Karnataka High Court
Muniraju vs State Of Karnataka on 7 March, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 16.01.2025
Pronounced on : 07.03.2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 07TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION NO. 28856 OF 2024 (GM - RES)
BETWEEN:
MUNIRAJU,
S/O LATE NARAYANAPPA,
AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS,
RESIDING AT BANDAHATTI VILLAGE,
MASTHI HOBALI, MALUR TALUK,
KOLAR, KARNATAKA - 563 130.
... PETITIONER
(BY SRI ROHAN VEERANNA TIGADI, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY SUB-INSPECTOR
OF POLICE, MASTI POLICE STATION,
KOLAR - 563 130.
2. SUKANYA N.,
W/O MUNIRAJU B.N.,
AGED 18 YEARS
RESIDING AT BANDAHATTI VILLAGE
MASTI HOBALI, MALUR TALUK
KOLAR, KARNATAKA - 563 130.
2
3. BYRAREDDY
CDPO MALUR, MALUR TALUK,
KOLAR, KARNATAKA - 563 130.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI JAGADEESHA B. N., SPL. SPP FOR R1;
SRI RAMESH H.N., ADVOCATE FOR R2)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION R/W SEC 528 OF BHARATIYA
NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER
DATED 17.09.2024 PASSED BY THE LEARNED ADDITIONAL
DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, FSTC-1 AT KOLAR IN CRIME NO.
218 OF 2023 (ANNEXURE-A) TAKING COGNIZANCE FOR THE
OFFENCES UNDER SECTIONS 376(3) INDIAN PENAL CODE,
SECTION 6 OF THE POCSO ACT 2012 AND SECTION 9 OF THE
PROHIBITION OF CHILD MARRIAGE ACT; QUASH THE ORDER
DATED 27.09.2024 AND FURTHER PROCEEDINGS PENDING ON THE
FILE OF LEARNED ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE,
FSTC-1 AT KOLAR IN SPL. C. (POCSO) 142 OF 2024 (ANNEXURE-A)
FOR OFFENCES UNDER SECTION 376(3) IPC SECTION 6 OF THE
POCSO ACT AND SECTION 9 OF THE PROHIBITION OF CHILD
MARRIAGE ACT; QUASH THE CHARGE-SHEET DATED 26.07.2024 IN
CRIME NO. 218 OF 2023 (ANNEXURE-B) PENDING ON THE FILE OF
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, FSTC-1 AT KOLAR.
AND ETC.,
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 16.01.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioner-accused is before this Court calling in question
the proceedings in Spl.Case(POCSO)142 of 2024 registered for
3
offences punishable under Sections 376(3) of the IPC, Section 6 of
the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 ('POCSO'
Act) and Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act.
2. Heard Sri Rohan Veeranna Tigadi, learned counsel
appearing for petitioner and Sri Jagadeesha B N., learned Additional
State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri
Ramesh H N, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2.
3. Facts in brief, germane, are as follows:
It is the case of the prosecution that the petitioner gets
married to the victim on 14-05-2023. At the time of marriage, it
transpires that the petitioner was 26 years and the 2nd respondent
was 17 years. The marriage was performed by the parents of the
petitioner, as the 2nd respondent was an orphan. After marriage,
the 2nd respondent becomes pregnant and goes to get herself
checked, it is then reported to the Child Development Project
Officer, Malur on 29-12-2023, as the 2nd respondent was pregnant
and she was 17 years and 8 months as on the said date. Therefore,
it becomes an offence under the POCSO Act.
4
4. The police take the petitioner into custody. On 23-02-2024
the 2nd respondent delivers a baby girl. The prosecution then file
their charge sheet against the petitioner for the aforesaid offences.
The concerned Court takes cognizance of the offences and registers
SPl.C.(POCSO) for the afore-quoted offences. The present case is
preferred by the petitioner on the score that the proceedings should
be quashed on two circumstances, that the chance of conviction in
the case at hand is absolutely nil and the husband and the wife
along with the child are living happily, as the child is close to one
year old.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would
contend that in such circumstances proceedings have been quashed
by this Court and other High Courts on account of marriage
between the prosecutrix and the accused. He would submit that
the proceedings should be quashed and the couple should be left to
live happily with the child, failing which, the child and the mother
would be left in the lurch, as the petitioner is the only breadwinner
in the family.
5
6. Per-contra, the learned Additional State Public Prosecutor
Sri B N Jagadeesh would vehemently refute the submission to
contend that it is a matter of trial for the petitioner to come out
clean. There cannot be quashment of the proceedings, either on a
compromise or on looking at the statement of the victim in a
proceeding under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.
7. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the respective parties and have
perused the material on record.
8. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute, as also, the
dates and events are also not in dispute. This Court, on 03-12-
2024, while entertaining the petition has passed a detailed order
staying further proceedings. The order reads as follows:
"The petitioner in the case at hand is the one who is
accused of the offences punishable under Section 6 of the
POCSO Act, Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act
and Sections 376(3) of the IPC.
The allegation against the petitioner is that, he has
married the 2nd respondent/victim, when she was yet to
complete 18 years of age. After the marriage, the victim
becomes pregnant; goes to the hospital for a general
checkup; the doctor gets to know that the age of the victim
6
at that point in time is 17 years and 8 months and she has
got in marriage to the petitioner before completion of 18
years.
