible to prove the
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character of the possession of the person who
holds under it.’ ”
34. From the principles laid down in the various
decisions of this Court and the High Courts, as
referred to hereinabove, it is evident that:
1. A document required to be registered, if
unregistered is not admissible into evidence under
Section 49 of the Registration Act.
2. Such unregistered document can however be used as
an evidence of collateral purpose as provided in the
proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act.
3. A collateral transaction must be independent of, or
divisible from, the transaction to effect which the law
required registration.
4. A collateral transaction must be a transaction not
itself required to be effected by a registered document,
that is, a transaction creating, etc. any right, title or
interest in immovable property of the value of one
hundred rupees and upwards.
5. If a document is inadmissible in evidence for want of
registration, none of its terms can be admitted in
evidence and that to use a document for the purpose of
proving an important clause would not be using it as a
collateral purpose.”
(emphasis added)
Analysis
28. By the said summary suit, plaintiff seeks rendition of accounts
with respect to the contractual amount due as per lease deed dated 6th
April 2016 (ground floor and first floor of the property) and lease deed
dated 6th April 2016 (basement of the said property) and a money decree
for the said amount due and payable along with pendente lite and future
interest @18% from the date of the termination of lease till the date of
realization.
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29. The defendants have asserted its leave to defend application, to
which a response had been filed by plaintiff. Pursuant to perusal of the
documents, pleadings and assessment of the submissions by the
respective counsels, in the opinion of the Court, the following aspects
can be ascertained:
i. Defendants do not deny the execution of lease deed-I and lease
deed-II. The principal objection taken in the leave to defend is that
lease deed-II, related to the basement, is an unregistered document
and, therefore, cannot be relied upon.
ii. A bald averment is made in para 9 of the leave to defend
application that these are false, fabricated and forged documents.
However, this is not substantiated in any form whatsoever, even in
the pleadings and the consistent stand of the defendants is that
lease deed-II cannot be placed in evidence, in view of Section 49
of the Registration Act, since it requires compulsory registration
under Section 17(1)(d) of the Registration Act.
iii. Quite to the contrary, defendants state in their application that they
have “made all the payments approved in the said tenancy” (para
12 of the said application). Defendants admit receiving plaintiff’s
legal notice dated 25th April 2018 (para 22 of the leave to defend
application) whereby plaintiff terminated defendants’ tenancy.
Plaintiff’s contention that they sent several reminders to
defendants on WhatsApp before they issued the legal notice to
defendants, is also shown by the WhatsApp chats requesting
defendants to clear 5 months pending dues, filed with additional
documents. This Court, therefore, finds that the plea that lease
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deed-II cannot be relied upon, is a defence which is not made in
good faith and is not genuine. There is nothing stated in the leave
to defend application to the effect that the basement portion was
never used by defendants.
iv. In any event, as per law articulated in K.B. Saha (supra), (relevant
paragraphs extracted in para 26 above), an unregistered
document can be used as evidence for a collateral purpose. The
collateral purpose must be a transaction, not itself required to be
affected by a registered document.
v. As regards lease deed-I, there is a clear admission by defendant
with respect to its execution. Leave to defend application also
inter alia in paras 14 and 16 admits that they paid the security
deposit of Rs. 50 lacs for this purpose and showed statements of
accounts to the Court, showing that they have recently paid Rs.
3,00,000/- lacs and Rs. 2,40,000/- on 16th April 2018 and 19thApril
2018, respectively. This bank statement was appended to an email
dated 4th May 2019 by accountant of plaintiff to the CEO of
defendants, which defendants relied upon.
vi. Having admitted the execution of least deed-I, defendants cannot
be permitted to vary from the contents of a written document in
terms of the principles laid down in Sections 91 and 92 of the
Evidence Act, 1872.
vii. It was also not denied that defendants had vacated the said
property in August 2021 when plaintiff had sold off their premises
to a third party. Defendants have not presented anything except for
bald denials to state that they were not in possession of the
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property as per lease deed.
viii. At the very least, ignoring lease deed-II for the moment, they
would be considered in possession from 06th April 2016 till
vacating the said property in 2021.
ix. The monthly rent payable was Rs. 2 lacs per month with an
increase by 50% as per the intervals in clause 1.1. The lock in
period was five years. There were additional charges to be paid in
case of dishonour of cheques presented (Rs. 1,000/-) and charges
for subsequent delay in paying the rent (Rs. 5,000/- per day).
x. Even, assuming that defendants raise an issue relating to the
imposition of the charges which require to be tried, the liability to
pay the admitted rent cannot be denied, at least for the period
when they were in possession.
xi. As per calculation sheet provided by plaintiff, appended to the
plaint, the outstanding rent for the time period when they were in
possession was Rs. 62,24,550/- on which GST of 18% would be
levied. Though, an additional claim has been made for cheque
bouncing charges (Rs. 17,000/-), charges for delayed rent (Rs.
