Mohd. Shafi vs Ut Of J&K Through Sho on 13 March, 2025

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Jammu & Kashmir High Court

Mohd. Shafi vs Ut Of J&K Through Sho on 13 March, 2025

Bench: Sanjeev Kumar, Moksha Khajuria Kazmi

     HIGH COURT OF JAMMU & KASHMIR AND LADAKH
                     AT JAMMU
                          Reserved on: 06.03.2025
                         Pronounced on: 13 .03.2025

                                    Crl A(D) No.24/2023
                                    c/w
                                    Crl Ref (L) No.8/2023

Mohd. Shafi, aged 34 years S/o Mohd. Wasim
R/o Indh, Tehsil Gool District Ramban Presently lodged in District
Jail, Udhampur, J&K                               ...Appellant(s)

                          Through:- Mr. Imtiaz Mir, Advocate
       V/s
1.    UT of J&K through SHO, Police Station, Gool
      District Ramban
2.    Superintendent, District Jail, Udhampur         ...Respondent(s)

                         Through:- Mr. Pawan Dev Singh, Dy. AG
Coram:
     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV KUMAR, JUDGE
     HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MOKSHA KHAJURIA KAZMI, JUDGE

                               JUDGMENT

Sanjeev Kumar J

1. Instant criminal appeal filed by the convict-Mohd. Shafi under

Section 410 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Samvat, 1989

[“Cr.P.C. 1989″] arises out of a judgment of conviction dated 16th

August, 2023 and order of sentence passed on the same day by the

learned Principal Sessions Judge, Ramban [“trial Court”] in File

No.48/Challan titled State v. Mohd. Shafi (FIR No.89/2013). Vide

judgment and order impugned, the appellant has been convicted for

commission of offence punishable under Section 302 of Ranbir Penal

Code (RPC) and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life and a fine

of Rs.10,000/-. The appellant has been directed to undergo further
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imprisonment for six months in case he makes default in payment of

fine.

2. Before we advert to the grounds of challenge urged by Mr.

Imtiaz Mir, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, we deem it

appropriate to briefly state the prosecution case.

3) On 30th October, 2013, Police Post, Indh received an

information through reliable sources that a minor boy, namely Mohd.

Suleiman son of the appellant has died under suspicious circumstances

and that his dead body was lying in the house of appellant. A report in

this regard was entered in the Daily Diary Register of the Police Post

and inquest proceedings under Section 174 Cr.P.C were entrusted to

ASI Nizam Din, Incharge Police Post, Indh. Mr. Nizam Din went on

spot, photographed the place of occurrence along with dead body of

the deceased, prepared the site plan, seized the dead body and sent the

same for postmortem at PHC, Gool. The postmortem on the dead body

of the deceased was conducted by the Medical Officer present in PHC,

Gool. The wearing apparels of the deceased having smell of insecticide

(Nuvan) were also seized during the postmortem. Dead body, after

completion of the legal formalities, was handed over to the relatives

for performing last rites. Statement of mother of the deceased, PW-8

Rubina Begum was recorded by the ASI Nizam Din under Section 175

Cr.P.C. Viscera collected from the dead body of the deceased child

was also sent for chemical examination.

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4. In the inquest proceedings, it surfaced that mother of the

deceased PW-8 Rubina Begum and appellant-Mohd. Shafi were

husband and wife having contracted their marriage about 4/5 years

prior to the occurrence. The deceased child, aged two years and one

girl child aged 6/7 months were born out of their wedlock. It also came

to fore that the relations of the husband and wife were strained, in that,

the appellant was adamant to contract second marriage. The mother of

the deceased, PW-8 Rubina Begum would insist that the appellant

could not contract second marriage unless he provides her and her two

children adequate maintenance. It also came to be divulged during the

inquest proceedings that two months prior to the occurrence, the

appellant- Mohd. Shafi had made the deceased child to drink kerosene

oil. The child vomited the oil out and was, thus, saved. The matter was

settled, but the relation between the two became more strained. It was

further concluded during the inquest proceedings that when PW-8

Rubina Begum had gone to attend the call of nature in the washroom at

about 5.30 a.m. on 30th October, 2013, the appellant got an

opportunity, as per plan, and administered poison to the child with an

intention to kill him in his bed. In the meanwhile, PW-8 Rubina

Begum came back in the room and saw the child in restless condition.