This results in an information being transmitted to the
competent authority and registration of a crime in Crime
No.218/2023, for the offences as found in the proceedings.
It is the case of the prosecution that the parents have
forced the girl to get married to the petitioner. Therefore, it
is the parents who are responsible in the case at hand for
driving the petitioner and the victim to get married and then
become offenders of the POCSO Act.
The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that
from the wedlock, a child is born, today if the petitioner is
convicted of the offences, the child and the mother would be
left in the lurch. All for the acts of the parents of forcing the
girl child for marriage at an underage. It is rather surprising
as to how the parents are left of the hook for the offences
under the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929.
But for now, looking at the circumstance that the
newborn is now one year old and the petitioner is the only
breadwinner of the family, I deem it appropriate to stay all
further proceedings.
Therefore, there shall be an interim order of stay of all
further proceedings in Spl.C.(POCSO) No.142/2024 (Crime
No.218 of 2023), pending before the Additional District and
Sessions Judge, FTSC-1, Kolar, qua the petitioner, till the
next date of hearing.
List the matter on 10-01-2025 for further hearing."
The issue now that would emerge is, whether this Court could
quash the proceedings on account of marriage of the petitioner and
the victim and the child born from the wedlock. It is not in dispute
7
that the petitioner and the prosecutrix are married and a child is
born from the wedlock. The birth certificate and the DNA report
both are placed before the Court, which depict the petitioner and
the victim to be the biological parents of the child. It is in this light
the law in this regard is to be noticed.
9. The learned Additional State Public Prosecutor has placed
heavy reliance upon two of the latest judgments of the Apex Court,
one in the case of RIGHT TO PRIVACY OF ADOLESCENTS1
wherein the Apex Court had taken suo motu cognizance of the
judgment of acquittal of the Calcutta High Court, wherein the High
Court had acquitted the accused for the offences punishable under
Section 376 of IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The Court,
while reversing the order of acquittal and convicting the accused
holds that, in the facts and circumstances of the case, even if the
accused and the victim come out with a settlement, the High Court
under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., cannot quash the prosecution.
The Apex Court holds as follows:
1
2024 SCC OnLine SC 2055
8
"1. Criminal Appeal no. 1451 of 2024 has been
preferred by the State of West Bengal, aggrieved by the
judgment and order dated 18th October 2023, passed by a
Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Calcutta.
The learned Special Judge appointed under the Protection of
Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short, 'the
POCSO Act'), Baruipur, South 24 Parganas, convicted the
accused for the offences punishable under Section 6 of
the POCSO Act and Sections 363 and 366 of the Penal Code,
1860 (for short, 'the IPC'). For the offence punishable under
Section 6 of the POCSO Act, the accused was sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for twenty years and pay a
fine of Rs. 10,000/-. He was sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment for four and five years, respectively, for the
offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of the IPC.
Though the learned Special Judge under the POCSO
Act concluded that the accused was guilty of the offences
punishable under clause (n) of sub-section (2) and sub-
section (3) of Section 376 of the IPC, in view of the sentence
imposed for the offence punishable under Section 6 of
the POCSO Act, no separate punishment was imposed.
... ... ...
3. By the impugned judgment, the High Court held
that the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 366 of
the IPC were not made out, and therefore, the High Court
acquitted the accused for the said two offences. Considering
the factual scenario that the High Court noticed, it purported
to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India read with Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, 'the Cr. P.C.')
to set aside the conviction of the accused for the offences
punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and sub-
sections 2(n) and (3) of Section 376 of the IPC. The High
Court noted that the mother of the victim had disowned her
and therefore, the victim was continuously residing with the
accused along with their minor child.
EXERCISE OF PLENARY POWERS TO QUASH THE ORDER
OF CONVICTION
9
20. Now, coming to the conviction of the offences
punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and
Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, the Division Bench proceeds on
the footing that the said offences have been established.
However, the Court purported to exercise its "plenary
powers" under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. coupled with
Article 226 of the Constitution of India to set aside the
conviction of the accused. In short, as we can see from the
last few paragraphs of the impugned judgment, the High
Court was swayed away by the following aspects:
(a) There was a "non-exploitative" consensual sexual
relationship between the two consenting adolescents;
(b) The ground reality was that after the birth of the
child, the accused is taking care of the victim and the
infant/small child;
(c) The victim has no support from her parents, and
(d) A humane view is required to be taken to do
complete justice.
21. On a plain reading of "sixthly" in Section 375 read
with Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, notwithstanding the
consensual sexual relationship, the offence punishable under
clause (n) of sub-section (2) of Section 376 of the IPC, was
made out. One of the objectives of the POSCO Act is to
effectively address sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of
children, as both offences are very heinous. To give effect to
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children
ratified by India on 11th December 1992, the POCSO Act has
been enacted. As noted earlier, in the facts of the case, the
accused was not an adolescent, but his age was about
twenty-five years on the date of the commission of the
offence, and the victim was only fourteen years old. When
such offences of rape and aggravated penetrative
sexual assault are committed, by exercising its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India and/or Section 482 of the Cr. P.C., the High
Court cannot acquit an accused whose guilt has been
proved.