1,66,18,000/-) and damages (Rs. 58,50,000/-) which may be
potentially subject to trial after consideration of the respective
accounts, the outstanding rent at the very least has to be taken into
consideration for purposes of considering the application for leave
to defend.
30. In this regard, the principles laid down in IDBI Trusteeship
(supra) are extremely relevant and apposite. The same principles have
been reiterated by the Supreme Court more recently in 2022 in B.L.
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Kashyap (supra) [relevant paragraphs of IDBI Trusteeship (supra)
extracted in para 25 and of B.L. Kashyap (supra) in para 24 above].
31. In the opinion of this Court, defendants have not placed anything
on record to state that they have actually paid post 2021, any amount of
this outstanding rent, nor any calculation sheet has been provided nor
any substantiation with the application. Only bald averments are made in
the application itself, which to this Court do not seem genuine, and in
good faith.
32. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, relying upon paras 17.3
and 17.4 of the IDBI Trusteeship (supra) (extracted in para 25 above),
this Court is inclined to impose a condition on the defendants, for deposit
of the said outstanding rent claimed by plaintiff in the Court, for
allowing the application for leave to defend.
33. As regards the cheque bouncing charges, delayed rent and
damages, the Court is inclined, at this stage, to provide benefit of doubt
to the defendants in order to allow them to raise their defence, relating to
the imposition of the same. To this extent, the security/deposit by the
Court has not been imposed.
34. Imposition of the security/deposit in respect of arrears of rent is
also a broad estimate, considering that there are interest charges also
applicable on the same, since the payments were delayed as per the
plaintiffs.
35. Therefore, taking the outstanding arrears amount as Rs.
62,24,550/- alongwith 18% GST calculated at Rs. 11,20,419/-, the Court
is inclined to allow the leave to defend conditional upon the defendants
depositing an amount of Rs. 73,44,969/- within a period of four weeks.
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36. It is quite clear and categorical that defendants do not have a
defence relating to the arrears of rent. The defence raised is improbable,
and further, the element of plausibility is very slim if not negligible. It is
in this assessment, that the Court is imposing a pre-deposit/furnishing of
security.
37. As regards the issue of limitation is concerned, the fact that the
previous suit which had been filed by plaintiff was subsequently
withdrawn, after the defendants vacated suit premises in August 2021,
followed by mediation proceedings between the parties in 2022 and
2023, the Court finds that the application of Section 14 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 is prima facie tenable and defendants’ plea that the suit was
barred by limitation, is a triable issue at best, mixed question of fact and
law. Considering that the leave to defend application is being permitted,
the Court would not like to express a view on this issue, at this stage.
38. The issue of suppression of the previous suit is not relevant
considering the plaint itself categorically discloses in para 17 about the
previous suit. The argument relating to suppression, by defendants is
completely unmerited.
39. The other aspects which have been asserted in the application for
leave to defend inter alia there are payments of Rs. 40 lacs by the new
purchaser, the issue of conversion charges and refund of security, which
defendants choose to raise in the written statement, maybe considered as
triable, after an assessment, at the stage of framing of issues.
Conclusion
40. The Court in allowing the leave to defend application has not only
considered the principles in IDBI Trusteeship (supra) but also the
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR I.A. No. 31874/2024 in CS(COMM) 560/2023 Page 17 of 18
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20:14:34
principles enunciated in B.L. Kashyap (supra) where the Court has
stated “while dealing with an application seeking leave to defend, it
would not be a correct approach to proceed as if denying the leave is the
rule or that the leave to defend is to be granted only in exceptional cases
or only in cases where the defence would appear to be a meritorious
one”.
41. Therefore, the leave to defend application is allowed subject to
defendants depositing an amount of Rs.73,44,969/- to the Registrar
General of this Court, within a period of four weeks, which shall be kept
in an interest-bearing fixed deposit.
42. If the said amount is not deposited, the plaintiff shall be entitled to
summons for judgment and the leave to defend application shall be
considered as having been dismissed.
43. List before the Joint Registrar (Judicial) on 22nd April 2025 for
further directions and noting compliance, if any.
44. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.
(ANISH DAYAL)
JUDGE
MARCH, 2025 /RK/na
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
By:MANISH KUMAR I.A. No. 31874/2024 in CS(COMM) 560/2023 Page 18 of 18
Signing Date:12.03.2025
20:14:34