Froth was coming out of the mouth of the child. She took the child

immediately to PW-3 Molvi Abdul Rashid to drive out evil spirit.

However, Molvi Abdul Rashid advised her to take the child to the
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doctor as the froth coming out of the mouth of the child smelled like

poison.

5. PW-8, Rubina Begum rushed to the doctor but the child

succumbed on the way. The inquest officer completed the inquest

proceedings and delivered the file to the Police Station concerned with

the request to register formal FIR in the matter. This is how FIR

No.89/2013 for offence under Section 302 RPC came to be rregistered

in the Police Station, Gool and investigation commenced. The SHO,

Police Station, Gool, PW-15, Mushtaq Ahmed conducted the

investigation. The inquest proceedings file containing the inquest

proceedings submitted by the inquest officer was seized, the statement

of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and 164-A Cr.P.C. were

recorded. Postmortem report was obtained by the Investigating Officer

from PHC, Gool. The appellant was taken into custody and arrest

memo was prepared. During his custody with the police, the appellant

made a disclosure statement, which led to the recovery of a bottle

(Nuvan container) having some left over Nuvan in it. The bottle was

sealed and sent to FSL for chemical examination. Report from the

chemical analyst from FSL was obtained. The Investigating Officer

wrapped up the investigation with the conclusion that the death of the

deceased child had occurred due to poison administered to him by the

appellant-Mohd. Shafi. Accordingly, charge-sheet was laid before the

Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ramban on 28.01.2014, who

committed the same for trial to the trial Court on 11.02.2014.
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6. Charge for commission of offence under Section 302 RPC was

framed by the trial Court against the appellant on 03.06.2014. Contents

of the charge were read over and explained to the appellant, who

pleaded not guilty to the charge and claimed to be tried. The trial Court

directed the prosecution to produce its evidence. The prosecution

examined in as many as 15 witnesses over a period of about four years

and finally prosecution evidence was closed on 09.04.2018. One of the

prosecution witnesses i.e. Chemical Analyst of the FSL in respect of

the report submitted by him was examined later on 18.07.2022. The

incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution evidence

were put to the appellant and his statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C

was recorded. The Appellant denied his involvement in the

commission of crime and recorded the statements of DW-Gulam

Mohd. and DW-Mohd. Rustam in defence. Thereafter analyzing the

prosecution evidence and evidence produced in defence, trial Court

came to the conclusion that there was sufficient evidence on record led

by the prosecution to connect the appellant with the commission of

offence under Section 302 RPC. Accordingly, the appellant was

convicted for offence under Section 302 RPC and sentenced to

imprisonment for life and fine as stated above in terms of the

impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence.

7. The appellant has challenged the impugned judgment of

conviction and consequential order of sentence primarily on the

following grounds:-

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i) That the trial Court has failed to appreciate that the prosecution

evidence was highly contrary, insufficient and inspiring no

confidence of the Court. The trial court failed to take note of the

fact that most of the witnesses cited by the prosecution had not

supported the prosecution case and stood declared hostile by the

prosecution.

ii) That the trial Court has put undue weightage and credence on

the lone statement of PW-8 Rubina Begum, whose version

before the Inquest Officer, Investigating Officer, before the

Magistrate under Section 164-A Cr.P.C and before the trial

Court was completely at variance with one another and,

therefore not trustworthy. Statements of PW-Molvi Abdul

Rashid, PW-Hakim Din, PW-Barkat Ali, PW-Bashir Ahmed,

PW-Chirag Din do not support the version put forth by PW-8

Rubina Begum. The statement of PW-8 Rubina Begum was

recorded by the Inquest Officer after 21 days whereas her

statement under Section 164-A Cr.P.C. was recorded after more

than 43 days of the occurrence and that puts the entire case of

prosecution in the realm of grave suspicion.