22. Perhaps the consideration of sympathy and the
so-called welfare of the victim and her child prevailed on the
Judges of the High Court. The Court was influenced by the
10
fact that the victim's parents did not support her, and
therefore, by sending the accused to jail, she and her child
would be miserable as the accused and his family were
taking care of them.
23. There are various decisions of this Court
holding that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. to quash a
prosecution on the grounds of settlement or by
consent. One such judgment is in the case of Gian
Singh v. State of Punjab1. Paragraph 58 of the said
decision reads thus:
"58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal
proceeding having regard to the fact that the dispute
between the offender and the victim has been settled
although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as
in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be
an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that
the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace
is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate
guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have
harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that
seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the
society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only
because he and the victim have settled the dispute amicably
or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certain
crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or
without the permission of the court. In respect of serious
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of
mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude
under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and
the victim can have no legal sanction at all. However,
certain offences which overwhelmingly and predominantly
bear civil flavour having arisen out of civil, mercantile,
commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactions
or the offences arising out of matrimony, particularly
relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the
wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the
victim have settled all disputes between them amicably,
irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been
made compoundable, the High Court may within the
framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal
proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that
on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood
11
of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the
criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of
justice shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and
not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts and
no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed."
(emphasis added)
23.1 Therefore, in view of the settled position of
law, in the facts of the case, even if the accused and
the victim (who has now attained majority) were to
come out with a settlement, the High Court could not
have quashed the prosecution.
HELPLESS POSITION OF THE VICTIM
24. The situation in which the victim was placed after
the commission of the offence needs a bit of elaboration. As
noted earlier, the victim left her house on 20th May 2018,
and her mother filed a complaint on 29th May 2018. On
1st June 2018, PW-5 (ASI Gopal Chandra Saha) brought the
victim from the house of the accused to the police station.
After her medical examination was conducted, she was sent
for safe custody at Alor Disha Child Line at Champahati. PW-
2, mother of the victim, without giving any particulars stated
that she got her daughter back from Narendrapur Sanlaap
home. She claimed in the cross-examination that the victim
remained in her house for one year and, later on, went back
to the house of the accused. She admitted that she never
went to the home of the accused, not even to see her
grandchild. The victim's parents completely abandoned her,
at least from the year 2019.
25. Ms. Madhavi Divan, the learned amicus
curiae, rightly emphasized that no opportunity was
made available to a girl of fourteen or fifteen years of
age to make an informed choice to decide whether to
stay with the accused. She did not get any support
from her parents and the State machinery when she
required it the most. As held by us hereafter, the State
machinery failed to act according to the law to take
care of the victim. The situation in which she was
placed at that time was such that she had no
12
opportunity to make an informed choice about her
future. She had no option but to seek shelter where it
was provided to her i.e. in the house of the accused. In
any event, it is doubtful whether she could have made
an informed choice at the age of fourteen or fifteen.
THE FAILURE OF THE STATE
26. The question before us is whether the State
was under an obligation to take care of the victim of
an offence under the POCSO Act, who was fourteen
years old. Apart from the State's constitutional
obligations, the statutes have enough provisions to
address this situation. Though the existing law of the
land could have taken adequate care of the poor victim
in this case, the machinery created by the law failed.
These conclusions need more elaboration.
,,, ,,, ,,,
33.2 Section 46, read with Rule 25, is one of the most
critical provisions that needs to be effectively implemented.
Thus, the JJ Act has adequate provisions to ensure the
care, protection, treatment, and rehabilitation of the
victim of an offence under the POCSO Act. The ultimate
object is to integrate the child in need of care and
protection into society to lead a dignified and
meaningful life.
34. If sub-section (6) of Section 19 is
implemented in relation to the victims of the offences
under the POCSO Act and thereafter, the CWC strictly
implements the provisions of the JJ Act which we have
referred to above, no victim will face the situation
which the victim in this case had to face. The JJ Act is
a complete code that makes provisions for the care,
protection, treatment, and development of children in
need of care and protection. The JJ Act provides for
making available their basic needs and protection. The
Act takes care of all the needs of the victims under
the POCSO Act who fall under the category of children
in need of care and protection. The object is to
13
undertake the rehabilitation and social re-integration
process of such victims based on individual care plans
as provided under Section 39 of the JJ Act. Section 46
is a provision that requires the State Governments to
frame rules to provide financial support to any child
living in a child care institution upon completion of 18
years of age. The financial support has to be very
exhaustive as the object of financial support is to
facilitate a child's re-integration into mainstream
society.
35. However, at the grassroot level, sub-section (6) of
Section 19 is not being implemented. Even if the information
is provided to the CWC, the children in need of care and
protection are not being produced before the CWC. Even if
the information is given under sub-section (6) of
Section 19 of the POCSO Act, the CWCs are not taking any
action, though, under clause (xii) of Section 30, CWC has the
duty to take suo motu congnizance of the cases and reach
out to the children in need of care and protection who are
not produced before the CWC. Under sub-section (6) of
Section 19, the police are under a mandate to report the
matter to the jurisdictional Special Court or the jurisdictional
Sessions Court, in the event the Special Court has not been
established. On getting information, it will be ideal if the
Special Courts or the Sessions Courts forward the
information to the jurisdictional CWC. It is very crucial that
sub-section (6) of Section 19 is scrupulously implemented
and the CWCs take immediate action to protect the victim.
Therefore, we are directing that a copy of this judgment
should be forwarded to the Secretaries of the Law
Department of each State and Union Territories. The Law
Secretaries must coordinate with the concerned departments
and ensure that the benefits of these statutory provisions
under the JJ Act are extended to the victims of the offences
under the POCSO Act. The Secretaries will also ensure that
the State Governments undertake the process of framing
rules as required by Section 110(1), including the rules
provided under Section 46, to make the measures provided
under the JJ Act more effective.
36. It is nobody's case that, in the present case,
recourse was taken to the provisions starting from
14
sub-section (6) of Section 19 of the POCSO Act. As
these statutory provisions were overlooked entirely, a
situation was created which did not allow the victim to
make an informed choice about her future. She did not
get that opportunity even after attaining majority.
37. It is the responsibility of the State to take
care of helpless victims of such heinous offences. Time
and again, we have held that the right to live a
dignified life is an integral part of the fundamental
right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution
of India. Article 21 encompasses the right to lead a
healthy life. The minor child, who is the victim of the
offences under the POCSO Act, is also deprived of the
fundamental right to live a dignified and healthy life.
The same is the case of the child born to the victim as
a result of the offence. All the provisions of the JJ Act
regarding taking care of such children and
rehabilitating them are consistent with Article 21 of
the Constitution of India. Therefore, immediately after
the knowledge of the commission of a heinous offence
under the POCSO Act, the State, its agencies and
instrumentalities must step in and render all possible
aid to the victim children, which will enable them to
lead a dignified life. The failure to do so will amount to
a violation of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the
victim children under Article 21. The police must
strictly implement subsection (6) of Section 19 of
the POCSO Act. If that is not done, the victim children
are deprived of the benefits of the welfare measures
under the JJ Act. Compliance with Section 19(6) is of
vital importance. Non-compliance thereof will lead to a
violation of Article 21.
... .... ...
41. Now, the question is whether we can force the
child to take benefit of the support extended by the State
Government. It may be argued that it is too late for the
State to come out with this offer. Still, the Court must allow
the victim to make an informed choice after being informed
the details of the support that the State is willing to extend.
We must do so as, at no stage, she was given such an option
15
and an opportunity to make an informed choice about her
future. Now, the question is how to enable the victim to
exercise her option. This must be left to very qualified
professionals/experts to ascertain her views. This can be
done by directing the State to constitute a team of two or
three experts, including a clinical psychologist and a social
scientist, who should meet the victim at a proper place and
inform the victim about the offer of the State Government
with all its material particulars. The state government can
get assistance from expert bodies like the National Institute
of Mental Health and Neurosciences (NIMHANS) or the Tata
Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) to constitute the team.
The experts will have to meet the child on multiple
occasions. While doing so, the experts will have to carefully
ascertain the kind of support, if any, the victim and her child
are getting from the accused and his family members. For
that purpose, the committee can seek the help of the local
child welfare officer. We must leave it to the committee of
experts to decide how it will do the exercise. The place, the
time and the methods must be left to the Committee. The
committee will have to perform its duties cautiously and
sensitively. The committee must ensure that this exercise
does not make the victim more insecure."
CONCLUSIONS
42. Thus, to conclude, we hold that the accused is guilty of
the offences punishable under sub-sections (2)(n) and (3) of
Section 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The
issue regarding sentencing will be considered after the
committee's report is received.
43. This extraordinary situation was created because
the State machinery did not follow the provisions of law
starting from sub-section (6) of Section 19 of the POCSO
Act. The importance of rehabilitation of the victims of
offences under the POCSO Act, which is a mandatory
requirement of law, is being overlooked by all
stakeholders. Perhaps, at levels, there is a need for
introspection and course correction. We include even the
Judiciary in that."
(Emphasis supplied)
16
In yet another judgment, in RAMJI LAL BAIRWA V. STATE OF
RAJASTHAN2, the Apex Court has held as follows:
"25. Thus, in unambiguous terms this Court held
that before exercising the power under
Section 482, Cr. P.C. the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the crime besides
observing and holding that heinous and serious
offences could not be quashed even though a victim or
victim's family and the offender had settled the
dispute. This Court held that such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on the
society. Having understood the position of law on the
second question that it is the bounden duty of the
court concerned to consider whether the compromise
is just and fair besides being free from undue pressure
we will proceed to consider the matter further. A bare
perusal of the impugned order dated 04.02.2022
would reveal that the High Court has erred in not
bestowing proper consideration the law laid down
in Gian Singh's case (supra) while rendering the same.
The impugned order would reveal that the allegations
contained in the subject FIR was not at all even
adverted to, before quashing the same. We have
referred to the allegations which are of serious nature
revealed from the FIR. The complaint in this case is
annexed to the FIR produced in this proceeding as
Annexure P-1. In the said complaint which led to the
registration of the FIR reads thus:--
"Hence my report may be lodged and
action may be taken against the offender xxx as
he is making pressure on me not to lodge
report."
(underline supplied)
... ... ...
2
(2024) SCC Olnline SC 3193
17
29. In the contextual situation, it is also relevant
to refer to a Three Judge Bench decision of this Court
in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan16. This Court held
that whether an FIR is quashable or not would depend
upon the facts and circumstances of each case and
while considering that question, the Court has to apply
its mind to (i) whether the crime is one against the
society or against an individual alone, nature of the
dispute, (ii) seriousness and how the crime was
committed (iii) whether offence(s) is one under a
special statute (iv) stage of proceedings and how the
accused manged to compromise with the complainant.