8. Per contra, Mr. Pawan Dev Singh, learned Dy. AG, would

argue that none of the grounds of challenge urged by the learned

counsel for the appellant are tenable in the face of clear and clinching

evidence on record with regard to the involvement of the appellant in
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the commission of murder of his minor son. He would, therefore,

support the reasoning given by the trial court in the judgment

impugned to connect the appellant with the commission of offence

punishable under Section 302 RPC.

9. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

material on record, we are of the considered opinion that the

prosecution has miserably failed to lead any cogent and trustworthy

evidence to connect the appellant with the commission of offence

punishable under Section 302 RPC. We do not find any reliable and

trustworthy evidence on record, which proves beyond reasonable doubt

that the murder of minor child was committed by the appellant and

nobody else.

10. Indisputably, there is no eye-witness to the crime in which a

minor child lost his life. It is true that in the inquest proceedings it has

come to be established that the death of the minor child was homicidal.

This is also substantiated by the postmortem report and the statement

of PW-12 Dr. Sheikh Yasir Nazir and statement of PW Pawan Abrol,

FSL expert. It is amply proved by scientific evidence led by the

prosecution that the death of the minor child occurred due to

consumption of poison i.e. organophosphourus insecticide. In the

absence of contrary evidence, even suggesting that the poison was

taken by the child accidently, it has to be taken as proved that the

poison „organophosphourus insecticide’ was administered to the child
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by someone. Who has administered that poison to the child is a

question that begs determination in light of the evidence on record.

11. PW-3 Molvi Abdul Rashid is an independent witness, who was

approached by PW-8 Rubina Begum along with deceased son for

treatment. As per his deposition, Rubina Begum came to his house at 7

a.m. on 30.10.2013. She was carrying her two years old child, who was

critically sick. He states that he called the appellant and asked him to

take the child to doctor, as the condition of the child was serious.

While the appellant and his wife Rubina Begum were coming back

home, the child expired. The witness states that on coming to know of

the death of the minor child, he along with his neighbourers came to

the house of the appellant for condolence. The wife of the appellant

was saying that she would not allow the child to be buried till the

police came on spot. The police was called and Rubina Begum

demanded medical examination of the dead body of the deceased child.

The dead body of the deceased child was shifted to Hospital, Gool.

Appellant along with some other persons accompanied the police to

the hospital. He further states that the appellant was arrested on 3rd

days after the occurrence and this was done by the police on the PW-8

Rubina Begum expressing her doubts about the involvement of the

appellant in administration of poison to the deceased child. He

further states that after about one month i.e. on 2nd December, 2013,

the police came to the house of the appellant and called the witness

also. The appellant was brought at about 9 in the morning. The police
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officials told the witness that one bottle had been recovered. He was

called to the Police Station on 03.12.2013 and his statement was

recorded and his signatures taken on the statement. The witness

testified the correctness of the seizure memo of the dead body, clothes

of the deceased and spurdnama of the ring. Since the witness did not

support the prosecution case entirely, in particular, the recovery of the

bottle containing left over poison, as such, on the request of the PP, he

was declared hostile. During cross-examination by the learned PP, the

witness clearly deposed that the appellant had not made any disclosure

in his presence nor any recovery of any bottle containing the left over

poison was made at the instance of the appellant in his presence.

12. PW-Hakim Din has deposed before the trial Court that he heard

a rumour that the deceased child had died due to taking of some

medicine. He, however, does not know anything about medicine nor

about the person who had administered the same to the deceased child.

He has also denied having any knowledge about the relation between

the appellant and his wife Rubina Begum. Obviously, the aforesaid

witness, too, was declared hostile by the prosecution and subjected to

cross-examination. The witness, as is evident from his statement, has

not changed his stance even during cross-examination by the PP. He

has denied having seen the appellant making any disclosure statement.

He is categoric in his statement that the bottle allegedly recovered by

the Investigating Officer was already wrapped in a newspaper and was

then sealed by the police in cloth.

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13. PW-Abdul Rashid in his testimony before the trial court deposed

that he heard that the appellant had administered Nuvam to his child

but does not know why he did so to his child. He has further deposed

that during the time, occurrence happened, the child was already sick.