... ... ...
32. In the decision relied on by the High Court to
quash the proceedings viz., Gian Singh's case (supra)
and the decision in Laxmi Narayan's case (supra) in
unambiguous terms this Court held that the power
under Section 482, Cr. P.C. could not be used to quash
proceedings based on compromise if it is in respect of
heinous offence which are not private in nature and
have a serious impact on the society. When an incident
of the aforesaid nature and gravity allegedly occurred
in a higher secondary school, that too from a teacher,
it cannot be simply described as an offence which is
purely private in nature and have no serious impact on
the society."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the above mentioned case, on a compromise, the proceedings
under the POCSO Act had been quashed, notwithstanding the fact
that in the afore-quoted judgment the accused was the teacher of
the victim. The Apex Court holds that in such extreme cases, the
18
Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should
not quash the proceedings.
10. The issue in the case at hand is slightly different. In the
circumstances which shroud the present case, it becomes necessary
to notice the law laid down by the Apex Court and that of different
High Courts, permitting quashing of the proceedings on entering
into a settlement. The Apex Court in the case of K. DHANDAPANI
v. STATE BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE3 has held as follows:
"7. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this
case, we are of the considered view that the conviction and
sentence of the appellant who is maternal uncle of the
prosecutrix deserves to be set aside in view of the
subsequent events that have been brought to the notice of
this Court. This Court cannot shut its eyes to the ground
reality and disturb the happy family life of the
appellant and the prosecutrix. We have been informed
about the custom in Tamilnadu of the marriage of a
girl with the maternal uncle."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court holds that the Court cannot shut its eyes to the
ground reality and disturb the happy family life of the appellant,
3
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1056
19
who was accused No.1 and the prosecutrix on being informed that
the custom in Tamilnadu was that marriage of a girl in their custom
would be with the maternal uncle. In the said case the fact was
that the first child was born when she was 15 years and the second
child was born when she was 17 years of the age. In a later
judgment, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in the case of
DEVENDER NATH v. STATE OF U.T. CHANDIGARH4 has held as
follows:
"12. Learned Amicus Curiae further submits that the
proximity of age between the petitioner and respondent no.
2 must be given due consideration and a compassionate view
be taken considering their young age. While teenage
relationships are looked at with disdain by the society, the
law must consider their consensual nature and the human
tendency to seek companionship. In view of the same,
following suggestions are made regarding quashing of such
FIRs:
(a) Assessment of Voluntary Consent: It must be
ensured that if the alleged sexual act is claimed
to be consensual, it must emanate from a place
of volition, untainted by coercion, duress or
undue influence.
(b) Proximity in Age : Due regard must be given to
the age differential between the parties so as to
ascertain the nature of the relationship.
(c) Upholding the Best Interests of the Minors : The
welfare of the minors is the paramount
4
2024 SCC OnLine P & H 2034
20
consideration which includes their psychological
well being and prospects of a dignified future.
(d) Acknowledgment of Socio-cultural Dynamics :
An assessment of such situations must duly
consider the socio-cultural context enveloping
the relationship.
(e) Engagement with Parental or Guardian
Perspectives : The insights and apprehensions of
parents or legal guardians or absence thereof
must be judiciously considered to ensure the
relationship does not go against the best interest
of the minors.
(f) Implication of Criminal Proceedings : It must be
contemplated that the perpetuation of criminal
proceedings can incite potential stigma, social
alienation and psychological afflictions on the
minors.
(g) Mandate for Legal and Social Counseling : It is
incumbent upon the State to ensure that the
minors have been afforded comprehensive legal
and social counseling, facilitating informed
decision-making and a nuanced understanding of
legal contours and societal ramifications.
(h) Vigilance against Exploitation : No strait jacket
formula can be adopted for dealing with such
cases therefore the Courts must remain vigilant
to discern any indications of exploitation, abuse
or disparity in the relational dynamics ensuring
the relationship is rooted in mutual respect and
equality."
OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS:
14. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and
the learned Amicus Curiae and after perusing the record with
their able assistance, it transpires that the marriage
between petitioner and respondent no. 2 was
solemnised on 12.09.2022, with the blessings of their
families, when respondent no. 2 was a minor of the
21
age of 17.5 years. The couple had been blissfully
residing together and were on the family way when
respondent no. 2 went to the hospital for a check-up
on 20.02.2023. No complaints were made by
respondent no. 2 or her parents during the subsistence
of the marriage or before that. The genesis of the instant
FIR lies in the reporting of respondent no. 2's pregnancy by
the doctors under Section 19 of the POCSO Act. While the
intent behind the statutes criminalising sexual
exploitation of women, especially children is noble in
all senses of the term, it must be understood that
application of such statutes cannot be divorced from
the reality of the situation. The criminal proceedings
have wreaked havoc on the lives of the instant
petitioner and his wife. The couple also, unfortunately,
lost their newborn child in the process of securing
justice.
... ... ...
17. In the instant case, respondent no. 2 has
been happily married to the petitioner and has
categorically stated that she neither moved any
complaint nor desires further action against the
petitioner. Respondent no. 2 has attained the age of
majority and wants to continue with her matrimonial
life. If the criminal proceedings against the petitioner
allowed to continue, not only will it lead to
unnecessary incarceration of the petitioner but also
leave respondent no. 2 bereft of financial and
emotional support. Therefore, this Court is of the
considered view that justice can only be substantially
realised if the FIR in the present case is quashed, in
view of the compromise entered into between the
parties.
18. In view of the above discussion, the present
petition is allowed and FIR No. 13 dated 20.02.2023
registered under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC and
Section 6 of POCSO Act at Police Station Sarangpur,
Chandigarh and its subsequent proceedings are quashed.
However, before parting with this order, this Court
22
appreciates the valuable and effective assistance rendered by
Mr. Vaibhav Sharma, Advocate as amicus curiae."
(Emphasis supplied)
The High Court observes that the marriage between the petitioner
and the victim was solemnized on 12-09-2022 with the blessing of
their respective families at which time, the victim was a minor aged
17.5 years. The couple had been blissfully residing together and
were on the family way. When the victim goes to the hospital for
check up at which point in time, the crime emerges. There were no
complaints with the Police registered either that the daughter had
gone missing or the accused had indulged in any sexual assault.
Based upon this, permitting to lead a happy married life the High
Court accepted the settlement and quashed the proceedings against
the accused therein. It is apt here to refer to the judgment of the
High Court of Delhi in somewhat similar circumstance reported in
AMAR KUMAR v. STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI)5. The facts
obtaining are found at paragraph 4 and they read as follows:
"4. The present FIR bearing no. 0843/2020 under
sections 376/506/34 IPC & section 4 of Protection of Children
from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) at P.S.
5
2023 SCC OnLine Del 8452
23
Samaipur Badli was got registered at the instance of
respondent no. 2. It is reflecting that the petitioner no.
1 and respondent no. 2 after liking each other had
developed intimacy. The respondent no. 2 came to
know about her pregnancy with petitioner no. 1 and
subsequently delivered a child. The respondent no. 2
was stated to be a minor at the time of registration of
FIR on 21.12.2020. The statements of the respondent
no. 2 were recorded under section 161 and
section 164 Cr. P.C. wherein the respondent no. 2
primarily stated that she had a relationship with the
petitioner no. 1 out of her own free will and
subsequently came to know about her pregnancy with
the petitioner no. 1 and thereafter they got married
with each other. After conclusion of the investigation, the
charge-sheet was filed and the trial is stated to be pending in
the court of Ms. Richa Gusain Solanki, ASJ, North, Rohini
Courts, Delhi."
(Emphasis supplied)
Answering the said facts, the High Court of Delhi holds as follows:
"10. The Supreme Court regarding the quashing of FIR
registered under section 376 IPC in Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 laid down following principles:--
"57. The position that emerges from the above
discussion can be summarised thus : the power of the
High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR
or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is
distinct and different from the power given to a
criminal court for compounding the offences Under
Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide
plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be
exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in
such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii)
to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what
cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or
complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the
24
offender and victim have settled their dispute would
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case
and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the crime.
Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or
offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be
fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's
family and the offender have settled the dispute.
Such offences are not private in nature and have
serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise
between the victim and offender in relation to the
offences under special statutes like Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot
provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal
cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly
civil favour stand on different footing for the
purposes of quashing, particularly the offences
arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil,
partnership or such like transactions or the offences
arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the
family disputes where the wrong is basically private
or personal in nature and the parties have resolved
their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High
Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view,
because of the compromise between the offender and
victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and
bleak and continuation of criminal case would put
accused to great oppression and prejudice and
extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
quashing the criminal case despite full and complete
settlement and compromise with the victim. In other
words, the High Court must consider whether it
would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice
to continue with the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding would
tantamount to abuse of process of law despite
settlement and compromise between the victim and
wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice,
it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end
and if the answer to the above question(s) is in
25
affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its
jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.
... ... ...
14. The High Court should quash criminal
proceedings where possibility of conviction is remote
and bleak and continuation of criminal case is causing
great oppression and prejudice to the accused and
extreme injustice would be caused to him and to put
an end to criminal case would be appropriate. The
Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi
Narayan besides reiterating principles laid down in Gian
Singh case observed that while exercising the power under
section 482 of the Code to quash the criminal proceedings in
respect of non-compoundable offences, the High Court is
required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the
conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused was
absconding and why he was absconding, how he had
managed with the complainant to enter into a compromise,
etc. The Supreme Court in Ramgopal v. State of Madhya
Pradesh observed that the High Court after considering
peculiar facts and circumstances of a case and for justifiable
reasons can press Section 482 of the Code in aid to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court and/or to secure the ends
of justice. It was further observed that the High Court
can quash non compoundable offences after
considering nature of the offence and amicable
settlement between the concerned parties. The High
Court can evaluate the consequential effects of the
offence and need to adopt a pragmatic approach to
ensure that quashing does not paralyze the very object
of the administration of criminal justice system. It was
further observed that a restrictive construction of inherent
powers under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. may lead to rigid or
specious justice which may lead to grave injustice."