In short, this witness, too, is of no help to the prosecution.

14. PW-Barkat Ali has in his deposition stated that when he heard

about death of the minor child of the appellant, he went to his house

where wife of the appellant Rubina Begum was saying that the

deceased had taken some medicine, as a result whereof, the child had

died. On the request of the PP, this witness, too, was declared hostile

and subjected to cross-examination by the learned PP. He has

maintained his stance even during cross-examination by the PP. He has

also stated that the appellant was arrested and taken to the Police

Station three days after the death of the deceased and that the appellant

was arrested on the allegation of PW-Rubina Begum that it was the

appellant, who had administered poison to the deceased child leading

to his death.

15. These were some of the star witnesses of the prosecution, who

have not supported the prosecution case at all and have instead stated

in unison that nobody had seen any person administering poison to the

child. These witnesses clearly rule out the presence of any eye-witness

at the time of occurrence. PW-Molvi Abdul Rashid and PW- Hakim

Din, the witnesses to the disclosure statement made by the appellant,
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which led to the recovery of the Nuvan bottle from the field, have

completely resiled from their statements recorded by the police. They

have rather stated that no Inqshaf (disclosure) was made by the

appellant in their presence nor any bottle recovered at his instance in

their presence. They are categoric in their deposition that the seized

bottle was already in possession of the police and they were only asked

to sign the recorded statements in the Police Station.

16. PW-9 Chirag Din, too, is a witness, who was declared hostile by

the prosecution, as nothing could be elicited by the prosecution from

him. PW-Nizam Din, the prosecution witness, who has prepared the

inquest report in terms of Section 174 Cr.P.C. He has explained the

manner in which he conducted the inquest proceedings. Apart from

saying many things about the incident, the witness has stated that when

he visited the spot immediately after the occurrence, mother of the

deceased PW-Rubina Begun did not make any statement with regard to

the involvement of the appellant in the commission of the crime. She

was, however, saying that she would not allow the child to be buried

unless cause of his death is asserted. If we were to believe the

statement of PW-Nizam Din, it is quite evident that the mother of the

deceased, PW-Rubina Begum, who ultimately named the appellant as

perpetrator of the crime, was not even aware about the cause of death

and wanted it to be ascertained by the police. In the later part of his

statement, he has, however, mentioned that the wife of the appellant

had told him that the appellant was the person, who had administered
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poison to the deceased child, however, he did not record her statement

at that time, although he had the authority to do so.

17. From a reading of the statement of the Inquest Officer, PW-

Nizam Din, it is abundantly clear that he has completely messed up the

inquest proceedings. If we were to believe him that Rubina Begum had

disclosed to him on spot that the child had died due to administering of

poison by the appellant, the inquest proceedings could have been

wrapped up then and there and FIR registered. This, however, has not

happened. It is surprising to note that the Inquest Officer did not even

think it proper to record the statement of the mother of the deceased,

Rubina Begum wherein she had, as per the witness, clearly indicated

the involvement of the appellant in the commission of crime. It is, thus,

clear that this part of the statement of the Inquest Officer is not

truthful. There is ample evidence on record to show that on the date of

occurrence, mother of the deceased child, who was first to notice the

froth coming out of the mouth of the deceased was not even sure about

the cause of critical sickness of the child. As has come in deposition of

PW-Molvi Abdul Rashid, the child in critical condition was first taken

to him for warding off evil spirit and not to the hospital for medical

treatment. It is, thus, clear that when the child passed away and was

subjected to postmortem examination by the doctor, it came to fore for

the first time that the death of the deceased had occurred due to

administering of poison. It is at this stage, PW-Rubina Begum, who

admittedly had strained relations with her husband, doubted the
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involvement of the appellant in the commission of crime in question. It

is because of this reason, it has come in the evidence of the prosecution

that the appellant was arrested on the third day of the occurrence by the

Inquest Officer, though his arrest has been shown much later in papers.

He was formally arrested on papers in the month of November, 2013

when the FIR was formally registered at Police Station, Gool. Rubina

Begum is, thus, the only prosecution witness left, who has to some

extent tried to support the prosecution case.