(Emphasis supplied)
26
The High Court holds that when conviction is remote and bleak,
continuation of criminal case would cause great oppression and
prejudice and, therefore, to put an end to a criminal case, it would
become appropriate to step in and quash the proceedings.
11. Further, the Delhi High Court in its recent judgment in the
case of MOEED AHAMAD v. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI6,
considering the spectrum of the law, following the judgment of the
coordinate bench therein, noticing the fact of marriage and birth of
a child has held as follows:
"6. This is a petition filed under Section 528 of BNSS
(erstwhile Section 482 of CrPC) seeking quashing of FIR No.
436/2017 registered at Police Station - Mahendra Park and
consequential proceedings emanating therefrom. The said
FIR was registered under Section 363 of IPC, and thereafter,
the chargesheet has been filed under Sections
363/365/376/368/212/506/34 of IPC and Section 4 of
POCSO Act.
7. He petitioners are present in Court and have been
identified by their counsel, Mr Lewish Edward.
8. Respondent No. 2/complainant and respondent No.
3/prosecutrix are also present in Court and have been
6
2024 SCC OnLine Del 8119
27
identified by Investigating Officer, SI Nagendra Singh, PS -
Mahendra Park.
9. The allegations in the FIR are made by the father of the
minor child that his daughter, who was aged about 16 years
on the date of the incident, had been kidnapped by the
petitioner No. 1. Subsequently, the charge-sheet was filed.
10. During the pendency of the proceedings, the parties
have arrived at a settlement dated 01.10.2024 wherein the
complainant has settled the disputes and does not wish to
prosecute the complaint/case. The prosecutrix and her father
state that it was a case of love affair. On the date of the
incident, the respondent No. 3/prosecutrix was 16 years old
and the petitioner No. 1 was 19 years old, and thereafter,
both of them got married in the year 2019 according to
Muslim rites & customs and have two minor children born out
of the wedlock.
11. The respondent No. 3/prosecutrix is 25 years old now
and states that she is living happily with the petitioner No. 1.
12. Both the parties state that they have entered into the
aforesaid settlement out of their own free will, volition and
without any threat, force, undue influence or coercion. It is
stated by the respondent Nos.
2 and 3 that they have has no objection if the aforesaid FIR
is quashed qua the petitioners.
13. Mr Sabharwal, learned APP vehemently opposes the
quashing of the said FIR on the ground that the allegations
are serious in nature being under Section 376 IPC.
14. A coordinate Bench of this Court has taken a view in the
judgment dated 25.03.2021 in CRL.M.C.1015/2021 titled
'Vikash Kumar v. The State' Relevant paragraphs read as
under:
"8. In the present case, the allegation in the FIR is that the
prosecutrix and the accused were working in the same place
and have become friends. They fell in love and were living
together for two years. The accused went to his native place
and the FIR was lodged alleging rape. The prosecutrix has
married the accused with whom she was living for two years.
28
The prosecutrix in her affidavit has affirmed the statements
made in the petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. that the
parties got married on 01.10.2020 according to Hindu Rites
and Ceremonies. Their families have accepted the marriage
and they have a child from the marriage. In the facts of the
case, continuation of the proceedings would cause immense
harm to the prosecutrix and the small child. This Court is
aware that offences like rape cannot be quashed by
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr. P.C. if a
compromise has been reached, but, at the same time,
this Court cannot ignore and overlook the welfare of
the small child and the future of the prosecutrix.
10. Mr. Raja Ram Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner has placed reliance on an order dated 07.09.2020
passed by this Court in Bitu Yadav @ Vikas Yadav v.
State(NCT of Delhi), [CRL.M.C.1761/2020], wherein this
Court has quashed the FIR where the prosecutrix and the
accused were married. Paras 17, 18 and 19 of the said order,
read as under:
"17. In view of the submissions made by the
respondent No. 2 before this Court, the respondent
No. 2 is liable to be prosecuted. However, keeping in
view the fact that the petitioner and respondent No. 2
are married and living happy married life, I hereby
refrain from taking any legal action against the
respondent No. 2. A similar view was taken by this
court in the case of Danish Ali v. State in
Crl.M.C.1727/2019.
18. Taking into account the aforesaid facts and the
fact that the petitioner and respondent No. 2 are in
love affair since 2013 and they are married, this Court
is inclined to quash FIR as no useful purpose would be
served in prosecuting petitioner any further.
19. For the reasons afore-recorded, FIR No. 384/2020
dated 31.07.2020, for the offence punishable under
Sections 376/506 IPC, registered at PS-Dwarka North,
Delhi and consequent proceedings emanating
therefrom are quashed."
(emphasis added)"
(emphasis supplied)
29
15. Further, a Coordinate bench of this Court in CRL.
M.C. 4168/2022 titled as 'Sonu @ Sunil v. State of NCT
of Delhi' vide judgment dated 26.04.2024 observed as
under:--
"26. Of late, however, the Courts are faced with
petitions where children, who are about to attain
the age of majority, in ignorance of the statutory
prohibitions and restrictions and consequences,
in the name of love, commit acts which would
otherwise amount to offence under the
provisions of the Child Marriage Act, POCSO Act,
and the IPC. Though, being minor, their consent
is immaterial, however, factually it is there. This
situation makes the Courts face with two
consequences, either to go strictly by the
mandate of the statute and convict the boy and
impose punishment on him, which is rather
severe in these statutes, or to exercise its power
under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. to protect the
otherwise innocent children/adult by quashing
the criminal proceedings. The Courts when faced
with such a dilemma, has been adopting the
route of exercising its power under Section 482
of the Cr. P.C., to quash such criminal
proceedings where it finds that the girl was
nearing the age of majority; had gone with the
boy of her own free will (though it may be
immaterial in law); is happily living with the boy,
either in matrimony or otherwise, after attaining
the age of majority; and in some circumstances
where such relationship has also resulted in
children being born. The Court, in such
circumstances, is persuaded to save the lives of
such an accused, rather than to make him
undergo trial and eventual punishment, which
would not only ruin innocent lives of the parties
to such a relationship, but may be, also of the
children that are born therefrom. In this regard,
apart from the judgments that have been cited by the
learned Amicus, I may also refer to the judgment of
the Supreme Court in Kapil Gupta v. State of NCT of
Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1030, wherein the
Supreme Court, while quashing an FIR and
30
consequential proceedings where the accused had
been charged with offence under Section 376 of the
IPC, observed as under:--
"13. It can thus be seen that this Court
has clearly held that though the Court should be
slow in quashing the proceedings wherein
heinous and serious offences are involved, the
High Court is not foreclosed from examining as
to whether there exists material for
incorporation of such an offence or as to
whether there is sufficient evidence which if
proved would lead to proving the charge for the
offence charged with. The Court has also to
take into consideration as to whether the
settlement between the parties is going to
result into harmony between them which
may improve their mutual relationship.
14. The Court has further held that it is also
relevant to consider as to what is stage of the
proceedings. It has been observed that if an
application is made at a belated stage wherein
the evidence has been led and the matter is at
the stage of arguments or judgment, the Court
should be slow to exercise the power to quash
the proceedings. However, if such an application
is made at an initial stage before
commencement of trial, the said factor will
weigh with the court in exercising its power."
27. Reference should also be had to the judgments of
this Court in Rahul Verma v. State, 2013 SCC OnLine
Del 469 and Vijay Kumar v. The State Govt. of NCT of
Delhi (judgment dated 22.05.2023 in Crl.M.C.
2153/2021)."
16. In offences under Section 376 of IPC or under
POCSO Act, the Court must be circumspect while
quashing the FIR as these are offences against
society, even when a compromise has been reached.
But at the same time, the Court cannot overlook that
both the parties i.e. respondent No. 3/prosecutrix and
petitioner No. 1 are married and have children born
31
from the wedlock. In the present case, the respondent
No. 3 who is present in Court has herself made the
statement that she wants to put a quietus to the
matter without any undue influence, threat, pressure
or coercion and out of her own free will. Further, there
is no criminal intent involved in the act and it is not a
case where there was a forceful physical relationship
with the minor child on the date of incident. The minor
child was in love with the petitioner and thereafter
they both got married and two children are stated to
be born from the wedlock."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. In view of the judgments as afore-quoted quashing the
proceedings against the accused accepting the settlement arrived at
between the parties, I deem it appropriate to notice the affidavit
filed by the 2nd respondent/victim in the case at hand. It reads as
follows:
"1) I state that I am the 2nd Respondent in the present
case. I state that the present petition has been filed by
my husband Muniraju seeking quashing of order dated
17/09/2024 and further proceedings pending before
the Learned Additional District and Sessions Judge,
FSTC-1 at Kolar in Crime No.218 of 2023 for offences
under Section 376(3) IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO
Act 2012 and Section 9 of the Prohibition of Child
Marriage Act.
2) I state that I was born on 01/06/2006. I married
Petitioner Muniraju on 14/05/2023 out of my own free
will. I state that, on 23/02/2024, a daughter named
32
Niveditha was born to me and Petitioner. Both my
parents have passed away.
3) I state that I attained majority on 01/06/2004 and
continue to remain happily married to the Petitioner. I
state that the Petitioner takes very good care of we
and our daughter. I state that the Petitioner is the sole
breadwinner of the family.
4) I state that continuance of criminal proceedings will
cause great inconvenience and injustice to me and my
family members. I state that future of our daughter
will also be in serious jeopardy if my husband is
prosecuted in the above-mentioned criminal
proceedings. I state that I am swearing this affidavit
out of my own free will. There is no fraud, coercion,
misrepresentation and inducement for filing the
present affidavit before the Hon'ble Court.
WHEREFORE, it is most humbly and respectfully prayed that
this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to take this affidavit on
record and quash the proceedings against my husband."
In the affidavit afore-quoted, the victim clearly admits that she is
leading a happy life with the petitioner along with their child and
she has no objection to close the proceedings. In view of the same,
I deem it appropriate to accept the affidavit filed by the 2nd
respondent-victim/wife and close the proceedings against the
petitioner/husband, the sole accused.
33
13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Writ Petition is allowed.
(ii) Proceedings in Spl.C.(POCSO) 142 of 2024 pending on
the file of Additional District and Sessions Judge, FTSC-
1, Kolar stands quashed qua the petitioner.
(iii) It is made clear that the proceedings against the
petitioner is quashed solely on the affidavit of the wife.
In the event he would leave the wife in the lurch, unless
for justifiable reasons, these proceedings would get
revived.
Sd/-
______________________
JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
BKP
CT-ASC