18. PW-Rubina Begum, who is a star witness of the prosecution, has

in her deposition before the trial Court stated that she met her husband

somewhere in Srinagar where both of them were working as domestic

helps in two adjoining houses. They developed friendship, which led to

contracting of marriage. She has further stated that out of the wedlock,

two children were born. Girl child is alive whereas her son has been

killed by her husband. She has tried to introduce motive in her

statement by stating that the appellant had been pressuring her to go to

the house of his married sister with a proposal of his marriage with the

sister of his brother-in-law. She would state that she refused to do so

and insisted that if he wanted to contract second marriage then he must

construct a pacca room for her and give share of the property to her

son. Her deposition, if taken as correct, on its face value, would clearly

prove the fact that she was not an eye witness to the administration of

poison by the appellant to the deceased child. In her deposition she has

clearly stated that when she returned from the washroom, she saw
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some blue colour water coming out of the mouth and nose of the

deceased child. She also claims to have seen the appellant trying to

hide Nuvan bottle in his pocket. When we look on the statement PW-

Rubina Begum, who is cited as eye-witness by the prosecution, we

clearly find that she has not stated the truth, particularly, with regard to

the hiding of Nuvan bottle by the appellant in his pocket. Had this

happened in her presence, she would have been the first person to

disclose it to the PW-Molvi Abdul Rashid, who was approached in the

first instance for treatment of the ailing child. She would have

definitely told the police and the people gathered in her house to

mourn the demise of her minor child. She would not have waited for

twenty one days to make statement divulging that death of the

deceased child had occurred due to administering of poison by the

appellant.

19. From the evidence on record, it is clear that PW-Rubina Begum

was not clear either about the cause of death or the person who has

caused it till postmortem report revealed that death had occurred due to

consumption of poison by the deceased. She expressed doubt about the

involvement of the appellant. Although, the police did not record

statement of the PW-Rubina Begum in this regard, yet on the basis of

suspicion shown by her, the appellant was picked up on third day of

occurrence for interrogation. It is a different matter that he was not

shown arrested by the police and his arrest was shown only after

registration of the FIR.

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20. PW-Rubina Begum had projected a story in the statement

recorded by the police that two months prior to the alleged occurrence,

the appellant had made the child to drink kerosene oil but the said part

of the statement was abandoned by her when she made her deposition

before the trial Court. She has also stated in her statement that a night

before she had been subjected to severe beating by the appellant but

this was not so stated by her to ASI Nizam Din, who conducted the

inquest proceedings, when he visited the place of occurrence. It is

because of this reason, she was never medically examined to find out

any injury on her body. The witness has made several improvements

while making her deposition before the trial Court, which runs counter

to what she stated before the Magistrate in her deposition under

Section 164-A Cr.P.C. If we discord the testimony of PW-8 Rubina

Begum, the entire case of the prosecution falls flat on the ground.

21. The scientific evidence i.e. testimony of the doctors, who

conducted the autopsy and the statement of chemical analyst of FSL

would only prove the cause of death of the deceased child and is not

sufficient in itself to connect the accused with the administration of

poison to the deceased child.

22. The trial Court has analyzed the evidence on record and has

found established that the death of the deceased child had happened

due to the administering of poison organophosphourus insecticide.

This finding of fact has been arrived at by the trial Court on the basis
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of oral testimony of the prosecution witnesses and the scientific

evidence on record. We have also discussed the evidence herein above

and see no reason to differ with this finding of fact returned by the trial

Court. We, however, do not find any evidence, oral or scientific, which

demonstrates beyond any reasonable doubt that the poison was

administered by the appellant to the deceased child with an intention to

kill him.

23. There is no direct evidence to the occurrence and the

circumstantial evidence available on record is only in the shape of

motive and the disclosure statement made by the appellant leading to

the discovery/recovery of the bottle containing left over poison. So far

as motive is concerned, it has come on record and sufficiently proved

by the prosecution that the relations between the appellant and his wife

PW-Rubina Begum were strained. Despite strained relations, they were

still staying together. The motive, which is projected by the

prosecution is that the appellant wanted to contract second marriage

whereas his wife Rubina Begum wanted him to first settle the share of

his children and make provision of construction of a room and

maintenance.

24. Motive, in the instant case, as projected by the prosecution, is

double edged. This could be possible motive for the appellant to take

extreme step of committing murder of his son and sparing his daughter

but it could also be a motive for the wife of the appellant-Rubina
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Begum to falsely implicate the appellant. That apart, we do not find

that motive sought to be proved by the prosecution for the commission

of crime in question by the appellant is so strong that a person of

ordinary prudence would believe the reason for commission of murder

of his own child by the appellant. If the appellant wanted to get rid of

his children then he would not have spared his other child i.e. daughter.

25. Even if, we were to accept that the prosecution has succeeded in

proving motive, yet in the absence of other circumstances constituting

an unbroken chain leading to the only hypothesis inconsistent with the

innocence of the appellant, the appellant cannot be convicted for the

offence, he was charged with by the trial Court.

26. We are aware and as has been held by the Hon‟ble Supreme

Court in the case of Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1988

SC 1011, the murder by poison is invariably committed under the

cover and cloak of secrecy. Nobody will administer poison to another

in the presence of others. The person who administers poison to

another in secrecy will not keep a portion of it for the investigating

officer to come and collect it. The person who commits such murder

would naturally take care to eliminate and destroy the evidence against

him. When we examine the case in hand in the light of legal position

adumbrated in Bhupinder Singh‟s case (supra), we clearly find that

though the prosecution may have succeeded in establishing that the

death of the deceased child occurred due to administering of poison
18

(organopharphorous) to child, yet there is no evidence on record to

prove that the poison was administered by the appellant. The

disclosure statement and the recovery of the bottle having left over

poison have not been proved at all.

27. In light of the evidence on record, it is difficult for us to believe

the prosecution story that the appellant administered poison to

the child, which he had brought in a small Nuvan bottle and that

after administering the poison, the appellant kept the bottle with

left over poison hidden in the fields, which the prosecution

recovered after more than one month of the occurrence. As is

rightly pointed by the Supreme Court in Bhupinder Singh‟s case,

a person who administers poison to kill a person will not keep

the left over poison, if any with him for months together and

wait for the police to come and recover it from him. The natural

conduct of such person is to destroy the evidence by throwing

away the left over poison, if any, after administering the same to

his victim.

28. Viewed from any angle, we do not find the judgment of

conviction recorded by the trial Court in conformity with the evidence

on record and in consonance with law. In the absence of ocular

evidence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove its case on

the basis of circumstantial evidence. Law with regard to proving the

case, which rests on circumstantial evidence, is well settled.
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29. In Sharad Birdichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra, AIR

1984 SC 1622, Hon‟ble the Supreme Court elaborated the five golden

principles of circumstantial evidence laid down in Hanumant v. State

of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343, which are being followed consistently in

the later cases. These five principles are as follows:-

“1. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is
to be drawn should be fully established.

2. That facts so established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they
should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except
that the accused is guilty.

3. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency.

4. They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the
one to be proved, and

5. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to
leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent
with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all
human probability that act must have been done by the
accused.”

30. When we examine the case on hand in light of the settled legal

position, we are convinced that the prosecution has not established the

circumstances forming an unbroken chain leading to the only

hypothesis inconsistent with the innocence of the appellant.

31. For the foregoing reasons, we are inclined to accept this appeal

ad reverse the judgment of conviction passed by the trial Court.

32. Ordered accordingly.

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33. As a result, the impugned order of sentence is also set aside. The

appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith.

33. Reference received from the trial Court stands disposed of

accordingly.

                                             (Moksha Khajuria Kazmi)              (Sanjeev Kumar)
                                                      Judge                           Judge

                         JAMMU
                         13.03.2025
                         Vinod,PS
                                                    Whether the order is speaking : Yes
                                                    Whether the order is reportable: Yes




Vinod Kumar
2025.03.13 12.05
I attest to the accuracy and
integrity of this document
Jammu



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